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Deutsche Zusammenfassung 
Wie jede Technologie, die vom Forschungsgegenstand zum Massenprodukt weiterent-
wickelt wird, birgt auch automatisiertes Fahren verschiedenste Vor- und Nachteile. 
Besonders die Frage der Sicherheit (Safety) der unterschiedlichen Stakeholder in der 
Gesellschafft ist zu beantworten. Obwohl aktuell eine Vielzahl von Forschern und Ent-
wicklern an der Thematik des automatisierten Fahrens arbeiten, fehlt dennoch ein Kon-
zept zur Bewertung der Sicherheit des öffentlichen Straßenverkehrs mit automatisiert 
fahrenden Fahrzeugen. 
Diese Arbeit schlägt ein solches Konzept zur Bewertung der Sicherheit vor. Das Kon-
zept nimmt eine makroskopische Perspektive für die Sicherheitsbewertung ein, indem 
die Sicherheit des automatisierten Fahrens durch eine gefahrene Distanz und dabei 
aufgetretene Ereignisse (z.B. Unfälle) beschrieben wird. Dabei wird angenommen, dass 
die Verteilung der Ereignisse einer Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilung für seltene diskrete 
Ereignisse folgt (Poisson-Verteilung). Der statistische Sicherheitsnachweis kann für 
aktuell bekannte Use-Cases des automatisierten Fahrens nicht wirtschaftlich erbracht 
werden. Besser zu sein als der heutige Straßenverkehr entspricht einer Sicherheitsanfor-
derung, die mit dem heutigen Stand der Technik nicht bewiesen werden kann. Aller-
dings ist auch nicht nachzuweisen, dass der heutige Straßenverkehr an Sicherheit einbü-
ßen würde, wenn das automatisierte Fahrzeug sich ähnlich sicher wie Fahranfänger 
verhalten würde. 
Da beides nicht nachgewiesen werden kann, ist die Sicherheitsanforderung zu verfei-
nern. Aus einer werden damit zwei Anforderungen: 1. Der Nutzer des automatisierten 
Fahrens fordert eine objektive Abschätzung der geringsten Sicherheit, der er bei Nut-
zung ausgesetzt wird. 2. Die Gesellschaft fordert, dass maximal eine zuvor definierte 
akzeptable Anzahl an Ereignissen in Verbindung mit automatisiertem Fahren entsteht. 
Das formalisierte, simulierte und ausgewertete Konzept nutzt Daten des heutigen Stra-
ßenverkehrs, sowie fiktive Testdaten um die Erfüllung beider Anforderungen sicherzu-
stellen. Eine konkrete Einführungsstrategie ist das Ergebnis, die gezielt die Nutzung des 
automatisierten Fahrens limitiert und neu anfallende Informationen aus der Nutzung für 
eine iterative Anpassung der Limitierung einsetzt. Ein bestärkender Lernzyklus entsteht. 
Herausforderungen für die Anwendung und Weiterentwicklung des Konzepts werden 
diskutiert. Damit das beschriebene Konzept die Einführung automatisierten Fahrens 
unterstützt, sind vor allem zwei Themen in Zukunft zu bearbeiten: 1. Die Sammlung 
von detaillierten Daten für die Anwendung des Konzepts auf konkrete Use-Cases. 
2. Die Beantwortung einer unausweichlichen Frage: Wie viel Schaden, hervorgerufen 
durch automatisiertes Fahren, ist akzeptabel für Menschen, die der Technologie ausge-
setzt sind? 
 XV 
 
Summary 
Status Quo: Automated systems will replace the human operator at different tasks in 
everyday life. From today’s perspective, these new technologies offer predicted but also 
unknown benefits. However, as every other new technology, also automated systems 
will have drawbacks for some stakeholders in our society. As long as new technologies 
are within readiness levels of research, their impact is mostly negligible. The technology 
readiness level of automated driving in road traffic is pushed forward strongly by many 
researchers and developers all over the world. Consequently, the demand for safety 
assurance gets urgent. From today’s perspective, a concept that evaluates the safety of 
automated driving in an affordable and meaningful way is missing. However, this con-
cept is necessary to enable the introduction of automated driving to public road traffic. 
Objectives: The objective of this thesis is to improve the understanding of the challenge 
for safety assurance on automated vehicles. Therefore a concept is aimed for, that esti-
mates the safety impact for the stakeholders of automated driving. Estimations are 
always based on assumptions and suffer from uncertainty. For that reason the concept 
needs to consider and express the underlying assumptions and uncertainties.  
Methodology: The methodology for reaching the objectives is formed around the core 
assumption of the concept: The safety of an Object under Test (OuT) can be described 
by the parameter of a probability distribution. This parameter connects the number of 
events   that result from driving a distance   with the safety performance of the OuT 
     . 
Based on this core assumption a model for safety evaluation is developed iteratively 
(see Figure 1). First of all the relevant stakeholders that are influenced by the technolo-
gy are identified and analyzed. The second step identifies measurable requirements for 
the safety of automated vehicles from the stakeholder’s perspectives. Based on this 
preliminary work on the one hand a usage strategy is defined that controls the introduc-
tion of automated vehicles. On the other hand an examination strategy is developed to 
evaluate whether this strategy enables the automation to meet the requirements. In step 
four the usage strategy is examined for the Autobahn automation being one representa-
tive use case. The results, meaning testing effort and introduction possibilities, are 
compared and discussed. A refinement of stakeholders as well as requirements is per-
formed. Such a refinement is necessary as only a more precise and subtle analysis will 
lead to a share between efforts and benefits of the introduction of automated vehicles 
that forms a basis for the discussion on the safety assurance challenge. 
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Results: The results of the thesis can be grouped into four mayor insights.  
Firstly, the number of rare events like accidents can be handled as being a product of a 
random experiment that depends on a safety performance of a traffic participant and the 
number of driven kilometers. From today’s perspective a falsification of this approach 
was not found and thus builds a simple first approach. Secondly, the statistical proof of 
safety based on real-world driving is not economically feasible before mass application 
of the automated vehicle. Thirdly, refinement of the requirements is necessary and 
justifiable to reduce the safety requirements. Splitting up the requirements of society 
and vehicle users leads to reduced testing efforts and an uncertainty-based usage strate-
gy. This uncertainty most likely will reduce during usage, thus also enabling a statistical 
statement on safety at one point in future. Lastly, a method consisting of evaluation 
criteria as well as an introduction simulation is developed to examine proposed usage 
strategies. Thereby the possible safety impacts of the usage are studied. 
Conclusion: As the safety of automated driving cannot be proven statistically before 
introduction, the introduction needs to be performed despite and under consideration of 
an estimated uncertainty. This does not mean that the introduced vehicles are less safe 
compared to their benchmark; however during introduction it will be uncertain.  
As long as the uncertainty stays above a threshold a usage strategy that is included into 
the safety assurance concept is necessary. Such a usage strategy would be cautious and 
based on regular observation of the events encountered by introduced vehicles. 
Several challenges have been identified for the developed introduction concept of auto-
mated vehicles. Based on these challenges further work should mainly address two 
topics: 1. The identification and collection of data that is necessary for concept applica-
tion. 2. The answer of an unavoidable question: How much harm, caused by a human-
built machine (AD3+), is acceptable for the exposed humans? 
  
Figure 1 Modeling methodology 
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1 Introduction: The Assessment of Auto-
mated Systems  
Q 1  Should automated driving be used on public streets? 
In 1886, the first motor vehicle called “Benz Patent-Motorwagen Nummer 1“ drove1 on 
public streets. A controversial discussion was held whether this new technology should 
be introduced or not.
 
The supporters of the technology enforced the benefits of usage. 
Thereupon the automobile was introduced as a commercial (mass
2
) product and got 
available for many people. Today the automobile affects people worldwide and changed 
the individual mobility persistently. In the 21
st
 century many new technologies are 
reaching a technology readiness level
3
 that again requires the discussion whether these 
technologies should be introduced as commercial mass products or not.  
Automated driving (find the definition in section 1.1) is one of these technologies. 
Approximately 80 years went by from the first concrete idea
4
 on self-driving cars until 
experts
5
 predict the technology reaching a technology readiness level (TRL) beyond 
research (TRL 4). Interviews with representatives of vehicle manufacturers present their 
confidence that “we will have complete autonomy in approximately two years”6. Today 
the stakeholders that will then be affected by automated driving could still discuss 
whether they want this effect or not. Actually they should discuss that, because auto-
mated driving, like most other technologies
7
, will not as a matter of course come only 
with benefits. Gasser et al.
8
 graphically explain this uncertain outcome of a new tech-
nology for the example of safety. 
                                                 
1
 Fersen, O. v.: Ein Jahrhundert Automobiltechnik (1986), p. 16f. https://www.2025ad.com/mission/-
welcome-to-2025ad/mission-statement/ accessed 24.09.2016 
2
 Volti, R.: Cars and culture: The life story of a technology (2006), p. 23. 
3
 European Commission: Technology readiness levels (2014).  
4
 Kröger, F.: AD im gesellschaftsgeschichtlichen Kontext (2015), p. 64. 
5
 ERTRAC: Automated Driving Roadmap (2015), p. 35–37. 
6
 Kirsten Korosec: Interview Elon Musk (2015).. Other vehicle manufacturers or suppliers aren’t that 
optimistic. But from the stand point of safety assessment this is taken as the worst because nearest in 
future case. 
7
 Grunwald, A.: Technikfolgenabschätzung - eine Einführung (2010), p. 23. 
8
 Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeugautomatisierung (2012), p. 11. 
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Figure 2 illustrates that on the one hand accidents will be prevented by the introduction 
of automated driving. On the other hand other probably different accidents will be 
produced by the risk of automation. Consequently, there might be benefits but also 
drawbacks following the introduction of automated vehicles. How does the ratio be-
tween benefits and drawbacks look like? 
The goal of this thesis is to support the discussion on the introduction of higher auto-
mated vehicles by delivering concrete inputs for the weighting process of some of the 
most important pros and cons. The train of thoughts that is described in the following 
thesis explains basic principles to deliver these concrete inputs.  
Train of Thoughts - Structure of this Thesis 
In six chapters the challenge of weighting pros and cons of automated driving will be 
narrowed down to safety. This safety challenge will be described by statistical consider-
ations. Its results are going to be interpreted and discussed critically. 
The current chapter (“Introduction: The Assessment of Automated Systems”) starts to 
define automated driving and thereby separates it from levels of automation that are 
already in use. Additionally, the chapter clarifies, which part of the assessment of auto-
mated vehicles is in focus and which perspectives are therefore considered. 
Chapter 2 “State of the Art: Challenges of Today’s Approach to Assess Automated 
Driving’s Safety” explains why automated driving challenges today’s approaches to 
assess safety. This chapter asks for new methods and tools for safety assessment of 
automated driving.  
Chapter 3 ”Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment” describes the main new 
contribution to research. A new concept for the safety assessment of automated vehicles 
despite given uncertainties is explained and discussed in detail. Conclusions for differ-
ent concept parameter combinations are drawn from the simulation of introduction. 
Chapter 4 “Application: Data to Apply the Usage Strategy” analyses the suitability of 
existing databases for the application of the model. Requirements are defined on data 
that is supposed to be used for application of the usage strategy. 
Figure 2: Theoretical potential for avoiding accidents with vehicle automation
8
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Chapter 5 “Consequences: The Safety Lifecycle of AD3+” reflects how the presented 
stochastic concept for safety assessment affects the safety lifecycle of automated vehi-
cles. Not only the phase before the start of production but also the other phases during 
usage are discussed. 
Chapter 6 “Conclusion: Critical Concept Reflection” discusses the introduction chal-
lenges based on the presented concept. What needs to be done to apply the concept and 
what might be the result? An outlook will then conclude this thesis. 
To simplify the understanding and highlight the necessity of each section a question 
driven approach is used. Each chapter and first level section answers one question that 
is of relevance for the train of thoughts. This question is explicitly stated at the begin-
ning of each chapter. At the end of chapter 6 a conclusion is drawn on the meaning of 
this thesis to answer: “Q 1 Should automated driving be used on public streets?” 
1.1 Automated Systems 
Q 2  What technology is the topic of discussion? What is automated driving? 
In principle any field of safety-related automation could be addressed. Whenever auto-
mation replaces the human as a machine operator the questions discussed in this thesis 
get relevant. The questions discussed in this thesis are of special interest when the task 
is safety critical and an unsupervised/non-correctable automation
9
 is installed. Neverthe-
less due to the motivation given above and the personal interest, this work focuses on 
on-road motor vehicles and the automation of their driving task.  
Automated vehicles, automated driving, driverless driving, automated driving tasks are 
mainly not defined properly. Whenever these words are used in this thesis, they are used 
in place for the automated driving systems defined by the Society of Automotive Engi-
neers (SAE). By definition
10
 several levels of driving automation exist. These levels
11
 
are distinguished as depicted in Figure 3. At level zero the human driver executes steer-
ing and acceleration of the vehicle, monitors the environment and is the fallback solu-
tion for all driving modes. By further increasing the level of automation, the system 
performs more tasks of the human. The word “system” describes an entity of mechani-
                                                 
9
 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: Do Autonomous Vehicles Learn? (2016), p. 457–458.; cf. Nusser, S.: 
Diss., (2009), p. 21–22. 
10
 SAE: International Standard J3016 (2014).; Gasser, T. M. et al.: Rechtsfolgen zunehmender Fahrzeug-
automatisierung (2012).; NTHSA: Preliminary Statement of Policy Concerning Automated Vehicles 
(2013).; VDA: Automatisierung (2015). 
11
 The SAE: International Standard J3016 (2014). level are used as the reference. 
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cal, electrical and electronic hard- and software elements, which senses, thinks and acts 
like an artificial driver. 
 
Systems up to level 2 are already in traffic
12
. The definition
11
 requires that these systems 
are supervised by the human driver. The human has to monitor the driving environment 
and he also is obliged to intervene if necessary. At least until today, these systems, that 
are made to support and do not replace the driver, were successfully tested and sold to 
customers. 
Vehicle systems that monitor the driving environment itself, without the human as a 
supervisor, do not exist on public streets today. Exactly these systems, beginning from 
level 3-Conditional Automation, are in focus of the theory that is explained in the next 
chapters. For this thesis the relevant levels of automated driving systems are called 
AD3+. 
These levels of automation describe only some characteristics of the new technology. 
But for discussing whether an introduction should be prevented or aimed for, the de-
tailed application of technology is relevant. The so-called use cases
13
 of the technology 
                                                 
12
 Bernhart, W. et al.: Index "Automatisierte Fahrzeuge" (2016), p. 5–6.; Winner, H. et al.: Handbook of 
Driver Assistance Systems (2016), p. 917 - 1396 of part VIII-IX. 
13
 Wachenfeld, W. et al.: Use Cases for Autonomous Driving (2016).  
Figure 3: SAE-level for On-Road Motor Vehicle Automated Driving Systems
11 
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can vary in a wide range and so can the benefits and drawbacks of the technology. If, for 
example, automated driving is applied to a slowly driving vehicle that serves as a cam-
pus shuttle, benefits and drawbacks are different ones than those of a privately owned 
car equipped with automated highway driving. 
Literature describes many different use cases that could sooner or later become reality. 
Winner
14
 structures the different use cases along three dominant introduction paths. One 
path starts at simple scenarios and reaches vehicle automation with the use case “Auto-
bahn Pilot”. The second path starts with low speed and develops to the first use case 
being the “automated valet-parking”. The third orthogonal path addresses critical situa-
tions and will come to the first automated system by the so-called “emergency automa-
tion”. To challenge the theory developed during the following chapters, one representa-
tive use case along each of the three paths will be discussed and therefore be introduced 
in the following.  
Figure 4: Evolution to automated driving, beginning with three starting points in the corners of 
the figure
14
 
Besides the evolutionary approach following the triangle, there exist additional possibil-
ities to increase the availability of automated driving successively within each path. 
Representative projects which follow this approach can be found at Google Inc.
15
 or 
Volvo Car Corporation
16
. The availability of automated driving will firstly be limited to 
                                                 
14
 Winner, H.: ADAS, Quo Vadis? (2016), p. 1577ff. 
15
 https://www.google.com/selfdrivingcar/ accessed 24.09.2016 
16
 http://www.volvocars.com/intl/about/our-innovation-brands/intellisafe/intellisafe-autopilot/drive-me 
accessed 24.09.2016 
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a narrow area or circumstances. This could be a certain section of highways or infra-
structure in general, like the roads from San Francisco to Palo Alto in sunny California 
or around the inner city of Gothenburg. A fourth use case, the “Seed Automation”, is 
introduced to study the applicability of the developed theory for this kind of use cases as 
well (see section 1.1.4).  
1.1.1 Use Case - Autobahn Pilot17 
The driving robot takes over the driving task of the driver exclusively on interstates or 
interstate-like expressways (Autobahn). The driver is just a passenger during the auto-
mated journey, can take his/her hands off of the steering wheel, feet off the pedals, and 
can pursue other activities. 
As soon as the driver has entered the Autobahn, he/she can, if desired, activate the 
driving robot. This takes place most logically in conjunction with indicating the desired 
destination. The driving robot takes over navigation, guidance, and control
18
 until the 
exit from or end of the Autobahn is reached. The driving robot safely coordinates the 
handover to the driver. If the driver does not meet the requirements for safe handover, 
e.g. because he/she fell asleep or appears to have no situation awareness, the driving 
robot transfers the vehicle to the risk-minimal state on the emergency lane or shortly 
after exiting the Autobahn. During the automated journey, no situation awareness is 
required from the occupant; the definition for high automation according to SAE
19
 
applies. Because of simple scenery and limited dynamic objects, this use case is consid-
ered as an introductory scenario, even if the comparatively high vehicle velocity exac-
erbates accomplishing the risk-minimal state considerably. 
1.1.2 Use Case - Automated Valet-Parking17 
The driving robot parks the vehicle at a remote location after the passengers have exited 
and cargo has been unloaded. The driving robot drives the vehicle from the parking 
location to a desired destination. The driving robot re-parks the vehicle. 
The driver saves the time of finding a parking spot as well as of walking to/from a 
remote parking spot. In addition, access to the vehicle is eased (spatially and temporal-
ly). Additional parking space and search for parking is arranged more efficiently. 
If a driver has reached his/her destination (for example place of work, gym, or home), 
he/she stops the vehicle, exits, and orders the driving robot to park the vehicle. The 
                                                 
17
 Wachenfeld, W. et al.: Use Cases for Autonomous Driving (2016). 
18
 Cf. Donges, E.: Fahrerverhaltensmodelle (2011). 
19
 SAE: International Standard J3016 (2014). 
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vehicle can be privately owned, but might also be owned by a car-sharing provider or in 
general possession might change due to other business models. Therefore, the driving 
robot may now drive the vehicle to a private, public, or service-provider-owned parking 
lot. It is important to assign a parking lot to the driving robot. The search for the respec-
tive parking lot by the driving robot is not taken into consideration for this use case. 
Therefore a defined destination for the driving robot is always given. Because of the 
low velocity and the light traffic situation, the deployment of automated Valet-Parking is 
limited to the immediate vicinity of the location where the driver left the vehicle. This 
limitation reduces the requirements regarding the (driving-) capabilities of the driving 
robot significantly, because lower kinetic energy as well as shorter stopping distances 
result from lower velocity.  
An authorized user in the vicinity of the vehicle can indicate a pick-up location to the 
driving robot. The driving robot drives the vehicle to the target destination and stops, so 
that the driver can enter and take over the driving task. If desired by the parking lot 
administration, the driving robot can re-park the vehicle. 
1.1.3 Use Case - Emergency Automation 
A human is driving the vehicle in regular situations. The emergency automation only 
intervenes in that moment when 9X % of human drivers would get into an emergency 
situation. Steering, braking, and accelerating the vehicle are the intervention options of 
the driving robot. The emergency automation is not limited to any area of application 
but to situations of high risk. Although the driving robot can handle situations of high 
risk, it is not made to drive the vehicle from A to B.  
The difference between existing emergency assistants and the described emergency 
automation is the share of true-positive actions in respect to all actions. Today’s sys-
tems, as they assist humans, can have a low number of true-positive actions. Figure 5 
explains this by depicting a characteristic receiver operating characteristic (ROC). The 
 
Figure 5: A best guess of an ROC for Emergency Assist vs. Emergency Automation 
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human compensates or just doesn’t benefit as much as possible from the assistant sys-
tem. The emergency automation however aims to reach a true-positive level that can 
compete with the upper percentile of human drivers without excessively showing false-
positive reactions. 
This automation aims to be active in every scenario and area in regular traffic. 
1.1.4 Use Case - Seed Automation 
The word “Seed Automation” is defined for the first time in this thesis. The automation 
is applied like a seed/a first starting point, which needs to grow along different dimen-
sions to reach the full benefits of the described use cases. The dimension might be the 
area of application, the tolerated weather conditions for application etc. 
For example, the seed automation drives the vehicle in a narrow operation area of one of 
the above defined use cases. For example the Drive Me Project
20
 aims to apply an Au-
tobahn Pilot to a predefined road segment (approx.      ) that limits speed (average 
speeds of 70 km/h) and other dynamic objects (no pedestrians). Additionally for the 
beginning, the functions will be limited to certain, eventually good, weather conditions. 
The selected road segment is a closed loop from Hisingen, Frölunda to Mölndal. 
The Drive Me Project has not reported whether the segment for application will be 
enlarged. However, the Seed Automation use case assumes this. The spatial evolution of 
the Autobahn Pilot is simplified and depicted in Figure 6. The use case starts between 
two Autobahn junctions. From time step to time step this area is extended. 
a) Time Step 1 b) Time Step 2 
                                                 
20
 http://www.volvocars.com/intl/about/our-innovation-brands/intellisafe/intellisafe-autopilot/drive-me 
accessed 24.09.2016 
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c) Time Step 3 d) Time Step 4 
Figure 6 Evolutionary growth of the seed automation at a road-net of highways at four time 
steps a) to d). Green areas are open for automated driving, yellow areas are under examination. 
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1.2 Benefits & Drawbacks of AD3+ 
Q 3 What benefits and drawbacks result and thus support or prevent the introduction 
of AD3+? 
The manifold the use cases of automated driving are, the manifold are their benefits and 
drawbacks. This section will not list benefits and drawbacks for automated driving. 
There exist many publications
21
 and public discussions
22
 that to greater or lesser extent 
systematically derive possible pros and cons. Of importance is the fact that many bene-
fits and drawbacks could result from the introduction and these benefits and drawbacks 
are strongly interconnected. Thus, simply deriving requirements from one type of draw-
back without checking and evaluating other types of benefits is not valid. The decision 
on introduction can thus not be made based on one specific benefit. Examples for 
weighting different benefits and drawbacks exist in the mobility sector of today’s public 
traffic. To go from one place to another different alternatives are accessible: walk, ride a 
bike or a motorbike, drive a car or truck, use an autobus, and go by train, boat or plane. 
Each modality has its own pros and cons and consequently is accepted for mobility 
demands. If just one criterion would be used for decision some forms of mobility would 
just not exist. The balance of different criteria leads to the decision of introduction. 
The critical point of making a decision about the introduction is to clearly identify the 
benefits and drawbacks. Benefits and drawbacks can easily be speculated about. But 
most of them are not as easy to predict as it is often done. Especially when a technology 
or product does not exist, the exact definition of what will happen after the introduction 
is just not possible. The goal of this thesis is to participate on the research question on 
how to predict one of the crucial effects of automated driving. A new approach for 
predicting the safety impact resulting from the introduction and use of automated driv-
ing is the core of this thesis.  
                                                 
21
 Fraedrich, E. et al.: Transition pathways to fully automated driving (2015)., Thomopoulos, N.; Givoni, 
M.: The autonomous car—a blessing or a curse (2015)., Gurney, J. K.: Sue my car not me (2013)., 
Beiker, S. A.: Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving (2012)., Litman, T.: Autonomous Vehicle Im-
plementation Predictions (2014).; EU Transport Ministers: Declaration of Amsterdam (2016). 
22
 http://www.statetechmagazine.com/article/2014/09/pros-and-cons-driverless-cars-infographic;   
http://www.autoinsurancecenter.com/top-20-pros-and-cons-associated-with-self-driving-cars.htm; 
https://sites.google.com/site/unibathautonomouscars/services ; http://www.gizmag.com/pros-and-cons-
driverless-cars-traffic-future/35841/; http://www.itsinternational.com/categories/location-based-
systems/features/autonomous-vehicles-the-pros-and-cons/;https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-
switch/wp/2016/02/05/why-you-should-consider-getting-a-driverless-car-in-1-chart/; Hearing focus of 
SF 2569 Autonomous vehicles task force establishment and demonstration project for people with dis-
abilities http://mnsenate.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=1&clip_id=235 all last accessed 
22.09.2016 
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As safety in its general meaning is still a topic with many facets
23
: 
Safety is the state of being "safe" (from French sauf), the condition of being protect-
ed against physical, social, spiritual, financial, political, emotional, occupational, 
psychological, educational, or other types or consequences of failure, damage, error, 
accidents, harm, or any other event that could be considered non-desirable. 
In the technical domain of road traffic it is already narrowed down to
24
 
absence of unreasonable risk 
with risk beeing
24
 the 
combination of the probability of occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm 
and harm is explained as
24
 
physical injury or damage to the health of people. 
This thesis explicitly concentrates on the safety that is described by the number and 
severity of road accidents where the word road accident describes the physical energy 
exchange of one vehicle with another vehicle, pedestrian, animal, road debris, infra-
structure, or nature in general. Such an accident results property damage, injuries, or 
fatalities. This chosen focus excludes security
25
 from the discussion, although security 
issues can also result in safety issues. 
Nearly every motivation for automated driving argues that the human being is the cause 
for 9  % of today’s accidents26 in road traffic. It is concluded when we remove this 
human driver we will reduce the number of accidents. Of course it is true that the num-
bers caused by human errors will vanish. But there is missing one major step in the 
logic to compare the numbers. Someone, or rather something, has to conduct the vehicle 
thus take over this challenging job. As Figure 2 motivates, this can result in new and 
other cases of accidents. Consequently, if one will use safety as an argument for intro-
duction, pros but also cons have to be identified, estimated and balanced carefully
27
. 
Figure 7 illustrates the theoretical risk avoidance potential in a qualitative way, depend-
ing on the severity of the accident. Figure 7 adheres to the findings of Heinrich
28
 and 
                                                 
23
 Wikipedia: Safety (2015). 
24
 ISO: DIS 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2008), p. 1ff in part 1. 
25
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/ defines security:”The safety of a state or organization against 
criminal activity such as terrorism, theft, or espionage” whereas safety:”The condition of being pro-
tected from or unlikely to cause danger, risk, or injury” accessed 24.09.2016 
26
 U.S. DOT: Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (2016), p. 5. Singh, S.: Critical Reasons for Crashes 
(2015), p. 1. 
27
 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations for Autonomous Driving. (2016).  
28
 Ward, R. B.: Revisiting Heinrich's law (2012). 
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Hydén
29
 that accidents of decreasing severity occur in larger numbers. The scale of the 
related severity of the accident is ordinal, meaning that there is clearly an order between 
the different degrees of severity: For example, a fatality is weighted as graver than a 
serious injury. However, academics are divided
30
 on the way how to derive and apply 
the relative weighting of these different degrees. While degrees of severity are com-
pared in terms of costs, this scale gets continuous. 
Figure 7 Theoretical potential for avoiding accidents with vehicle automation with considera-
tion of severity of accident (similar to Gasser et al. see Figure 2) 
Considering the severity and the number of accidents, it shows that while accidents are 
removed (Figure 7 green area), there are remaining ones (Figure 7 blue area) which are 
not addressed by vehicle automation. In addition, new accidents are created by the 
substitution of humans and the automated execution of the driving. The human is no 
longer available as a backup in the case of a failure or a defect. The yellow area in 
Figure 7 illustrates these additional numbers. It is uncertain whether the removal of 
accidents and the creation of additional ones are uniform across the degrees of severity. 
It is possible that there is a greater reduction in serious accidents but an increase in less 
serious accidents. Figure 7 illustrates this idea via the deformation of the assumed trian-
gle.  
For the safety assessment of fully-automated driving, this means that not only a reduc-
tion in the number of accidents must be proven, but rather an accepted ratio      be-
tween avoided risk      and additionally caused risk     . 
 
     
    
    
 (1-1) 
The value for this accepted ratio is the result of a complex discussion among those who 
would be affected by automated driving. This value varies depending on various factors 
such as societal, political and economic differences. A vivid example of this is the ac-
                                                 
29
 Hydén, C.: The development of a method for traffic safety evaluation (1987). 
30
 Baum, H. et al.: BASt: Volkswirtschaftliche Kosten Herleitung (2011), p. 7–10. 
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ceptance of the use of nuclear energy in Germany, the USA, or Japan in the last years: 
On the one hand, the accepted ratio varies considerably between the countries, and on 
the other, this changes over time, so that for example in Germany in 2012, a nuclear 
phase-out was decided on. For that reason later in this document one possible approach 
to derive a value for what could be acceptable is derived. However, this thesis is not 
able to state the final value. Something accepted is nothing that can be defined by some 
stakeholders. A discussion on what it means when people accept a new technology can 
be found in Fraedrich et al.
31
. It is the discussion of something acceptable that is in 
focus. 
Risk as the opposite of safety
32
 contains three central semantic elements following 
Grunwald
33
: 
The moment of uncertainty, because the occurrence of possible damage is not cer-
tain; the moment of the undesired, because damage is never welcome; and the social 
moment, because both opportunities and risks are always distributed and are always 
opportunities and risks for particular individuals or groups. 
Before it can be answered what quantitative benefits and drawbacks by means of safety 
will result when introducing automated driving, the taken perspectives need to be identi-
fied. 
1.3 Societal Risk Constellation
33
 
Q 4 Whose health or property is affected by the introduction of automated driving? 
Every human is affected
33
 individually by technology. To discuss the introduction of a 
new technology certain groupings need to be identified that hold similar characteristics. 
There exists a certain social risk constellation, for instance different groupings like 
decision-makers, regulators, stakeholders, affected parties, advisors, politicians and 
beneficiaries are affected and profit in a different way from automated driving
34
. As 
discussed above, this thesis will focus on the safety aspect that is connected with the 
occurrence of accidents. Thus, a certain physical proximity to a vehicle is necessary to 
be affected of automated driving. The ones that are in this proximity are called the 
                                                 
31
 Fraedrich, E.; Lenz, B.: Societal and Individual Acceptance of Autonomous Driving (2016). 
32
 Safety is defined by the absence of unreasonable risks. ISO 26262 But cf. Smith, B. W.: Regulation and 
the Risk of Inaction (2015). p.595f 
33
 To get a more detailed discussion on this topic the chapter of Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constella-
tions for Autonomous Driving. (2016). should be read.  
34
 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations for Autonomous Driving. (2016). discusses different risks: 
accident, transportation system, investment, labor market , accessibility, privacy and dependency risk 
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affected parties and are in focus of this discussion. One vehicle driven in one street 
doesn’t directly influence the safety of someone being in the neighboring street. This is 
different for a technology like nuclear plants or the like. One major nuclear plant acci-
dent does affect everyone in its greater vicinity. Consequently, no systemic risk results 
from one vehicle being driven automated. 
When introducing more than one vehicle, this does not change. To be affected of the 
technology, one needs to be in the direct vicinity of a vehicle. But when connecting 
vehicles via network (V2X) the potential exists that cybercriminals could conquer con-
trol of all connected vehicles. Thereby they could create an effect similar to a systemic 
risk by initiating a crash of all vehicles at once. This is, in first place, a security issue, 
which is excluded from the discussion within this thesis. This exclusion is mainly based 
on the assumption that all safety-related functions are independent from communication 
and are designed to be diverse, thus not attackable at once. Additionally, a controlled 
shutdown of automated functions is expected in case any systemic risk gets obvious. 
Consequently the risk constellation in means of accidents is similar to the risk constella-
tion of other modalities of individual mobility today. In general there exist different risk 
categories and Grunwald defines
34
: 
Risks that the individual can decide to take or not,  
imposed risks that the individual can reasonably easily avoid,  
imposed risks that can only be avoided with considerable effort and 
imposed risks that cannot be avoided. 
These different risk categories divide the affected parties into two different groupings. 
On the one hand there are active users or passengers. They are individuals that can 
decide whether or not to take the risk that arises from automated driving vehicles. On 
the other hand there are other traffic participants or bystanders that are imposed with 
risks that they cannot avoid or could avoid only with significant limitations
34
. This 
second group will be called the exposed society, as nearly everybody in developed 
countries participates in traffic. For Germany
35
 2013, the participation in traffic is above 
92 %. 
During the introduction of a new technology these two groups are also distinguishable 
due to the risk level they are confronted with. Risk is defined
36
 by the product of the 
probability of the accident occurring and the expected loss in case of the accident. For 
the individual of the group user and the individual of the group society the factor proba-
bility of occurrence differs significantly. During the whole operating time the user is in 
                                                 
35
 Streit, T. et al.: Deutsches Mobilitätspanel Bericht 2013/2014 (2015), p. 33. 
36
 ISO: DIS 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2008). 
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direct vicinity to the automated vehicle (as long as it is not driving without a passenger), 
thus the user has the highest exposure. If something happens he is involved. On the 
other side an individual of the society is nearly never exposed to an automated vehicle 
as long as their number is little. Even a person who is commuting between the same 
buildings like a user of an automated vehicle will have a little exposure. Presupposed 
both persons do not strictly follow each other 1/100 of their commutes. In this case an 
exposure smaller than 1 % of the average operating time of the automated vehicle re-
sults for the individual of the society. The active user is highly exposed and the individ-
ual of the society is little exposed to the technology of automated driving during the 
first phase of introduction, hence the level of risk of both groups is significantly differ-
ent. This will be formalized further in the next subsections. 
It is assumed that the share of benefits of automated driving is divided in a similar 
manner as the risks. The user will be the one that benefits most
37
 from the functionality 
of automated driving. Whereas the society will probably gain not as much as the indi-
vidual from the technology applied to some vehicles during the first phase of introduc-
tion. The formulation used here is vague as it is difficult to predict the real benefit that 
comes with automated driving. The share that is described above is intentionally used as 
a worst-case scenario. The benefits meet the group that can decide to take the risks 
whereas the group that is exposed to risks without the possibility to avoid them is nearly 
without benefits. 
The groups identified above could easily be subdivided. Users could for example be 
regular drivers, excluded ones from individual mobility, like elderly, inebriated or sick 
people. The acceptance of each of these groups is of relevance if they should use the 
vehicle. Though, their acceptance depends on all their benefits and drawbacks as well as 
on individual values of each individual. The individual acceptance cannot be construct-
ed externally. However, for developers, decision-makers and regulators the require-
ments on safety need to be derived from normatively expected acceptance i.e. the ac-
ceptability of the risks. Therefore these two groups, users and society, are defined as the 
equivalence groups for safety characteristics and are further discussed in the next chap-
ters. 
  
                                                 
37
 It is not a given thing that the user is the one benefiting most. Think about an automated transportation 
service that replaces regular taxis. If saved costs would not be passed on to the user, he or she might 
not benefit at all compared to regular taxi usage. The beneficiary would be the organization running 
the service. 
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1.4 Possible Safety Impact of AD3+ 
Q 5 What safety impact may result from the introduction of automated driving? 
There exists an interview with Matt Schwall from 2016, speaking for Tesla Motors. He 
says (translated into English): 
We reached a point, where we can prove that autonomous vehicles are safer than 
human.
38
 
How Schwall measures this safety and what he means by “autonomous vehicles” is 
unclear. In a publication from 1998 Binfet-Kull et al.
39
 define a guideline: 
A vehicle, which is able to drive without human intervention (autonomous) by use of 
electronic equipment, shall not entail a hazard to human beings and/or property 
which is greater than the hazard represented by the conventional (human) driver! 
Furthermore, the requirement is defined, that the machine has to be 10
-2
 times safer 
than the human being. 
In this paper it is not directly mentioned on which scale this “     times safer” should 
be reached. Does      safer mean 100 times less safe? Reschka40 concludes from the 
context in Binfet-Kull et al. that the frequency of failures per hour of operation is meant. 
To answer the safety question a comparable quantity needs to be defined and derived for 
the different levels of automation in road traffic. 
1.4.1 Quantities Representing Safety 
Road Traffic Victims 
Following for example Papadimitriou et al.
41
, the safety outcome of a whole road sys-
tem is the number of fatalities. The source of risk in road traffic is
42
  
physical injury or damage to the health of people. 
                                                 
38
 http://www.golem.de/news/autonomes-fahren-google-und-tesla-draengen-auf-das-lenkradlose-auto-
1601-118826.html Matt Schwall from Tesla Motors: "Wir sind an einem Punkt angelangt, an dem er-
wiesen ist, dass autonome Autos sicherer als Menschen sind.“ Author of the Articel: Friedhelm Greis, 
Accessed March 18th 2016 
39
 Binfet-Kull, M. et al.: System safety for an autonomous vehicle (1998), p. 470. 
40
 Reschka, A.: Diss., Fertigkeiten- und Fähigkeitengraphen (2016), p. 82. 
41
 Papadimitriou, E. et al.: Safety performance assessment in Europe (2013). referring on Hauer, E.: On 
exposure and accident rate (1995). 
42
 ISO: DIS 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2008). 
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This has already been cited for concretizing the drawbacks and benefits of AD3+. Thus 
the pure number of personal injuries         at the time   since the beginning of 
counting    would be the simplest quantity for comparison. As these injuries have dif-
ferent severities also statistics separate these numbers into different severities. Mostly
43
 
the number of light injuries   , severe injuries    and fatalities    are distinguished. 
Additionally, more detailed ordinal scales as the Abbreviated Injury Scale (AIS), the 
Head Injury Criterion (HIC) and others are used
44
 for in-depth studies. However the 
pure number      counted from the first occurred injury until a certain time   in total is 
without meaning when comparing a new with an existing technology. Consequently, an 
observation interval needs to be defined. 
Social Risk 
Fritzsche
45
 defines the social risk for a defined population as the number of victims 
counted during a certain time frame   . For example the number of injuries    during 
one year                      
                                  (1-2) 
In this equation   is the number of years (     ), following the Gregorian calendar46. 
In the minuend         is the last day of year  , whereas in the subtrahend    
         is the last day of the preceding year      . 
The weakness of the yearly number of victims with different severities as an indicator 
for safety gets obvious when comparing for example different countries. Austria counts 
less fatalities (        )
47
 in 2013 then Germany (         )
47
 does. Does this 
mean that being part of Austrian road traffic is more safe then being part of German 
road traffic? Thus either this number needs to be compared always for the same popula-
tion or the number of victims needs to be put into relation to a value of exposure to 
make these numbers comparable. 
                                                 
43
 BMVI et al.: Verkehr in Zahlen 2015/16 (2016). Schnieder, E.; Schnieder, L.: Verkehrssicherheit 
(2013), p. 124,150ff. 
44
 Schnieder, E.; Schnieder, L.: Verkehrssicherheit (2013), p. 152ff. 
45
 Fritzsche, A. F.: Wie sicher leben wir? (1986), p. 19–20. 
46
 ISO 8601: Representation of dates and times (2004). 
47
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015). 
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Injury Rate 
Exposure can be defined by a time. Thus, counting the number of victims for the differ-
ent severity levels per time   , new as well as old technologies get comparable as long 
as their usage is the same. Given this assumption, the injury rate       is calculated 
on a statistic for one year      and the corresponding number of fatalities      
 
      
    
  
  (1-3) 
For the above derived numbers the fatality rate in Austria would be            
       whereas in Germany the rate would be                   . For Germany 
and Austria the usage during the same time interval differs, thus it is not sufficient to 
just refer to an observation time. An exposure value that measures usage is necessary for 
comparison of new and old technologies that might be used to a different extent. 
Road Traffic Victims per Exposure Time - Exogenous Mortality 
One possible exposure value is the exposure time    instead of the general observation 
time   . The number of injuries per exposure time         is defined by 
 
     
  
  
  (1-4) 
Krebs et al.
48
 explain and define the exogenous mortality     
  based on prior work 
of Kuhlmann. It is the number of fatalities compared to the average number of users 
     and the average exposure time    of a user for a specific unit of time (e.g. per 
year) 
 
      
    
       
 
    
  
  (1-5) 
Krebs et al.
48
 also define that the number of fatalities      should be corrected by the 
number of invalids (factor 0.1) and injured (factor 0.01). This weighting of different 
levels of severity will be discussed later and be neglected for further calculations of the 
mortality. 
As a reference value the Minimum Endogenous Mortality (MEM) is defined by 
Kuhlmann
49
 as the natural death rate (without deformity and immaturity)         
       for a 5-15 year old German based on numbers from 1973 from the German 
                                                 
48
 Krebs, H. et al.: MEM:ein universelles Sicherheitskriterium (2000), p. 821. Kuhlmann, A.: Alptraum 
Technik? (1977)., Kuhlmann, A.: Einführung in die Sicherheitswissenschaft Albert Kuhlmann (1981)., 
Schnieder, E.; Schnieder, L.: Verkehrssicherheit (2013), p. 177f. 
49
 Kuhlmann, A.: Alptraum Technik? (1977), p. 37&50f. 
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statistical office. Coincidentally, this is similar to the non-natural death rate for this year. 
As Seeger
50
 indicates this second rate, the non-natural death rate, is used for argumenta-
tion in EN 50126
51
. Kuhlmann as well as the EN 50126 suggest that the entire risk from 
all technical systems must not exceed this value. The MEM approach assumes that 
maximally 20 systems act simultaneously on the individual, thus an individual risk limit 
of        is defined. This risk limit additionally is a function of severity as depicted by 
Figure 8 as defined by Kuhlmann
49
. However, also this is negligible for AD3+ as it is 
assumed (see negligence of security discussion) that events with more than 100 fatali-
ties will not be caused by AD3+. 
 
As Seeger explains, these reference numbers have changed. The probability to die has 
reduced during the last 40 years. Compare the numbers from 1973 stated above with the 
overall mortality in Germany
52
 2013 (see Figure 9).  
                                                 
50
 Seeger, C.: MEM - eine Konstante? (2013), p. 14&15. 
51
 DIN 50126 Bahnanwendungen (2000). 
52
 statista.de: Sterbetafel: Deutschland, Jahre, Geschlecht,Vollendetes Alter (2013). 
Figure 8 Individual risk limit for exogenous reasons as a function of fatalities per event
49 
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Calculating the MEM for 2013 and following the approach reported in Seeger two 
different values for MEM result. In 2013, the German population of 5-15 years olds 
was
53a
              
 . Of these            died
53b
 and out of these           
died
53c
 from exogenous reasons (International Statistical Classification of Diseases and 
Related Health Problems (ICD-10)
54
). Thus, following either the Kuhlmann definition 
      
            
    
               results, or the EN 50126 definition       
     
    
               results. Both numbers are meaningful to study.  
Besides the minimum endogenous mortality also the current exogenous mortality 
caused by road traffic could be taken for comparison. As has been described the exoge-
nous mortality depends on the kind of scenario one is exposed to. The exogenous mor-
tality caused by road traffic is defined by the fatalities in road traffic     , that has al-
ready been used. But what is the exposure time of road traffic? In general, this is not 
directly reported by any statistic. To identify the average exposure of the individual to 
road traffic    the results of questionings give approximate values. For Germany in 
2013, the time spent for mobility daily is reported
55
 to be       (German: 
Mobilitätszeit). Unfortunately it is not reported how much of this time is spent in road 
traffic. A modality split is given, but without distinguishing different forms of public 
transport. Based on these numbers approximately     of these       is the rough 
                                                 
53
 Destatis: Gesundheit, Todesursachen in Deutschland (2014), p. a:46, b:6, c:8. 
54
 http://apps.who.int/classifications/icd10/browse/2016/en Class V01-Y98 Chapter XX accessed 
24.09.2016 
55
 Streit, T. et al.: Deutsches Mobilitätspanel Bericht 2013/2014 (2015), p. 37–39. 
Figure 9 Mortality over age for German men in 2013 
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estimation
56
 for this thesis, thus                                 are assumed 
to be the average time spend in road traffic for the German population in 2013. The 
average population of Germany in 2013 was
57
              
 . The exogenous 
mortality results to be              
     caused by road traffic. For Austria the last 
questioning was held in 2008, thus no numbers exist for comparison of 2013. For the 
question on whether to use the road traffic victims per exposure time for quantifying the 
safety outcome of AD3+ two main results can be drawn: First, today’s statistics do not 
directly offer the average exposure time to road traffic. Second, the roughly estimated 
exogenous mortality for road traffic exceeds the defined MEM limit. 
Besides the challenge of identifying the usage time, this time not necessarily stands for 
a successful fulfillment of mobility needs. Mobility means the transport of someone or 
something from one place to another. Consequently, in the following subsection the 
distance  , another value for exposure, is studied. 
Road Traffic Victims per Distance 
Besides expressing the usage by exposure time   , also the distance   can be used as 
exposure. The values of victims per distance        and victims per exposure time 
     are connected by the average velocity    
 
     
   
  
  (1-6) 
Caution: In Germany
58
 2013, private motorized transport covered       of the dis-
tance in traffic whereas it only covered       of the usage time spend in traffic. For 
walking the ratio is even more extreme:       of the time and      of the distance. 
Thus, it must be clearly defined what is referred to as the exposure.  
Some approaches exist in literature that try to define first qualitative requirements for 
automated driving based on fatalities      per vehicle distance driven    during a time 
frame, for example one year  , 
 
       
    
  
  (1-7) 
Sivak and Schoettle
59
 discuss different cases of automated driving fatalities per distance 
     in comparison to conventional driving shown in Figure 10. Case 1, representing 
                                                 
56
 Additional effects like not represented foreigners in these questionings could be considered. 
57
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015), p. 6. 
58
 Streit, T. et al.: Deutsches Mobilitätspanel Bericht 2013/2014 (2015), p. 36&38. 
59
 Sivak, M.; Schoettle, B.: Road safety with self-driving vehicles (2015). 
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the line for a fleet containing only self-driving (Level 4) vehicles, is discussed to be 
unrealistic as it goes through zero on the vertical axis. Sivak and Schoettle leave it open 
which of the other cases will become reality. 
 
The drawback of the discussion of personal injuries   and vehicle distance   is the fact 
that there exist events with more than one victim. Thus the value that is discussed with 
    would most likely not be seen in reality. 
Accidents per Distance 
The ratio     between victims of accidents60            
  and accidents with per-
sonal injuries
60
               
  for the total Germany road traffic in 2013, is  
 
        
  
     
      (1-8) 
Consequently other approaches exist that discuss accidents per distance     to express 
the risk of road traffic. To “[…] illumine a facet of the safety of some entity […] where 
the entity may be a road section, a set of intersections of the same type, a group of 
vehicles having some common features, an age cohort of drivers and the like” 61 Hauer 
more generically discusses the accident rate    
 
   
                                              
                                      
 (1-9) 
                                                 
60
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015), p. 20. 
61
 Hauer, E.: On exposure and accident rate (1995). 
Figure 10 Fatalities per distance driven, using conventional vehicles 
and self-driving vehicles as a function of driver/user age
59 
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If from a motorist point of view the accident rate gets lower with exposure being vehicle 
distance traveled   , thus the accidents per distance    , the entity clearly gets safer
62
  
 
     
  
  
  (1-10) 
Coming back to the previous example, as the distance driven
63
 in Germany (   
               and the number of accidents with fatalitis64              are big-
ger than in Austria
65
 (           
     and          ) the two numbers on 
accidents with fatalities per billion kilometer              for Germany and 
                           fatalities per billion kilometers for Austria result. Thus 
for people driving the same distance, the German road traffic system is safer. Changing 
the exposure and using time in traffic, number of trips, or others, also Austria could be 
safer. This simple example shows how difficult it is to fairly compare two entities in 
road traffic in means of safety. It is not just the kind of accident that needs to be speci-
fied, it is also the kind of exposure that is used for comparison. And even the numbers 
for distance driven are not unambiguous, because these numbers have to be estimated 
based on different measurements
66
. 
Although the distance between two events of the same kind is described by statistics, 
the drawback using the accident per distance quantity is the uncertain severity of an 
accident registered in the databases. The German Federal Statistical Office reports
64
 
three major classes of accidents for 2013: with “property damages”             
   , with “personal injuries”             
  as well as with “fatalities”       
    . Besides these classes further accident classes are reported67, which not necessari-
ly are relevant for safety. Consequently these additional differentiations (e.g. accidents 
with victims influenced by intoxicating substances) are neglected for the further discus-
sion. 
                                                 
62
 Just dividing by exposure does not always make accident rates comparable, as for example the number 
of accidents and the exposure could correlate. For further discussion on this topic especially in the 
context of road safety work and civil engineering see Hauer, E.: On exposure and accident rate (1995). 
63
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015). 
64
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015), p. 20. 
65
 OECD IRTAD: Road Safety Annual Report 2016 (2016), p. 70. Statistik Austria: Straßenverkehrsun-
fälle Österreich (2016), p. 17. 
66
 Hakkert, A. S. et al.: The uses of exposure and risk in road safety studies (2002), p. 8. 
67
 BMJV: StVUnfStatG (1990). 
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Figure 11 Theoretical potential to reduce accidents per distance with vehicle automation and 
consideration of accident severity 
Given these classes of accident severities the idea of the triangle from Figure 7 can be 
translated to accidents per distance and a discrete ordinal scale as depicted in Figure 11.  
Exposure, Accidents, and Severity 
The thoughts discussed above lead to the three dimensions of the so-called road safety 
problem from a public health point of view
68
 that is depicted in Figure 12 (left). 
Depending on the level of severity that is studied the volume’s shape changes. However, 
the severity selective gray areas must sum up to the overall number of accidents. The 
volumes representing the number of victims must sum up as well to the overall number 
of victims. 
Al-Haji concludes that there are three ways of reducing the safety problem
69
: 
                                                 
68
 Rumar, K.: Transport safety visions, targets and strategies: beyond 2000 (1999), p. 17. 
69
 Al-Haji, G.: Diss., Road Safety Development Index (2007), p. 43. 
 
 
 
Figure 12 The size of the safety problem (number of human injuries and fatalities) illustrated 
as a function of the product of the three variables exposure  , crash risk     and injury conse-
quence     (cf. Rumar68) (left: all accidents, middle: with fatalities, right: with injuries) 
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Reducing exposure factors (  : by reducing the amount of travel per person or vehi-
cle and the total reduction in traffic volume. 
Reducing accident risk factors (Apd): by for instance improving driver skills, road 
user education, vehicle performance, road standards, legislation and enforcement. 
Reducing accident severity factors (   ): by protecting people better in vehicles 
from injury severity. Protecting pedestrians and other vulnerable road users by vehi-
cle design, and protecting two wheelers by using appropriate helmets.  
In principle to study the overall safety outcome when introducing AD3+, all three di-
mensions need to be addressed. It should be mentioned that for studying the whole 
traffic system’s safety different safety performance indicators exists70, however the 
following has been defined to be focused in this thesis. 
Safety Performance 
To study a quantity that expresses the safety of a driving function of AD3+ without 
considering the usage and passive safety features, the inverse of the accidents per dis-
tance measure is defined as the safety performance   : 
It represents the distance between two accidents, or more generally the distance between 
two events of the same category. The bigger the safety performance   , thus the dis-
tance, the safer the vehicle which is observed. As the thoughts on the severity classes of 
accidents expressed by Figure 11 still need to be taken into account, the safety perfor-
mance is defined as a vector   . To study the effect of competing classes of events in 
this thesis two classes, accident with fatalities     as well as with personal injuries    , 
are considered. 
The    for the whole German traffic in 2013 follows, with the numbers given above, to 
be 
                                                 
70
 Al-Haji, G.: Diss., Road Safety Development Index (2007).; Chen, F. et al.: Benchmarking road safety 
performance (2016). 
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In general also additional classes of events can be studied for assessing safety. For this 
reason the safety performance refers to events   in the following of the thesis. 
Monetary Weighting 
To come to one scalar value expressing the safety performance it seems obvious to 
weight by a monetary factor. Weighting a person’s live against   severe injured people 
is ethically challenging and provokes criticism and rejection. Nevertheless, as the possi-
bility exists to do so, my understanding is to discuss it and to objectively prepare infor-
mation on this topic for broader discussion. 
The German Federal Highway Research Institute (BASt) similar like other national 
institutes of other countries publishes approximated numbers on accident costs for 
different severities in Germany
71
 (see Table 1). 
Table 1 Economic costs of road accidents and victims in Germany
71
 
 Severity 
Value 
for 2013 
Accident costs      total 
Person injuries total  13.42 
Fatalities        3.95 
Severe injuries 
       
7.83 
Light injuries 1.65 
Property damage 19.08 
Total 32.51 
Person injuries costs of 
accident victims in      
Average fatality      1182 
Average severe injury      121.8 
Average light injuries      4.982 
Accident costs for property 
damage each accident in 
     
Average accident with fatalities 47.16 
Average accident with severe injuries 22.65 
Average accident with light injuries 14.52 
Average severe accident with only property damage 21.48 
Other property damage 6.095 
 
From Table 1 the costs for victims of accidents in 2013 are used to come to an average 
cost for accidents with injuries       and with fatalities       
                                                 
71
 BASt: Volkswirtschaftliche Kosten von Straßenverkehrsunfällen (2015). Information on the 
methodology find here: Baum, H. et al.: BASt: Volkswirtschaftliche Kosten Herleitung (2011). Values 
for the USA and a critical reflection on that can be found in Blincoe, L. et al.: The economic and so-
cietal impact of vehicle crashes (2015). and Viscusi, W. K.; Aldy, J. E.: The value of a statistical life 
(2003). 
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            (1-15) 
A mistake is made by assuming the numbers of severe and light injuries are zero 
(         for accidents with fatalities    . It is neglected due to two reasons: the 
number of accidents with injuries is orders of magnitude higher than the number of 
accidents with fatalities (         and the average cost of a fatality is magnitudes 
higher than that of severe or light injuries        
 
    
 
    (see Table 1).  
Using the average accident cost the cost performance scalar    is calculated by  
 
    
     
     
 
     
     
 
  
  (1-16) 
This theoretical value would express which distance could be driven with one cost unit, 
when accident costs should be balanced out. The values from equation (1-13) of the 
German road traffic in 2013 lead to a cost performance of 
       
  
 
  (1-17) 
However, this cost performance is without meaning when discussing test distances. 
There are no events in real driving that “cost” one Euro. For that reason the    is not 
used for safety evaluations. Other ways of using the monetary values for weighting are 
possible. For example, accidents with injuries could be converted into virtual accidents 
with fatalities by the factor 
     
     
. This virtual number of fatalities could be used to de-
fine a virtual safety performance on the class of fatalities.  
Nevertheless, this virtual safety performance would never be seen when testing in real 
traffic. For that reason the safety performance vector    is used as the quantity repre-
senting the safety of vehicle driving and AD3+ driving functions in specific.  
1.4.2 Prospective vs. Retrospective Assessment 
The quantities explained above, that express the safety of an entity or a whole traffic 
system, are calculated either retrospective or prospective. 
Retrospective 
The retrospective evaluation counts the number of events that have happened, registers 
the costs that result and estimates the exposure values like the total vehicle distance 
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traveled   . Besides the numbers for the severity level fatalities, the accident numbers 
do not perfectly reflect the reality, as there exist especially bagatelles that are not report-
ed or recorded. But also the numbers of light injuries differs from the real accident 
happenings. Blanco et al. state in this context
72
:  
Two factors complicate the national crash data. First, states have different require-
ments concerning what incidents are reported as crashes. Second, many crashes go 
unreported. Estimates of unreported rates of crashes have ranged from as little as 
15.4 percent to as much as 59.7 percent. The result is that the current national crash 
rate is essentially a low estimate of the actual crash rate. 
This needs to be taken into account when comparing the numbers for human driven 
vehicles with the automated driven ones. It is already a worst-case estimation, as the 
accident numbers of automated vehicles will be made transparent
73
 whereas human 
accident numbers are inaccurate.  
It is not just the number of accidents that contains errors. Also the level of severity or 
the costs that are recorded can differ significantly from what is the real result of that 
accident. The same counts for distance    as this is estimated based on other observa-
tions like gasoline consumption, traffic counting or odometer readouts
74
. Nevertheless, 
the retrospective evaluation based on records, countings and estimations seems to be the 
best that can be done to validate the safety assurance approach. After the concept of this 
thesis has been introduced, the challenges of existing data and corresponding require-
ments are derived in chapter 4 “Application: Data to Apply the Usage Strategy”. 
To derive reference values and illustrate certain calculations with examples this thesis 
refers, whenever possible, to the numbers of the year 2013. Although, for many of the 
used parameters more up to date values are available, others like the cost factors or 
counting of the origin of vehicles on German Autobahn are not reported for 2014 or 
later. 
Prospective 
In contrast, the prospective evaluation estimates the number of events that will happen 
in the future. It estimates the costs that will result and assumes usage and exposure 
values like the distance    for AD3+. Due to the nature of each estimation and assump-
                                                 
72
 Blanco, M. et al.: Automated Vehicle Crash Rate Comparison Using Naturalistic Data (2016), p. i. Cf. 
Blincoe, L. et al.: The economic and societal impact of vehicle crashes (2015). 
73
  Own assumption based on the DMV approach: 
https://www.dmv.ca.gov/portal/dmv/forms/forms/ol/ol316.pdf accessed 24.09.2016 
74
 Papadimitriou, E. et al.: Safety performance assessment in Europe (2013), p. 374 ff. 
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tion, it suffers uncertainty. But the goal of each safety assurance is to do a prospective 
safety evaluation based on all information that is available ahead of introduction. 
The goal is not to speculate prospectively about the time in future when “Vision Zero” 
gets achievable. The goal of the thesis is to make a realistic prospective assessment of 
the safety question. To my understanding the argumentation doesn’t need to just focus 
on zero accidents, as Grunwald
75
 describes our society is used to road accidents. Traffic 
participants are aware that driving in a vehicle can end up with damage to property or 
health. A system has formed around this damage that tries to cover it by emergency 
services, trauma medicine, liability law, and insurance. As most of the people worldwide 
take part in road traffic, they do accept this system and the fact that accidents occur. 
Generalized this means that every human prospectively does a “small” safety assess-
ment ahead of participating in today’s road traffic. The chance exists to be part of a road 
traffic accident. 
To get the type approval for the technology and handle liability argumentations it would 
be worth aspiring to show prospectively that automated driving reaches a safety ex-
pressed by the safety performance   . The following chapters will focus on that. Dif-
ferent approaches will be explained, its challenges will be indicated and a new concept 
that results in a specific usage strategy will be derived. 
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 Grunwald, A.: Societal Risk Constellations for Autonomous Driving. (2016). 
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2 State of the Art: Challenges of Today’s 
Approach to Assess Automated Driving’s 
Safety
76
 
Q 6 How to predict the safety impact of automated driving? 
The goal is clear. Assess a new technology by prospectively deriving quantities repre-
senting safety. But why is Q 6 raised especially for automated driving? Why not for 
systems which were released for production in the past? Becker
77
 concludes on this 
question in one of his talks: 
The expenditure for validation of systems suffering higher complexity will increase 
by a factor of 10
6
 to 10
7
, thus: traditional statistical validation is not suitable for 
higher degrees of automation, highly automated systems require completely new re-
lease strategies. 
He underlines his thoughts with Figure 14 and formulates the goal: 
Combination of statistical validation with new qualitative design and release strate-
gies 
 
The following sections will firstly explain current test concepts, secondly define generic 
requirements for test concepts, and thirdly discuss the special features of automated 
driving compared to today’s vehicles on the road, rail, and in avionics. Then subsection 
                                                 
76
 The main content and wording of this chapter is taken from Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: The Release 
of Autonomous Vehicles (2016). 
77
 Becker, J.: Toward Fully Automated Driving (2014). 
Figure 13 Validation and release process - challenges
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2.4 will derive the challenges of releasing fully-automated vehicles. Based on this 
knowledge, the so-called “Approval-Trap” will be highlighted. Subsection 2.5 will 
conclude this state of the art with a review of existing approaches to overcome the 
“Approval-Trap”. 
One of these approaches will be the “Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment” 
that is introduced in chapter 3. This concept of chapter 3 makes up the main contribu-
tion to research within this thesis. 
2.1 Current Test Concepts in the Automobile In-
dustry 
Q 7 How are today’s automobiles tested? 
The safety validation concepts currently used in the automobile industry are obtaining 
approval for four distinct automation levels. To illustrate the difference for the test of 
these systems compared to AD3+, these four systems will be explained briefly: 
The first system in series is the driver-only vehicle without the automation of the driv-
ing task. For these systems, it can be seen that, on the one hand, the components used do 
not exceed maximum failure rates, and on the other, that the driver is able to maneuver 
the vehicle reliably in road traffic (controllability). The abilities of the driver are relied 
on, as the results of the conducted tests with test drivers are transferred to future users in 
the subsequent area of use. Over the last decades, this has shown itself to be successful 
in serving as proof of safety. Despite the increasing number of kilometers driven in road 
traffic, the number of accidents remains
78
 constant, and the number of fatalities has even 
decreased. 
The second level of automation in series is the assisting system: For systems such as 
Adaptive Cruise Control
79
 (ACC) or Lane Keeping Assist
80
 (LKA), their functions have 
to be covered by the test in addition to the existing scope of testing. The option of a 
take-over by the driver and controllability must be provided in systems that actively 
support the driving task, increase comfort, and reduce the driver’s stress. The Code of 
Practice
81
 thus assumes that, in this ADAS (Advanced Driver Assistance System), re-
sponsibility for vehicle behavior remains with the human driver. For these systems it 
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also applies that the abilities of the driver are relied on, so that the results of the con-
ducted tests with test drivers are transferred to future users in the subsequent area of use. 
The first partly-automated systems
82
 (AD-level 2) have also been approved for use in 
series cars: Depending on the speed, ACC in combination with LKA takes over the 
lateral and longitudinal control for the driver. According to the definition, in the third 
category of systems, the driver is also responsible for the vehicle behavior. Therefore, 
this test also focuses on the possibility of a take-over and the controllability by the 
driver; and so the same principle applies as with the assisting system, which relies on 
the abilities of the vehicle driver to correct undesired automation behavior. This level of 
automation presents the special challenge for the safety validation resulting from the 
conflict between relieving the driver and the necessary situation awareness of the super-
visor of the lateral and longitudinal control. The basics of this conflict have already 
been described by Bainbridge
83
 in 1983. However, again the driver is ultimately respon-
sible. 
Of particular interest for the test are emergency intervening systems, which automatical-
ly intervene in the vehicle control and thus in the vehicle dynamics. The goal of this 
fourth category of systems is to counter the driver’s loss of control over the situation. 
For example, Electronic Stability Control
84
 (ESC) and Emergency Brake Assist
85
 (EBA) 
are components of mechatronic brake systems that apply additional or reduced braking 
force without any action on the part of the driver, thus actively intervening in the vehi-
cle dynamics. This is performed during the driver’s loss of control when the vehicle, in 
combination with the driver, is at a higher level of risk. ESC is designed in such a way 
that an intervention is carried out when the driver clearly no longer has control over the 
vehicle in the current situation (e.g. in the case of extreme over- or understeering). In 
contrast, the EBA becomes active when the reaction time and the braking distance 
before a rear-end collision are no longer sufficient for a human to prevent this accident. 
The goal of validating the system regarding safety requirements is to show that emer-
gency intervening systems should only become active (true-positive) when the loss of 
control becomes obvious and thus there is a severely increased risk. For this, it must be 
shown that the false-positive rate becomes as small as possible
86
 and/or the effects can 
be controlled by the driver; the false-positive and false-negative rates of the EBA main-
ly depend on the object perception. Figure 5 shows a Receiver Operating Characteristic 
curve (ROC curve) which describes this relationship for a fictitious object detection.  
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As these emergency intervening systems are systems with no guaranteed operation, an 
increase in safety can be achieved by reduced usage combined with a smaller false-
positive rate. Additionally, these systems enable overriding
87
. ESC and EBA employ the 
selective braking of wheels to intervene mainly in the braking system, and various 
strategies can be used to override them, by steering and/or accelerating. 
As has been shown, the main focus in the development of the four system levels is 
controllability by the driver. The goal is either to enable controllability for the driver or 
to restore it for him/her (design for controllability). Therefore, the driver as a backup is 
the basis for validating current vehicles regarding safety and hence also for the produc-
tion release. 
The development and verification of this controllability for the driver is generally car-
ried out in accordance with the procedure model in Figure 14. This procedure based on 
the V-Model
88
 differentiates between the downward branch on the left - development 
and design - and the upward branch on the right - verification and validation - as a mean 
of quality assurance. A test concept is followed for the quality assurance. 
Figure 14 Safety evaluation methods in the development process (according to Weitzel et al.
89
) 
As shown by Schuldt et al.
90
 in Figure 15, a test concept comprises the analysis of the 
test object (object under test – OuT), the test case generation, the test execution, and the 
test evaluation. 
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Figure 15 Procedure for test concept (according to Schuldt et al.
90
) 
The analysis of the test object and the test case generation should be performed during 
the development/design phase, so that the test cases to be carried out are already defined 
for the verification and validation (see Figure 14, procedure model). According to 
Horstmann
91
 and Weitzel et al.
92
, at present a distinction is made between three methods 
for the determination of test cases: One method is the test specification based on the 
specification sheet, whereby test cases are defined based on system specifications which 
have been set down in specification sheets. The second method is the risk-based test 
specification, whereby risk considerations are used to determine the test cases. The third 
method is the interface-based test specification, whereby the test cases are selected in 
order to cover the value ranges of the interfaces. For all these methods, the driver – 
vehicle system is the basis of the test case determination. 
To start with the quality assurance as early as possible, tests are already carried out in 
virtual test environments
93
 before the first test vehicles are ready for testing. The test 
execution by means of model- and software-in-the-loop tests is based on simulation 
models of the vehicle, the human, and the environment. The previously identified test 
cases are used here. The further the development progresses, the greater the number of 
real components available for testing. Test benches, driving simulators or testing 
grounds are used for these tests. The tests performed using hardware-in-the-loop, driver-
in-the-loop, or vehicle-in-the-loop provide information about the quality of the compo-
nents and functions being tested. To check the actions and reactions of the driver – 
vehicle – environment system (to close the loop), simulation models are also needed in 
performing these tests. Therefore, simulation models will be required continuously for 
the test execution up to this development point in order to test the entire vehicle. Simu-
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lation models are mappings of reality in software and per se have the property of simpli-
fying the real world
94
. 
As a result of this fact, no safety-relevant function currently exists in a series vehicle 
that has not also been tested with real test vehicles. Thus, for testing current systems, the 
automotive industry always falls back on real vehicles, real humans, and a real envi-
ronment. 
An exemplary result of the necessary use of real driving is the production release of the 
Mercedes Benz E-Class (W212). A total of 36 million test kilometers were completed
95
. 
According to Fach et al.
96
, the safety validation of a current driver assistance system 
alone requires up to 2 million test kilometers. This high number of test kilometers be-
comes understandable when realizing that 50,000 to 100,000 km test drives were neces-
sary in between two interventions of the first level of the EBA (positive rate). This does 
not even consider the fact that the more critical second level of the EBA was not trig-
gered during these test distance (compare assertion in Figure 5). This eight-figure total 
of test kilometers is accompanied by considerable costs for the vehicle prototypes, test 
drivers, test execution, and the evaluation of the same. While the time requirement can 
be reduced by means of parallel testing with multiple vehicles, additional costs are 
incurred for the vehicle prototypes. 
This example shows that even for current driver assistance systems, validating safety 
based on real driving in road traffic represents an economic challenge for the OEM 
(Original Equipment Manufacturer). This challenge further grows against the back-
ground of the increasing number of functions and widening ranges of variants and 
versions for each vehicle model. For example, Burgdorf
97
 deduces a number of 160 ∙ 270 
variants for the BMW 318i (E90) with components such as body form, engine, trans-
mission, drive, color, A/C, infotainment. 
Therefore, there are already endeavors to use other test execution tools alongside real 
driving for final safety validation. The only example of applying SiL known to me is the 
homologation of ESC systems. According to ECE Regulation 13H for the EU
98
, there is 
the option to perform some of these tests in simulation:  
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When a vehicle has been tested physically in accordance with [(real world testing of 
a master car)], the compliance of other versions or variants of the same vehicle type 
can be proven by means of computer simulations that adhere to the test conditions 
[…] and the test procedures […].  
Note that this only applies to the ESC system. As an example, Baake et al.
99
 describe the 
homologation of ESC systems for vans from Daimler AG in collaboration with Robert 
Bosch GmbH and IPG CarMaker™: Using what are known as master cars, a vehicle 
model was created in CarMaker, and these master cars were used to collect reference 
data on the basis of which the simulation model was validated. This enabled a simula-
tion-based recommendation for the approval of further vehicle variants with different 
settings. Baake et al. also report on the transfer of this procedure to the Cross Wind 
Assist (CWA) function, although this has not been done at the time of their publication.  
2.2 Requirements for a Test Concept
100
 
Q 8 What does a test concept have to fulfill? 
In order to discuss why AD3+ poses a particular challenge for safety validation, the 
requirements for test concepts to assess safety are recapitulated
100
. These are divided 
into effectiveness and efficiency criteria. 
2.2.1 Effectiveness criteria 
Representative – valid 
The requirement for representativeness has two aspects: On the one hand, the test case 
generation has to ensure that the required test coverage is achieved. For example, a 
vehicle should not only be tested at 20°C and sunshine if it will be exposed to snow, 
rain, and temperatures under 0°C in real situations. Additionally, vehicle limit samples 
(tolerances during production) should be considered in the test case generation. On the 
other hand, the test execution (HiL, SiL, test tracks, etc.) must encompass the minimum 
degree of reality required. This means that the simplification in the representation of 
reality must neither influence the behavior of the OuT nor the behavior and properties of 
the environment with respect to real behavior. 
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Variable 
The test execution must provide the option to implement all the test cases defined by the 
test case generation.  
Observable 
For the test evaluation in particular, it is necessary to observe parameters of the test 
execution. Only when the situation can be described, it is possible to make the statement 
test “passed” or “not passed”.  
2.2.2 Efficiency criteria 
Economical 
There are two parts to the requirement for the economical test concept: On the one hand, 
the test execution should be prepared and carried out as quickly as possible in order to 
be able to provide feedback on the test object to the persons involved in the develop-
ment immediately. On the other hand, it must be ensured that the test execution is pre-
pared and carried out at the lowest cost possible.  
Reproducible 
Reproducibility greatly reduces the work required for regression tests. For example, if 
an error has been detected and the OuT modified accordingly, the goal is to subject the 
OuT to a test in the same scenario as before.  
In good time 
The earlier in the development process a product can be tested informatively, the fewer 
the development steps that need to be repeated in the case of an error. 
Safe 
The test execution should not exceed the accepted risk for all participants. This must be 
considered in particular for real driving, whereby road users are participating in the test 
without their knowledge. 
The requirements described are fulfilled sufficiently by the current test concepts and 
therefore the four different automation levels presented are approved. However, the 
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recalls
101
 or software updates
102
 of all the OEMs, which affect millions of vehicles, 
indicate that these test concepts certainly do not address everything. Are these concepts 
also suitable for validating the safety of new systems such as higher automated driving 
in public road traffic? The presented requirements do not change for the assessment of 
AD3+. However, as will be described in the following section, the OuT changes greatly.  
2.3 Special Features of AD3+ 
Q 9 What is different comparing AD3+ and today’s series vehicles? 
In the following section, the difference between AD3+ and current driving in road traf-
fic is explained. After this, the differences between the traffic systems for air travel, rail 
travel, and road traffic are presented in compact form to argue why only limited findings 
from these areas can be transferred to the assessment of AD3+. 
2.3.1 Comparison between AD2- and AD3+ road vehicles 
For the previously described safety validation of the levels of automation available in 
series (AD2-), the focus is on the vehicle. In particular the focus is on its controllability 
by the driver. In the combined representation of the three-level model for human target-
oriented behavior based on Rasmussen
103
 and the three-level hierarchy of the driving 
task based on Donges
104
 in Figure 16, this validation corresponds to the elements with 
the green background. The vehicle and its behavior in the longitudinal and lateral direc-
tions are tested; in this process, the behavior and abilities of the future driver are not 
tested. Only the possibilities for the test driver to control the vehicle in the test cases by 
means of steering and acceleration control are addressed. Therefore, the green box only 
overlaps slightly with the area that represents the driver and the environment. Perhaps, 
from the point of view of a current test manager this seems unusual, because already 
today this little portion corresponds to a high expenditure (compare again       from 
Figure 13). Nevertheless, this is just a small slice of the possible combinations the real 
environment
105
 offers, especially when combining road surface conditions, lighting 
conditions, other objects, ego motion states, etc.. 
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Figure 16 Three-level model for human target-oriented behavior based on Rasmussen
106
 and the 
three-level hierarchy of the driving task based on Donges
106
 
For AD3+, the abilities of the driver are now omitted and he/she no longer functions as 
a backup. The driving task, i.e. navigation, guidance, and stabilization/control, is taken 
over by the driving robot. This means that for AD3+, there is no test of the controllabil-
ity, but only a test of the operation of a technical system. On the one hand, this makes 
the test easier because the uncertainties due to the human and its individual differences 
no longer need to be covered by the test. On the other hand, there is no longer the option 
to use test cases and test drivers to draw conclusions about other use cases. The human 
is omitted, who generally acts based on skills, rules, and knowledge.  
For the safety validation of current systems, safety resulting from the driver and the 
vehicle in combination must be proven; however, for the production release of the vehi-
cle, today’s focus is solely on the vehicle. Additionally assumed, but not tested, is the 
“reliability” of the driver. In assessing the automated system in terms of safety, the 
safety which must be proven now results exclusively from the technical system of the 
driving robot and the vehicle (yellow field of Figure 16).  
Figure 16 shows on the one hand that in case of AD3+ the quantity of tasks that must be 
tested increases: The driving robot is required for a wide variety of application areas 
(see the different use cases) such as navigation, guidance, and stabilization/control. This 
task quantity presents a particular challenge in public spaces without access limitations. 
On the other hand, the quality of tasks for the technical system changes. Current tech-
nical systems are merely tools following instructions, or are continuously monitored by 
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a human. While for AD3+ the unsupervised execution of a task must fulfill the require-
ments of safety discussed at the beginning of this document.  
2.3.2 Comparison of the stipulations in air traffic, road traffic, 
and rail traffic 
Along with road traffic, there are other traffic systems in which automation has estab-
lished itself. The following section will discuss the extent to which the challenges and 
solutions from these areas are transferable to road vehicle automation. 
The automation in (civilian) air travel does not currently provide any examples of full 
automation. Even if pilots only very rarely actually perform flying tasks, they are still 
present in a supervising and operating capacity. Table 2 provides an overview of the 
differences in the traffic systems, which is taken from Weitzel et al.
107
 and Ständer
108
. 
For the safety validation, the safety concept for the traffic flow is of particular interest, 
as this shows the main differences between air travel and road traffic. Air travel operates 
in a legally self-contained traffic space, a collision warning system is mandatory, and 
external monitoring of operations is provided by air traffic control. 
The railway traffic system provides examples of full automation: For example, an au-
tomated underground railway is in operation in Nuremberg
109
. However, according to 
Table 2, even in this traffic system the safety concept for the traffic flow in particular 
differentiates between road traffic and the railway. There is a legally self-contained 
traffic space for rail travel; in addition, logic-based systems and external monitoring are 
used to avoid a collision between two trains. 
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Table 2 Comparison of the conditions in the traffic systems, taken from Weitzel et al. 
107
 and 
based on Ständer
108
 
 Air travel Road traffic Rail travel 
Movement options 3-D (space) 2-D (area) 1-D (line) 
Operator 
Responsible  
vehicle operator 
Usually redundant Not redundant Not redundant 
Professionalism of 
the vehicle  
operator 
Almost completely 
full-time occupation 
Small proportion 
full-time occupa-
tion 
Almost completely 
full-time occupation 
Training 
Theory > 750 hours > 21 hours ~ 800 hours 
Practice > 1500 hours > 9 hours ~ 400 hours 
Training for  
vehicle type 
Yes No Yes 
Further training Required Not required Required 
Safety concepts of the traffic flow 
Traffic space 
self-contained 
Legally defined 
boundaries 
In special cases 
Legally defined 
boundaries 
Driving by sight 
No, only in special 
cases 
Yes 
No, only in special 
cases 
Technical equip-
ment (examples) 
Collision warning 
systems mandatory 
Road markings, 
traffic lights, 
traffic signs 
Automatic vigilance 
device, intermittent 
train control, auto-
matic driving and 
braking controls 
External monitor-
ing 
Yes, air traffic con-
trol 
No 
Yes, centralized 
traffic control, oper-
ation center 
Technical framework 
Documentation of 
tours / operating 
hours 
Yes No 
Monitoring of oper-
ating performance, 
autom. tachograph 
Servicing, repairs 
Only by certified 
companies 
Workshops, Do it 
yourself 
Only by certified 
companies, and then 
also small work-
shops 
Accident analysis 
Every accident / 
serious malfunction, 
by independent 
state-run body 
In individual cases, 
by certified asses-
sor 
Every accident / 
serious malfunction, 
by independent 
state-run body 
Number of  
vehicles  
(in Europe) 
10
3
 (decreasing) 10
6 
(increasing) 
10
3
 (decreasing, with 
increasing kilometric 
performance of each 
traction unit) 
Change of model Approx. 20 years Approx. 5-7 years 
Approx. 20 years for 
traction units 
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As a mixed operation, road traffic does not fulfill the condition of a self-contained 
traffic space and external monitoring. The differences show why solutions for the pro-
duction release cannot be transferred directly to the transport modality of automated 
driving. 
Besides the differences of the traffic systems in general, there also exist differences in 
the statistics that challenges the comparison of safety of different means of transport. 
The definition of the severity of injuries for rail and road are harmonized in Germany 
since 2004. However, this is not the case for aviation as Vorndran
110
 explains: Aviation 
counts an injury as severe if the victim had to stay in a hospital at least two days during 
one week after the accident, whereas road and rail define a severe injured victim if 
he/she had to stay in a hospital for at least 24 hours. Here it should be mentioned that 
for comparing traffic systems it is not reasonable to compare accident numbers, like for 
comparing different types of driving. The injury per accident numbers differ significant-
ly. Also, the way an accident and thus a victim is registered in the statistics differs. In 
road traffic, the accidents are recorded by the police, whereas in rail traffic accidents are 
reported from the operating company and in avionics it is the German Federal Bureau of 
Aircraft Accident Investigation (BFU) that is responsible for the investigation of civil 
aircraft accidents and serious incidents within Germany. The accidents that are recorded 
for the different traffic systems also differ as road and rail only count accidents directly 
connected to traffic acts. However, avionics for example also register cases where peo-
ple were injured due to objects falling down inside the cabin. 
Not only the recorded accidents and the severity of injuries within the statistics differ. 
Also the safety reference numbers should be selected carefully. For example, the stock 
of vehicles or aircrafts as a reference figure is excluded by Vorndran
110
, because the 
ones are means of individual mobility with an average
111
 of 1.5 people using one vehi-
cle, whereas others are means of mass transportation. Also, the usage time is excluded 
as figures for this do not exist separated for the different means of transportation. The 
same counts for the frequency of usage. These numbers aren’t reported for rail and road. 
Also, the published numbers of people transported for the different means of transporta-
tion is imperfect – especially the private aviation sector is unreported. Nevertheless, 
following Vorndran
110
 the numbers of people transported together with the distances 
traveled with the different means of transportation are used for comparison. Thus, the 
difference between mass and individual transport is supposed to be compensated by the 
exposure value passenger-distance. It should be mentioned that also the distance trav-
eled is imperfect mainly due to the differences of inland vs. domestic traffic (German: 
Inlands- vs. Inländerkonzept). Inland traffic refers to traffic within a country whereas 
                                                 
110
 Vorndran, I.: Unfallstatistik-Verkehrsmittel im Risikovergleich (2010), p. 1084. 
111
 Follmer, R. et al.: Mobilität in Deutschland 2008 (2010), p. 3. 
2.3 Special Features of AD3+ 
43 
 
domestic traffic refers to traffic generated by vehicles registered in the respective coun-
try. Due to traffic of non-domestic vehicles or aircrafts, these numbers differ for each 
mean of transportation. 
In Vorndran
110
 the following numbers are compared: 
Table 3 The average numbers for 2005 to 2009 in Germany for victims per one billion passen-
ger-kilometers for different means of transportation
112
 
Mean of transpor-
tation 
(Verkehrsmittel) 
Passenger 
vehicle 
(Pkw) 
Bus 
(Kraft-
omnibus) 
Train 
(Eisenbahn 
incl. S-Bahn) 
Tram 
(Straßenbahn 
incl. Stadt,- 
Hoch,- 
Schwebe, U-
Bahnen) 
Aircraft 
weight at 
start > 5.7 t 
(Flugzeug) 
Injured per one 
billion passenger-
kilometers 
275.8 73.9 2.7 42.3 0.3 
Fatalities per one 
billion passenger-
kilometers 
2.93 0.17 0.04 0.16 0 
The challenge increases for comparing safety when also looking at other countries. Find 
a discussion on safety comparison of different means of transportation for the USA in 
Savage
113
. As an example, similar numbers like above are given for the USA in Table 4. 
Table 4 The average numbers for 2000 to 2009 in the USA for victims per one billion passen-
ger-kilometers (                ) for different means of transportation114 
Mean of trans-
portation 
Car or 
light 
truck 
Bus (> 10 
passengers) 
Commuter 
rail and 
Amtrak 
Urban mass 
transit rail 
Commercial 
aviation 
Fatalities per 
one billion 
passenger-
kilometers 
4.52 0.0684 0.267 0.149 0.0435 
The statistics of the different traffic systems show differences in quantity but also, as 
has been described, in the definition and methodology for recording and reporting 
events. Consequently, care needs to be taken if different means of transportation are 
used for comparison with AD3+ and road traffic in general. 
The comparisons given above should not exclude the possibility that solutions from air 
travel and rail travel are of interest for road traffic. Certainly, similar problems such as 
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the reliability of safety-relevant components exist. Nevertheless, due to structural and 
organization differences, existing solutions should be examined again for road traffic. 
These differences result in safety values that are orders of magnitude above those of 
road traffic. Thus, for the further development of a safety assessment concept, other 
means of transportation are neglected as a safety benchmark.  
2.4 The Challenge of Releasing AD3+ for Produc-
tion – “Approval-Trap”115 
Q 10 Why can today’s concepts not be used to release automated driving? 
As has been shown, the functions of automated driving as an OuT differ fundamentally 
from current road vehicles, but also from means of transportation in air and rail travel. 
Therefore, the meaningfulness of presented current test concepts when transferred onto 
AD3+ is examined. Additionally, in the following subsections, the effect of continuing 
with the current test concept is discussed.  
2.4.1 Validity of current test concepts for automated driving 
It has already been discussed that a test concept consists of test case generation and test 
execution. In the following it is discussed how and whether both are transferable to 
automated driving. 
Test case generation 
The three procedures for test case generation have already been explained briefly ahead; 
these procedures are based on the assumption of the driver’s driving capability. The 
question of whether a random driver can control the test object is tied to the legally 
stipulated driver’s license. According to the German Road Traffic Act116 (§ 2 Abs. 2), 
this driver’s license is only issued if, among other things: 
 the applicant has attained a minimum age,  
 he/she is suitable for driving a motor vehicle,  
 he/she has received training,  
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 and has passed theoretical and practical tests.  
 
And according to § 2 Abs. 4 StVG, suitable is taken to mean: 
A person is suitable for driving motor vehicles if he/she fulfills the necessary physical 
and mental requirements and has not substantially or repeatedly contravened traffic 
regulations or criminal laws. 
On the basis of this required driving capability on the part of the driver, the test case 
generation is limited to example situations: It is assumed that when the test driver has 
mastered these example situations, he/she and every other driver with a driver’s license 
will also master the other relevant non-tested situations when driving. These include 
situations in which the driver is actively driving, but also those situations in which the 
driver is supervising the system and takes over control if necessary. Therefore, in com-
bination with the driver’s license test, these test cases provide a metric that allows a 
conclusion to be drawn about the safety of the driver – vehicle system. The way in 
which it would be possible to further optimize the practical driver’s license test, as an 
evaluation basis for assessing the driving capability, is discussed by Bahr
117
. 
In the absence of the driver, the currently accepted metric no longer applies, and there-
fore the reduction of the test cases is no longer admissible. The test case generation for 
AD3+ must cover the driving capabilities in particular – a new quality of functions – 
which the human previously brought to the driver – vehicle system. The theoretical and 
practical tests of the driver’s license test do not represent the difficulty. However, the 
following paragraphs – § 10 Minimum Age, § 11 Suitability, and § 12 Visual Faculty of 
the Driver’s License Regulation – present the challenge. Therefore, these paragraphs 
stand implicitly for comprehensive requirements for the properties of the humans who 
perform driving tasks. The human who fulfills these requirements has 
 experienced tens of thousands of kilometers as a road user, 
 experienced social behavior as a member of society, 
 learned cognitive abilities, 
 trained sensomotoric abilities. 
I am not aware of any method for validly testing these functions for a technical system. 
Therefore, the accepted metric and the reduction of the test cases no longer apply if the 
human is removed from the responsibility of performing the driving task. The current 
test cases are not meaningful for releasing automated vehicles for production, and there-
fore the test case generation must be adapted to the new system.  
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Test execution 
Different methods ranging from HiL to SiL to real test-driving are used for the test 
execution
118
. Although there is still a need for real test-driving as an important method 
for the approval
119
; the reason for this, in particular, is the validity combined with the 
justifiable economic effort. However, along with the economic effort, higher automated 
driving also presents a systematic challenge for the known methods. At present, real 
driving stands for driving in public road traffic with test drivers. The task of the test 
driver is to drive or supervise the vehicle in every situation in accordance with the task 
of the vehicle user. Transferred to AD3+, the use of a test driver in the driver’s seat 
would not represent the behavior of a real user, as the user does not have to supervise 
the vehicle and the environment anymore, ready to intervene if the automation makes a 
mistake. Additionally, the vehicle could also participate in the road traffic without pas-
sengers (depending on the use case), and therefore a test driver would represent a non-
real component in the vehicle. As a result, there is a risk that the use of a test driver 
could influence the other road users and alter their behavior. Further reflections on this 
topic can be found at Färber
120
. 
Therefore, along with the test case generation, the current test execution is not directly 
transferable to AD3+. Research and development has to be executed that adapts the test 
execution tools for assessing AD3+. 
2.4.2 Millions of kilometers on public roads until the production 
release of fully-automated vehicles121 
The following theoretical consideration will show what it means to retain the current 
test concept despite the differences shown. Let us assume that a reduction in the test 
cases was not possible for AD3+, because no method like the driver’s license test for 
humans would exist. The objective still is to draw a conclusion as to whether the risk is 
increased or not by the use of the higher automated vehicle:  
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Here it should be noted that this condition is in no way imperative. However, for the 
theoretical consideration, a condition of less than 1 is assumed to be the level to cope 
with. 
As has been discussed in section 1.4.1, a metric that can be used to determine such a 
relationship are the figures from the subsequent evaluation of traffic accidents. For 
Germany, these are the figures from the Federal Statistical Office. In 2013 for example, 
the Federal Statistical Office
122
 cites            accidents with fatalities recorded by 
the police. The figure for fatalities is used because this represents the worst-case scenar-
io for the verification required. With a total of            
     driven in Germa-
ny
123
, the safety performance      is represented by an average of         
     
between two accidents with fatalities. As these figures only represent an expected value, 
shorter or longer distances also exist between two accident events of this class. To rep-
resent this distribution of the accident for AD3+ events  , the Poisson distribution124 is 
used:  
 
      
  
  
    (2-1) 
It is assumed that the occurrence of an accident is an independent and non-exhaustive 
random process      . In the equation,   corresponds to the number of accident events 
of one class and   to the expected value with which this event occurs. The expected 
value   is defined by the quotient 
   
     
  
, (2-2) 
whereby       stands for the observed test kilometers and    for the safety performance 
of the system. The performance, as explained before, denotes the expected number of 
travel distance between the events. The probability distributions for               
and         are shown in Figure 17 as an example for the next gedankenexperiment. 
The figure illustrates the problem of providing verification of a certain level of risk: It is 
assumed that the dark distribution stands for an AD3+ vehicle and the light distribution 
for a driver-only vehicle. Both vehicles are driven the same test distance            , 
with the distance factor      and the average interval    between two fatal accidents 
in today’s traffic. The safety performance of the AD3+ vehicle                   is 
greater than that of the driver-only vehicle (       ) by the safety performance factor 
     . The index of the AD3+ safety performance is called “OuT” as this is the object 
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under test, whereas the driver-only index is called “bench”, indicating that the safety 
performance of the human driven vehicle builds the benchmark (           . Conse-
quently, the expected value for the automated vehicle is    , and for the driver-only 
vehicle    .  
Even though the AD3+ vehicle is characterized by double the safety performance of the 
driver-only vehicle according to the previous assumption, during the test the AD3+ 
vehicle was unfortunately involved in a fatal accident (probability          
   
    ). In contrast, in this gedankenexperiment the driver-only vehicle was not involved 
in a fatal accident (probability          
       ). That is just one of many possi-
ble outcomes. However, for understanding the challenge this outcome is assumed. 
Therefore, a conclusion that the AD3+ vehicle is less safe than the driver-only vehicle 
must be called into question. In any case, this example shows that a distance factor    
greater than 2 is necessary to be able to draw a conclusion with a sufficiently high sig-
nificance about the safety performance of AD3+. 
From a scientific point of view
125
, an error probability must be assumed. For example 
the error probability      can be used. A correspondingly large distance factor    
must be selected, depending on the number of events       , in order to have a probabil-
ity of less than    for a vehicle with a lower performance to achieve this small number 
of events. These thoughts are expressed by the inequality 
                  (2-3) 
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Figure 17 Poisson probability distribution for the number of accidents with two different ex-
pected values 
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The left side of the inequality represents the cumulative probability of the counted 
number of events       . A function              is defined as the minimal solution of 
the numerical search for 
 
               
  
 
  
    
      
 
   (2-4) 
Exemplary results for the determining expected value    are found in tables in appendix 
A. The necessary distance factor    results from knowing    by solving equation (2-2) 
 
   
     
       
       
     
  
          (2-5) 
Figure 18 shows the result of this consideration and the numeric values. 
Figure 18 Distance factor at error probability    
The data point at zero events means that, with a distance factor     , the probability 
is less than    that a vehicle performing worse than the comparison group is not in-
volved in an event. 
Unfortunately, the probability of success for this test is just as small. Because if the test 
vehicle is just as good as the comparison group, i.e. safety performance factor       
applies, it follows that the probability of success for this verification is also only   . 
For the test to be successful, a greater probability of success is desirable, thus a greater 
safety performance of the OuT      . As an example, a probability of success of 
    for the proof is now demanded; by which a test shows that the test vehicle is not 
worse than the comparison group. For this, the test vehicle must perform better than the 
test group.  
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This is formalized by  
                     (2-6) 
The determining                    is again found in tables or by numerical 
search. The necessary safety performance factor     results from knowing     and 
solving equation (2-2) 
 
    
     
           
     
     
      
     
  
   
 (2-7) 
Replacing the distance factor by equation (2-5), the safety performance factor is 
 
    
  
   
 (2-8) 
Figure 19 shows the result of this consideration and the numeric values. 
Figure 19 Performance factor over distance factor at an error probability of 5 % and a probabil-
ity of success for the test of 50 % 
The first point expresses the following: If the test vehicle is approximately 4.3 times 
better (     than the comparison group (       ), the test has successfully proven with 
a probability of 50 % that the test vehicle is better than the comparison group with an 
error probability of 5 %. 
The consequence for the test drive with the AD3+ vehicle is demonstrated by the safety 
performance benchmark              
     between two accidents with fatalities. 
The last point (blue diamond) in Figure 19 expresses the following: If the AD3+ vehicle 
is twice as good         as the comparison system (current vehicles), approximately 
a tenfold the test distance being at least             
     must be driven        
2.4 The Challenge of Releasing AD3+ for Production – “Approval-Trap” 
51 
 
        . In this case, the verification would have been achieved with 50 % probabil-
ity, but five events would also occur with the same probability. 
Ironically, it follows from this consideration that the safer the vehicle driving bench-
mark is, the greater the testing distance has to be, as the comparison value is corre-
spondingly higher.  
What hasn’t been discussed yet is the share between being responsible for an accident or 
being the person that is only affected by the accident without responsibility. If this 
would be taken into account for the calculation
126
, the benchmark value would further 
increase. As an example
127
, in Germany 2013, the average driver was responsible for 
55.9 % of his accidents. In addition, age differences are reported. Drivers from 18 to 21 
years are made responsible for 71.1 % of their accidents, whereas drivers from 45 to 55 
years are only responsible for 49.1 %. This example shows that the selection of a 
benchmark is not trivial. Although this question might be of interest when it comes to 
the question of guilt or to liability cases, for the safety outcome in this thesis it is unim-
portant. Especially because no numbers or reasonable estimations on these exist for 
AD3+, it would result in an offset on the safety scale. 
This theoretical excursion into statistics shows that production release can become a 
challenge, if not an actual trap, for AD3+ driving due to the high distances calculated. 
Hereby, a number of factors for determining the test distance have not been addressed 
yet; for example, a variation of the system would mean that the test distance would have 
to be driven again, or the test with and without passengers could use a factor of two in 
the calculation. The effect on the determined necessary kilometers of different parame-
ters such as area of use, accident severity, accident cause, and comparison vehicle is not 
considered here but is derived in detail in Winner
128
. The publication from Kalra and 
Paddock
129
 takes a similar approach and leads to corresponding results. Both publica-
tions in Europe and the US come to similar conclusions and propose similar actions. 
These considerations are theoretical observations with freely made assumptions. How-
ever, this approach is still suitable for illustrating the problems and challenges, and for 
motivating the approaches that follow next. 
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2.4.3 Conclusion on the Challenge of Releasing AD3+ 
The changing OuT reveals a lack of knowledge for the release of AD3+. New and spe-
cial features, as discussed in section 2.3, have to be covered by testing. The pure test 
driving and statistical evaluation is economically not feasible, as explained in section 
2.4. When shifting testing from real-world driving to HiL and SiL, knowledge is lacking 
on what to test. Additionally, the validity of these other test execution tools is uncertain 
for the new testing task.  
Thus, the challenge is that knowledge is missing on what to test, as well as on how to 
adapt existing tools. This challenge is special compared to other new technologies de-
veloped in the past, because AD3+ covers special features by replacing the human 
driver and his or her high level of safety. Solutions are needed that close the lack of 
knowledge in a reasonable manner. 
2.5 Possible Approaches for Solving the Chal-
lenge of Testing 
Q 11 Is there no approach other than real-world driving to solve the challenges of 
testing? 
As has been shown, AD3+ represents a new OuT which, due to its properties, calls the 
classic test concepts into question. Adapted approaches are required to overcome the 
testing challenge described: Accordingly, the next section will discuss why reusing 
approved functions, and thus an evolutionary approach, seems necessary from the per-
spective of safety validation. After this, existing approaches that could speed up testing 
will be discussed. These approaches formulate today’s approaches and therefore explain 
the best possible way to overcome the “Approval-Trap”. (Of course completeness can-
not be claimed here.) However, as will be discussed in the last Section 2.5.3, uncertainty 
will still exist when proving safety with these approaches. This motivates chapter 3 the 
“Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment”. 
2.5.1 Reusing Approved Functions 
The first and simplest possibility of obtaining the production release for a new system is 
in reusing functions already released. If a system is used in the same way as before, a 
release already issued can be transferred to future products
130
. However, if the scope of 
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functions is expanded, this new function must be treated again; the smaller the new 
involved area is, the less work is required.  
Based on this argument, an evolution across all dimensions would seem to be a possible 
approach for overcoming the testing challenge. Dimensions in this case refer, for exam-
ple, to the speed, the area of use, but also the level of automation. A distinction can be 
made between two perspectives in selecting the evolution steps: From the perspective of 
a function developer, due to the reduced speed and the limited access to the scene, the 
Autobahn during a traffic jam is a suitable starting scenario. From the perspective of the 
previously presented statistical considerations, a meaningful starting scenario would be 
one in which the human as a comparison group performs as badly as possible, that is 
making as many errors as possible. As many errors as possible corresponds to short 
distances between accidents, thus easing the validation of safety
131
. 
The revolutionary step – a fully-automated vehicle without evolutionary intermediate 
steps – contradicts this approach and seems unlikely. Smith132 uses the phrases “some-
thing everywhere” and “everything somewhere” that explain the alternatives for evolu-
tionary approaches in a simplified manner. 
2.5.2 Speeding up Testing 
Despite the evolutionary approach, the safety of new functions, although they are small, 
still has to be validated. To speed this up, there are basically two adjustments that can be 
made: Firstly, the What can be changed, and secondly the How. What test cases need to 
be inspected, and how will these tests be performed? Schuldt et al.
133
 call this the test 
case generation and the test execution. 
Test Case Generation 
The test case generation defines the tests to be carried out. According to Schuldt et 
al.
133
, the large number of influencing factors with a wide range of values results in a 
conspicuous number of test cases. As already described, the systems currently in use are 
based on the capability of humans and their options for controlling the vehicle. This 
results in a stark reduction of test cases that are theoretically required. Therefore, a 
metric exists that enables a conclusion about the safety without testing all the situations. 
This reduction does not apply for higher automated vehicles, and therefore new ways 
must be found for reducing the number of test cases for these vehicles. During the test 
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case generation, the requirements for a test concept detailed above must be considered. 
In particular, the representativeness is at risk when test cases are omitted. 
The approaches from Glauner 
134
 and Eckstein 
135
 describe the identification of relevant 
or critical situations in public road traffic. Based on previously defined event classes, 
potential critical situations are identified during the test drives or large-scale field stud-
ies. These critical situations are incorporated into the test case generation, and less 
critical situations can be omitted as a result. This reduction is based on the assumption 
that situations that are less critical are covered by critical situations. A task that remains 
unsolved at present is the search for a valid measure of criticality that enables an evalua-
tion in the first step, and the selection of critical situations in the second step. 
Another procedure for reducing test cases is provided by Schuldt et al.
136
: A generic test 
case generation is proposed to cover factors influencing the safety ensured by the sys-
tem in a sufficient way. This should use black-box testing procedures and combinatory, 
and be low-redundancy and efficient. This approach is based on statistical considera-
tions without knowledge and experience of the test object, but it still has the potential to 
reduce the test cases required. The remaining question for research is the definition of 
influencing factors.  
The approach described by Tatar and Mauss
137
 is also suitable for black-box testing: an 
optimization is used for the generation of test cases. Here, the input variables of a XiL 
simulation are varied in such a way that the evaluation function to be defined for the test 
is optimized. Despite the challenge of the valid XiL simulation and the required evalua-
tion function, this approach provides the option to focus the test cases on those evaluat-
ed as relevant. 
A fourth theoretical approach is to use and test a safety concept using formal meth-
ods
138
. Similar to the human assumed to be a monitor and a part of the safety concept of 
current vehicles, a verified reliable safety concept could make testing the overall func-
tionality of the vehicle in its complete representativeness superfluous. This would make 
a reduction of the test cases possible. These approaches stand or fall by the validity of 
the formalized world as will be described below. Formalized verification actually com-
bines the test case generation with the test execution. 
                                                 
134
 Glauner, P. et al.: Effiziente Felderprobung von Fahrerassistenzsystemen (2012). 
135
 Eckstein, L.; Zlocki, A.: Combined Methods for an Effective Evaluation (2013). 
136
 Schuldt, F. et al.: Effiziente systematische Testgenerierung (2013). 
137
 Tatar, M.; Mauss, J.: Systematic Test and Validation of Complex Embedded Systems (2014). 
138
 Mitsch, S. et al.: Provably Safe Obstacle Avoidance (2013). 
2.5 Possible Approaches for Solving the Challenge of Testing 
55 
 
Test Execution / Test Tool 
Along with the possibility of reducing the test cases during the test case generation, the 
test execution also has potential for speeding up the process. However, if we deviate 
from real driving and select another testing tool for the test execution, there is always an 
attendant simplification. This is described by means of Table 5. This table divides the 
testing tools into nine classes which are differentiated based on the representation of 
vehicle and environment. The passenger is assigned to the vehicle in this representation, 
as he/she is situated in the vehicle and does not actively intervene in the automated 
driving.  
Table 5 Classification of testing tools for testing automated vehicles
139
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Real driving represents both the environment and the vehicle in reality. Accordingly, 
during these tests there is the risk of real accidents and their consequences. The envi-
ronment is not controlled, and this results in test situations based on the randomness of 
reality; accordingly, the reproducibility for complex situations with other road users is 
not a given. This testing tool can be used, at the earliest, with the first roadworthy proto-
types, and therefore occurs at the end of the development process. 
An alternative is to test real vehicles in an artificial environment: This corresponds to 
driving on a test ground
140
, as situations are created artificially on the one hand, and on 
the other the “road users” are conscious of being involved in a test. Reality is simplified 
for the benefit of safety, variability, observability, and reproducibility. From economic 
perspectives, while the test cases are tested specifically and do not have to be experi-
enced randomly as in real driving, setting up the test field requires additional time and 
financial resources.  
Additionally, an artificial vehicle could move within a real environment; in this case, 
artificial refers to equipping the automated vehicle with a supervisor, for example, that 
has the option to intervene in the driving task. This could be a test driver with a steering 
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wheel and pedals, or alternatively a technical system that is superior to the series system 
due to its more powerful (additional) sensors. If components are represented artificially, 
the closeness to reality suffers, but gains are created in terms of safety, reproducibility, 
and observability.  
Along with the option of creating the environment and the vehicle artificially, there are 
tools that use a virtual representation in the form of computer simulations. However, 
strictly speaking, the two fields (gray) that combine real and virtual do not exist. This is 
due to the fact that the task of sensors and actuators is to “translate” between virtual and 
real signals. A real radar sensor cannot sense a virtual environment and a virtual con-
verter cannot create real voltage.  
In contrast, combinations of artificial and virtual environments and vehicles are possible 
and do exist. Examples of these are provided by different concepts of vehicle-in-the-
loop (ViL)
141
. To close the loop made up of actions and reactions of the environment 
and the vehicle, real components are mapped in the simulation in the form of models. 
Here, either the sensors or actuators mentioned are stimulated. This means that they are 
either artificially instigated (examples of this are simulation-based videos as stimulation 
for camera systems or dynamometers as stimulation for drive actuators) or that the 
testing tools directly simulate the power signals, such as the electromagnetic wave, and 
try to represent real effects of sensors and actuators in the simulation with the aid of 
models. For more information on this, see Hendriks
142
. The use of described models 
calls the meaningfulness of these testing tools into question. To get valid results using 
such models, it must be verified that these models do not contain any impermissible 
simplification; here, impermissible is to be seen in the context of the function. It means 
that deviations from reality are only permissible below the tolerances of the function. 
However, if this validity has been verified, the testing tool enables greater safety during 
the test execution. Objects of the environment and the vehicle only encounter each other 
in the virtual world. Due to the virtual components, these testing tools are distinguished 
by greater variability, observability, and reproducibility. From an economic perspective, 
this testing tool has the advantage of easily varying the virtual environment or repre-
senting the vehicle in a wide range of variants. An economic disadvantage could be the 
validation of the models (see below). An advantage of this testing tool is the option of 
performing tests early in the development phase using the simulated vehicle. 
The last level of abstraction represents the combination of a virtual vehicle and the 
virtual environment: The software-in-the-loop testing tool represents the closed control 
loop by modeling relevant components in the simulation
143
. In contrast to the previous 
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testing tools, the entire testing world is virtual. The tests are safe, variable, observable, 
and reproducible; there is also the option of using this tool early on during the develop-
ment. The economic advantage is provided by the hardware independence, as there is no 
connection to real time any more. The execution of the tests is only limited by the com-
puter power; simulations can be run day and night, and also parallel on a large scale. On 
the other hand, there is the necessary closeness to reality of the virtual test world, and 
therefore of every individual model: Only when the validity of the used models can be 
verified, virtual tests are sufficiently conclusive for a production release. Accordingly, 
for the economic consideration of simulation-based procedures, the validation of the 
models must be considered above all. 
The same challenge exists for the use of formal methods. Mitsch
144
 writes in this con-
text: “We do (…) prove that collisions can never occur (as long as the robot system fits 
to the model).” This means that even for formal methods, the degree of reality of the 
models used determines the conclusiveness of the results. For example, a particular 
challenge that is therefore a focus of the research is the formalization of the uncertain-
ties of machine perception or the behavior of other road users. 
The discussion of test execution and testing tools shows the potential to speed up the 
testing. With the aid of the artificially created environment and vehicle, test cases can be 
set up and executed specifically. Additionally, the virtual approach enables the tests to 
be sped up and run in parallel, depending on the computer power used. 
However, the discussion also shows that the validity of the tests, and therefore their 
conclusiveness, presents a challenge when artificial and virtual components are intro-
duced. 
2.5.3 Conclusion on Possible Approaches to Overcome the Ap-
proval-Trap145 
All approaches introduced above are based on simplifications and assumptions to either 
replace real parts of a test with artificial/virtual ones or neglect irrelevant situa-
tions/parameter combinations. These simplifications and assumptions can be invalid 
when applied on Object under Test (OuT) assessment.  
To avoid simplifications and assumptions that are not proper for OuT assessment, real 
driving such as road testing is necessary. This time test-driving is used for safety valida-
tion of test tools and for safety validation of assumptions. The validation of tools for a 
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defined number of test cases seems possible. But again, who can tell whether the selec-
tion met the necessary situations? Therefore, we come back to the challenge raised by 
the statistical train of thoughts. How can we show that the tools and assumptions are 
valid for OuT safety assessment?  
An advantage for tool and assumption validation is that the full target testing distance 
doesn’t need to be driven with the OuT. This simplifies the accumulation of testing 
distance. Another factor that would reduce the huge number of possible situations that 
need to be covered for tool or assumption validation could be the independence of 
different parameters of a situation. For example, properties of traffic models are inde-
pendent of properties of radar sensor models and therefore do not need to be modeled 
and validated in combination. This independence does not exist for the validation of the 
OuT as errors in real sensors lead to different behavior depending on the surrounding 
traffic. A disadvantage is that even more things need to be validated. For example, the 
behavior of other road participants needs to be reflected by the tool, at least to a certain 
extent. 
Until now, we have not seen any proof that the advantages outweigh the disadvantages 
resulting in lower testing distance necessary to be driven (no matter who collects the 
stated amount). On the one side, the more components are replaced and the more cases 
are neglected, the more validation effort for tools and assumptions has to be made. On 
the other side, the more cases are left for road testing, the more validation of the OuT 
has to be performed on the road. This seems to be a trade-off between OuT validation 
on the one hand and tool validation for OuT validation on the other hand. Additionally, 
the long term perspective has to be considered as well. It may be that the first validation 
of tools needs a higher effort as the road testing itself, but when validating another 
version, vehicle type or new generation, the overall effort could be reduced by orders of 
magnitude. An example for that effort reduction is described in Baake et al.
146
 for ESC 
testing.  
At this point a conclusion can be drawn: When pursuing approaches to replace or reduce 
road testing, road tests will still be of interest as these approaches need to be validated. 
At least until now, it is unclear whether other approaches reduce the validation effort for 
the first AD3+ generation. 
Of course, if a tool or an assumption is validated, its advantages and potential to in-
crease efficiency can be utilized. But up to that point, validation activities based on real 
driving are and will be necessary. 
The proof of safety of the OuT by simply road testing before SOP is economically 
infeasible with statistical significance. For alternative approaches, it is at least uncertain 
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if the required validation effort is reduced. Tool and assumption validation could equal 
out the reduction of OuT validation. This leads to the conclusion that, from a statistical 
perspective, the first vehicles that will be introduced will not satisfy a scientific proof of 
comparable safety. This conclusion is based on the assumption that the safety bench-
mark leads to testing distances that are economically not tolerable. 
This conclusion seems to be an obstacle on the way to everyday automated driving. The 
state of the art does not deliver an approach to assess the safety of AD3+ in an economi-
cal way ahead of introduction. Consequently, the automotive research community 
should extend their research on safety assessment of higher automated driving func-
tions! 
To address the challenge of bringing automated vehicles safely into market, it is neces-
sary to concentrate on two approaches. One is the microscopic and deterministic test 
case approach. The alternatives to real test driving described beforehand mainly address 
this microscopic approach. But as this first approach will leave uncertainties on safety 
when introducing the first AD3+, the second approach should exactly focus on these 
uncertainties. Thus, the second approach is called the macroscopic and stochastic real-
world driving approach. It is important to work on both approaches and not to see the 
microscopic and deterministic test case approach as contradictory to the macroscopic 
and statistic real-world driving approach. Both together are of great relevance and 
should be seen as complementary approaches to come to a solution for the raised chal-
lenge.  
For current research regarding the first, the microscopic deterministic test case ap-
proach, it is referred to two representative public funded projects: 
 PEGASUS147: Project for Establishing Generally Accepted quality criteria, tools 
and methods as well as Scenarios And (German: Und) Situations for approval of 
highly automated driving functions. It focuses on the test cases and their generation. 
It is funded by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. 
 ENABLE-S3148: European initiative to ENABLE validation for highly automated 
Safe and Secure Systems. It focuses on the test execution and test tools. It is funded 
as an ECSEL Joint Undertaking. 
The second approach, the macroscopic and stochastic real-world driving approach, is 
addressed in this thesis. In the following two chapters, the “Theory: Stochastic Model 
for Safety Assessment” and the “Application: Data to Apply the Usage Strategy” focus 
on “How Stochastic can Help to Introduce Automated Driving”. In chapter 5, the 
“Consequences: The Safety Lifecycle of AD3+” are discussed and a way to connect 
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both approaches is proposed. This proposal bases on the assumption that the test cases 
used for assessment by the microscopic deterministic approach represent a certain num-
ber of test distance in the stochastic macroscopic approach. 
 61 
 
3 Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety As-
sessment  
Q 12 How to use stochastic to achieve a safe usage of automated driving? 
Holló et al. describe contributing factors to road safety
149
: 
The pyramid model can be understood as a conceptual framework describing the 
causal relationships between different factors present in the road safety system, but it 
does have certain limits. 
 
One limitation for explaining the occurrence of accidents is the underlying stochastic 
process. Although I would put the pyramid shape in question, the general idea of Holló 
et al.’s Figure 20 is of importance to understand the difference between a purely random 
event and an event that underlies a stochastic process. Different factors contribute in 
improving or reducing road safety. Clear correlations have been shown between govern-
ance actions or road network changes and the safety outcome of road traffic. Neverthe-
less, numbers of killed or injured cannot be predicted in a deterministic way by these 
contributing factors. One, 10, 100, or even 1000 accidents (depending on the road sys-
tem under observation and the severity) more or less cannot be explained by a determin-
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istic model. Therefore, stochastic processes need to be discussed when arguing about 
road safety. 
This chapter will first of all start to discuss the relationship between accidents and sto-
chastic. Therefore, an engineer’s perspective on the names “accident” and “stochastic” 
is discussed. Secondly, section 3.2 “The Occurrence of Accidents follows a Poisson 
Process” takes a step back and derives the Poisson distribution used above by a theoret-
ical contemplation. The assumptions for using Poisson as well as the literature about 
different usage examples are discussed. 
Up to this point, the thesis discusses whether or not to assume a stochastic process and 
which probability distribution should be used. From section 3.2 on, the stochastic ap-
proach using the Poisson process is defined as the core assumption that represents the 
basis for all further argumentations. In the state of the art, this core assumption has been 
used for challenging the safety of automated driving. To further develop the state of the 
art, the next scientific step is made. Section 3.3 tries to falsify the hypothesis of a safe 
AD3+. The result will be that neither more nor less safety is economically provable 
ahead of introduction. Section 3.4 draws the consequences and takes the next step to 
refine the requirements. On top of these refined requirements, the following two sec-
tions 3.5 and 3.6 define and examine an uncertainty-based usage strategy that might 
pave the way for the introduction of AD3+. 
The applicability of the strategy to further defined use cases from subsection 1.1 is 
presented in the next chapter 4 that looks into existing “Application: Data to Apply the 
Usage Strategy”. 
3.1 The Meaning of “Accident” and “Stochastic”  
Q 13 Why should we think about stochastic when we think about accidents? 
As my mother tongue is German, the following concentrates on both languages German 
and English. 
Accidents 
The origin of the word “accident” is reported in the Online Etymology Dictionary150: 
late 14c., "an occurrence, incident, event," from Old French accident (12c.), from 
Latin accidentem (nominative accidens), present participle of accidere "happen, fall 
out, fall upon," from ad- "to" (see ad-) + cadere "fall" (see case(n.1)). Meaning grew 
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from "something that happens, an event," to "something that happens by chance," 
then "mishap." Philosophical sense "non-essential characteristic of a thing" is late 
14c. Meaning "unplanned child" is attested by 1932. 
Different definitions for today’s use of the word “accident” exist. For the use today, the 
Cambridge dictionary online
151
 says: 
something bad that happens that is not expected or intended and that often damages 
something or injures someone 
In German accident/Unfall is defined by Duden online
152
: 
„den normalen Ablauf von etwas plötzlich unterbrechender Vorfall, ungewolltes Er-
eignis, bei dem Menschen verletzt oder getötet werden oder Sachschaden entsteht” 
Both definitions define that an event where someone or something is damaged or in-
jured could be an accident. Additionally, the event needs to be not expected or not in-
tended. This indicates a small chance that the event happens. 
Stochastic  
The origin of the word “stochastic” is also reported in the Online Etymology Diction-
ary
153
: 
1660s, "pertaining to conjecture," from Greek stokhastikos "able to guess, conjectur-
ing," from stokhazesthai "to guess, aim at, conjecture," from stokhos "a guess, aim, 
target, mark," literally "pointed stick set up for archers to shoot at," from PIE 
*stogh-, variant of root *stegh- "to stick, prick; pointed" (see sting (v.)). The sense of 
"randomly determined" is from 1934, from German stochastik (1917). 
Stochastic in its use today is defined by the Cambridge dictionary online
154
 as: 
A stochastic process or system is connected with random probability 
Duden online
155
 explains the word stochastic/stochastisch with: 
vom Zufall abhängig. 
The definitions explain that a stochastic process is not deterministic and that the events 
that happen depend on some kind of randomness. There is the chance that an event 
happens or not. 
                                                 
151
 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/accident accessed 24.09.2016 
152
 http://www.duden.de/suchen/dudenonline/unfall accessed 24.09.2016 
153
 Harper, D.: "stochastic". Online Etymology Dictionary. 
154
 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/stochastic accessed 24.09.2016 
155
 http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/stochastisch accessed 24.09.2016 
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The Occurrence of Accidents as a Stochastic Process 
The Cambridge online dictionary
156
 offers the word “accident”, amongst others, as a 
synonym or related word for “stochastic”. This shows that the word “accident” by its 
original meaning and its use in the English language is somehow connected to a sto-
chastic process.  
Interestingly, the German language offers the word “per accidens” which means “durch 
Zufall”157. Thus, the connection between “accident” and “stochastic” as a fortuitous 
event also exists in German. Consequently, the word accident already naturally leads to 
stochastic processes. 
Looking back into the history of the usage of both words “road accident” and “stochas-
tic” by applying the Google Books Ngram Viewer158, it seems like the occurrence of the 
report and discussion of road accidents might have also stimulated the thoughts on 
stochastic. Figure 21 depicts that during the thirties and forties of the 20
th
 century the 
frequency of both strings increased.  
  
 
A possible conclusion: An accident can be seen as a special stochastic process with low 
probability and an unwanted outcome. The following section formalizes this conclusion. 
                                                 
156
 https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/stochastic?a=british accessed 24.09.2016 
157
 http://www.duden.de/rechtschreibung/per_accidens accessed 24.09.2016 
158
 https://books.google.com/ngrams/ accessed 24.09.2016 
Figure 21 Normalized Google Books Ngram Viewer results that charts frequency for the 
two strings found in Google's text corpora “English” for the years 1900 to 1999. 158 
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3.2 The Occurrence of Accidents follows a Pois-
son Process 
Q 14 Why should accident numbers follow the Poisson process? 
In section 2.4 “The Challenge of Releasing AD3+ for Production – “Approval-Trap””, 
the Poisson distribution has shortly been motivated and used. As this is not a given 
approach and subject to discussion, one step back will be taken for explanation. Firstly, 
the usage is derived by a theoretical contemplation. Secondly, a glance will be given on 
the usage of this distribution in other disciplines. 
Haight
159
, the author of the handbook of the Poisson distribution, begins his chapter on 
accidents with the sentence:  
The Poisson process as binomial limit, […], seems to fit exactly the sense of the word 
“accident”, as a completely fortuitous event. 
The Poisson process as a basic but important example for a stochastic process takes an 
important role in accident analysis
160
, as we will see in the following. The idea of the 
following section is to understand why. 
3.2.1 From a Bernoulli Experiment to the Poisson Process 
In accordance to an introduction into stochastic by Mittag
161
, the occurrence of road 
accidents will now be described by a probability distribution that is derived step by step. 
Starting with a Bernoulli experiment: 
Bernoulli experiment 
First of all, the limited observation or test of a traffic participant has two safety out-
comes  : Either an accident    or no accident   , or more general an event    or no 
event   . Therefore, it is assumed that the observation or test   of the road participants is 
a small part of real participation in traffic like for example      .    is a part of a 
driven distance, not a piece of the street system. The word small in this case means that 
within this traveled distance not more than one event will take place. From a theoretical 
point of view, the small part could converge to 0 (     , thus the event could be seen 
                                                 
159
 Haight, F. A.: Handbook of the Poisson Distribution (1967), p. 103. 
160
 Reichart, G.: Diss., Zuverlässigkeit beim Führen von Kraftfahrzeugen (2001), p. 20. Herz, R. et al.: 
Angewandte Statistik (1992), p. 75ff. 
161
 Mittag, H.-J.: Statistik: Eine Einführung mit interaktiven Elementen (2014), p. 161 ff.  
3 Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment 
66 
 
as a Dirac impulse     . However, this is described as a Bernoulli experiment by equa-
tion (3-1) with the indicator variable    
 
    
            
                
  (3-1) 
If the Bernoulli experiment is repeated   times for either the same or another traffic 
participant            , a count variable   can be written as  
 
     
 
   
  (3-2) 
In equation (3-2)    are   independent indicator variables with the expected value  
         (3-3) 
and the variance  
                (3-4) 
This expected value equation (3-3) describes the probability that an event occurs during 
one observation. The variance for a Bernoulli experiment is just defined by equation 
(3-4). 
Binomial distribution 
The distribution of   is called Binomial distribution. The expected value      and the 
variance      of the Binomial distribution are 
            (3-5) 
                    (3-6) 
Up to this point, basics of statistic were described. The variables   and   will now be 
used to again connect the statistical theory of Binomial distributions to road events. 
When testing a vehicle for a distance of      , defined in km, this would lead to 
 
  
     
  
 (3-7) 
observations. To get the characteristic values describing the above defined distributions, 
the probability   for one of the outcomes         needs to be defined. The probability 
      for an event within this small part of real driving is estimated by the numbers of 
existing event statistics. When    is the number of events that are recorded during one 
year   and    is the number of parts that have been observed during the same year or 
time span in general, the probability is calculated by 
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  (3-8) 
The number of parts that have been observed can be calculated by the distance traveled 
by all relevant road participants during this year and the defined    by 
 
   
  
  
  (3-9) 
Based on equations (3-8) and (3-9), we define the reference safety performance of the 
object under observation or test    by: 
 
   
    
     
  (3-10) 
This performance describes the average distance that can be traveled based on the prob-
ability       until one event (   ) happens. The performance is synonymous with the 
average distance between two events for the related observation time span. With the two 
equations (3-7) and (3-10) describing the Bernoulli experiment, the expected value (3-5) 
and the variance (3-6) of the Binomial distribution can be calculated: 
 
         
     
  
 (3-11) 
 
     
     
  
   
  
  
   (3-12) 
As a discrete random variable is not just defined by its      and     , the probability 
distribution function of   is necessary to be defined. This function can be derived by 
looking back to the Bernoulli experiment. The probability to experience   times    
before experiencing (   ) times    is a special Bernoulli series                  . 
Due to the independence of the experiments, the probability results in            
(see Mittag
161
). But as the order of the series is unimportant for the result of the sum 
(3-2), there exist  
 
 
  other series that lead to the same result. Therefore, the probability 
function        for the Binomial distribution is defined by 
 
       
 
 
                        
                  
   (3-13) 
The cumulative distribution function      is defined by the sum 
 
       
 
 
 
 
   
            (3-14) 
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Poisson distribution 
As accidents are extremely rare events, rare
162
 in the sense of the Binomial distribution 
with the probability        and the number of observations     , the Binomial 
distribution can be approximated by the Poisson distribution  
         (3-15) 
 
         
  
  
            
              
   (3-16) 
For the approximation
163
 based on                   , equations (3-5) and 
(3-6) lead to 
 
                
     
  
  (3-17) 
Figure 22 illustrates an example of the approximation. In the four subplots,     is kept 
constant whereas the number of trials   is increased and the probability   is reduced. It 
can be seen that the PDF’s (Probability Distribution Function) are merging while   
increases. 
 
Although the Poisson distribution was derived as an approximation of the Binomial 
distribution, the necessary assumptions for using the Poisson distribution are discussed 
in the following. For example, Fahrmeir et al.
164
 state: 
                                                 
162
 Accord. to Fahrmeir, L. et al.: Statistik (2007), p. 574.  
163
 Fahrmeir, L. et al.: Statistik (2007), p. 262.  
Figure 22 Comparison of Binomial- and Poisson-Probability Distribution Func-
tions for highlighting the approximation 
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Two events cannot occur simultaneously. 
The probability that an event takes place during the small time interval    is approx-
imately    . If    is small enough the probability is small as well. 
The probability for occurrence of a certain number of events during a time interval 
depends only on the length   but not on its absolute place on the time scale. 
The numbers of events of two disjunctive time intervals are independent. 
Let’s discuss what that means for the assumption that numbers of accidents follow a 
Poisson process. Fahrmeir’s requirements are based on the time domain. The require-
ments are transformed to the spatial domain assuming an average speed 
  
  
. This aver-
age speed depends on the use case that is examined and thus will vary. Nevertheless, 
both approaches (time and spatial domain) can be used to discuss the occurrence of 
accidents. For illustration reasons, this thesis examines the spatial domain, meaning 
accident rates referring to distance as exposure: 
 Can two accidents occur simultaneously? Examining one vehicle, only one accident 
can happen at one place. This results as it is unimportant if a collision with one or 
two or more obstacles is the cause for a damage/injury. The worst outcome 
“counts”. When examining more than one vehicle, these other vehicles also had to 
travel a certain distance to “reach” the accident. When “drawing” the driven dis-
tances of all examined vehicles on a virtual line (see Figure 23) and marking the 
accidents on that line, these accidents will not happen at the same observation in-
terval, thus not simultaneously. 
 
 When the examined distance decreases, does the probability for an accident become 
small? Before answering this question, the word small needs to be defined. Like 
stated above
162
, “small” in the sense of Poisson means smaller than 0.05. As auto-
mated driving will be compared in some way with human driven vehicles, the prob-
ability of occurrence of an event should be orders of magnitude smaller than 5 % 
per meter. Consequently, the probability for an accident can be assumed as small. 
 Does the probability for occurrence of a certain number of accidents only depend 
on the examined distance and not on the absolute position? This cannot be stated 
without limitations. In road traffic, there exist temporal and spatial accident hot 
spots. On one hand, it does not change the general validity of Poisson statistics be-
                                                                                                                                               
164
 (translated from German) Fahrmeir, L. et al.: Statistik (2007), p. 262.  
Figure 23 Driven distances lined up and accidents marked 
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cause the total number of events can be seen as a sum of sub Poisson processes 
with different properties. On the other hand, the travel distance that is taken under 
consideration needs to be representative covering these spatial and temporal spe-
cialties. That means that exactly this question raises the requirements for tests and 
latter introduction. The test distance should not only be representative to the usage 
kilometer. To fulfill Poisson process requirements, elements of the total distance 
should be representative to each other. 
 Are the numbers of accidents independent from each other when looking at two 
different intervals? This question cannot be answered globally for AD. What is as-
sumed for the thesis is that every road participant drives as “good” as he or she or it 
is able to. When this is the case, the individual numbers may change but do not de-
pend on each other and equal out the changes. Especially for AD, this question con-
nects with the question whether an AD learns, thus is adaptable or not. Because 
then one accident might reduce the chance for the next one and so on. For the first 
introduction, it is assumed that AD3+ does not change over time
165
. Additionally, it 
is assumed that there is a process that generates rare events that will never “run 
empty”. 
Whether the four requirements to apply the Poisson distribution on accident numbers 
are completely fulfilled is object of discussion. Nevertheless, the Poisson distribution 
enables the easiest and thus first approach to describe the uncertainty of accident counts. 
Other stochastic processes for discrete events base on at least one parameter or more. 
The problem with applying these other stochastic processes before observing AD3+ in 
real traffic is not knowing their parameters. The next section sums up how the Poisson 
process is used in literature. 
3.2.2 Literature on the use of the Poisson distribution for acci-
dent counts  
History 
The Poisson assumption has a long history in accident research
166
. As Hauer
166
 assumes, 
the first use of the Poisson distribution to model accident numbers was done by von 
Bortkiewitcz in 1898. Hauer
166
 writes:  
                                                 
165
 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: Do Autonomous Vehicles Learn? (2016). 
166
 Haight, F. A.: Handbook of the Poisson Distribution (1967)., Gerlough, D. L.; Schuhl, A.: Use of 
Poisson Distribution in Highway Traffic (1955)., Lee, J.; Mannering, F.: Impact of roadside features 
on accidents (2002)., Chin, H. C.; Quddus, M. A.: Random effect negative binomial model to examine 
traffic accident (2003)., Hauer, E.: Regression Modeling in Road Safety (2015), p. 205. 
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[von Bortkiewitcz
167
] had data about the number of deaths by horse-kick in ten Prus-
sian army corps over    years. When comparing the number of years with         
deaths to the number predicted by the Poisson distribution the fit was remarkably 
good. 
The Poisson Theorem for Accident Counts168 
A good starting point for a discussion on the basic concepts of road accident statis-
tics is the work by Poisson (Elvik
169
; Feller
170
), who investigated the properties of 
binomial (Bernoulli) trials, i.e. trials with two possible outcomes: success or failure. 
Modern versions of this standard theorem (in many textbooks f.i. Feller
170
; 
Shorack
171
) do not require the probability of each trial to be the same, and state that 
under reasonable conditions the probability distribution of the sum    of all success-
ful trials would tend to a Poisson probability distribution. Feller
172
 concludes ‘We 
conclude that for large n and moderate values of              the distribu-
tion of    can be approximated by a Poisson distribution.’ The following remarks in 
the context of road safety research should also be taken into account:  
The trials should be considered as situations that may result in one accident. 
The results indicated above mean that the number of accidents will be approximately 
Poisson distributed given the number of trails n and their nature reflected in the val-
ues        . This is detailed information on exposure. 
This result is relevant to the distribution of the number of accidents, not the number 
of victims or other outcomes of accidents (except being an accident). 
It is assumed that the outcomes of the events are independent. It may be a good idea 
to further research this aspect. 
Only registered accidents exceeding a certain level of severity are usually consid-
ered. This would yield that the relevant p-value would be: ‘a small probability of re-
sulting in an accident with a certain severity and being registered’. 
                                                 
167
 Bortkiewicz, L. von: Das Gesetz der kleinen Zahlen (1898). 
168
 This whole subchapter (one page) is taken from Papadimitriou, E. et al.: Safety performance assess-
ment in Europe (2013), p. 372. 
169
 Elvik, R.: Traffic safety (2004). 
170
 Feller, W.: An introduction to probability theory (1968). 
171
 Shorack, G. R.: Probability for statisticians (2000). 
172
 Feller, W.: An introduction to probability theory (1968), p. 282. 
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The registration system cannot be saturated by the accident process (e.g. limited po-
lice resource allocation to less severe accidents would have an effect on the applica-
bility of the theorem above). 
Note that although these results suggests that the number of accidents should be dis-
tributed according to a Poisson distribution, in practice, the distribution of accident 
counts will never be exactly according to a Poisson distribution, if only due to the 
limited number of trials on which it is based. If a count is based on a high number of 
trials (e.g. annual national counts), it is likely that for all practical purposes the 
count follows a Poisson distribution. However, care must be taken when the actual 
number of trials is rather low (Lord et al.
 173
). 
In practice, variants of the Poisson distribution are commonly used in the analysis of 
road safety count data, see for instance Lord et al.
173
 and the references therein. 
Other Disciplines using the Poisson distribution 
The Poisson distribution in general was introduced
174
 by Simone Denis Poisson in 1837. 
Since then it is used in different disciplines for explaining, prediction, and studying the 
occurrence of different events. To get an idea of the different application disciplines, a 
list of applications from Haights
175
 and Letkowski
176
 is given: 
The number of mutations on a given strand of DNA per time unit 
The number of bankruptcies that are filed in a month 
The number of arrivals at a car wash in one hour 
The number of network failures per day 
For reliability analysis in general the instants of breakdown  
The distribution of plants and animals in space or time 
The sampling of bacteria per square 
The number of defected teeth per individual 
The number of victims of specific diseases 
The number of cars passing a point in a fixed time interval 
The physical aspects of particle counting 
                                                 
173
 Lord, D. et al.: Regression models of motor vehicle crashes (2005), p. 36 ff. 
174
 Haight, F. A.: Handbook of the Poisson Distribution (1967), p. 113. 
175
 Haight, F. A.: Handbook of the Poisson Distribution (1967), p. 100–107. 
176
 Letkowski, J.: Developing Poisson probability distribution applications (2014), p. 3. 
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Of special interest for discussing the usage of AD3+ is the identification of individual 
humans that are more or less safe compared to other human drivers. An idea would be to 
replace those by automated vehicles that reduce the safety in road traffic most. Howev-
er, based on the Poisson distribution, Drösler
177
 and Gründl
178
 argue that a selection of 
individuals being bad drivers is not possible. The reason for that is the same that leads 
to the “Approval-Trap”. There will not be enough distance one person could drive in his 
lifetime to prove he or she is a bad driver (given the fact, that the person is allowed to 
keep its driver license). This is different when looking for groups of people that might 
result in lower road safety values. In average, different    level can be defined given a 
certain age, experience, or other characteristics
179
. Thus, the question might arise: “Why 
should these not be driven by an automated vehicle?” A quick answer would have been: 
”Because the automated vehicle is less safe than this group of people.” Can lower safety 
of AD3+ be shown? At this point, the next scientific question needs to be answered by 
applying the Poisson distribution: “Is the automated vehicle less safe than the worse 
group of people?” 
3.3 Falsifying the Safety Hypothesis 
Q 15  If we cannot prove safety, is automated driving unsafe then? 
As presented in chapter 2, today’s literature180 concludes that the scientific statistical 
proof of safety of automated vehicles is economically not feasible before the mass 
introduction of automated vehicles. These conclusions are made on the Poisson distribu-
tion explained before. If an economic benefit is aimed for, hundreds of millions or even 
billions of miles spent on testing in real traffic do not seem appropriate. Additionally, it 
was shown that alternative testing approaches also lack knowledge for application. Does 
it then mean we should stop developing and never introduce automated driving? 
No, because the nature of the statistical proof of safety is the attempt to reduce the 
uncertainty. When we want to prove safety, we raise the requirements to a level of sig-
nificance. By raising the requirements, we also increase the chance to reject a safe 
system. When counting for example two events       during an observed test (      , 
the statement on proven safety depends on the required level of significance. Using an 
                                                 
177
 Drösler, J.: Zur Methodik der Verkehrspsychologie (1965), p. 258 ff. 
178
 Gründl, M.: Diss., Fehlverhalten als Ursache von Verkehrsunfällen (2005), p. 15–19. 
179
 Maycock, G.; Lockwood, C. R.: The accident liability of British car drivers (1993). 
180
 Winner, H.: Quo vadis, FAS? (2015)., Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: The Release of Autonomous 
Vehicles (2016), p. 446–447., Becker, J.: Toward Fully Automated Driving (2014), p. 16., Kalra, N.; 
Paddock, S. M.: Driving to Safety: How Many Miles? (2016). 
3 Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment 
74 
 
error probability     , a distance factor of        is necessary for proving safety 
(   ). Whereas using      , a distance factor of only         results as being 
necessary to prove safety
181
. Both are statistically right, although the second has the 
same meaningfulness as guessing whether the vehicle is as safe as the reference or not. 
However, using the first level of significance, there is a good chance to reject the safe 
automated vehicle by mistake. Figure 24 illustrates how the necessary distance factor 
for the proof of being safer depends on the probability of error  .  
 
Consequently, the research question needs to be extended to study the falsification. We 
should not only ask “When have we proven safety?” but we should also ask “When 
have we proven the automated vehicle to be unsafe?”. As the proof of being less safe 
can be answered based on the same theory as the question on the proof of more safety 
has been answered, this theory will shortly be recapitulated
182
. To represent the distribu-
tion of accident events, we apply the Poisson distribution
183
 from equation (2-1): 
 
      
  
  
     
This distribution assumes that the occurrence of an event is an independent and non-
exhaustive random process      . In the equation,   corresponds to the number of 
                                                 
181
 Usually an error probability of       is used. 
182
 This short explanation is mainly taken from Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: The new role of road test-
ing. (2016).. 
183
 Nicholson, A.; Wong, Y.-D.: Are accidents poisson distributed? (1993).; Gründl, M.: Diss., Fehlver-
halten als Ursache von Verkehrsunfällen (2005). 
Figure 24 Distance factor    
as a function of the probability of error   and the 
number of counted events   for the proof of being better than         
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events and   to the expected value with which events occur. The expected value   is 
defined by the quotient like equation (2-2) formalizes 
 
  
     
  
  
whereby       stands for the observed test distance and    for the safety performance of 
the system. The performance represents the expected number of kilometers between two 
events of the same kind. It is assumed that a certain number of kilometers       were 
driven and a number of events        occurred. Can we now define a worse and a better 
performance level    from this test? Equations (2-1) and (2-2) connect this with the 
search of an expected value  . Based on a probability of error value184        that is the 
same for both proofs             , the questions can be mathematically formulated 
with two equations. Section 2.4.2 already discusses equation (2-3) 
                    
This equation asks for which    the probability that        or less events happened is at 
most   . In this case, a numerical search
185
 for equation (2-4) provides the value   . 
This says that when        events occur after a distance of       it is statistically proven 
with a probability of    that the vehicle is better in terms of safety compared to a per-
formance level of    
     
  
. To prove that the OuT is better than the benchmark 
(        , the test       has to cover a multiple (  ) of the distance that lies between 
two events                  for the benchmark. Thus      . 
What has not yet been discussed is the proof of being unsafe expressed by equation 
(3-18) 
                    (3-18) 
For which expected number    is the probability to have at least        events counted 
less than or equal to   ? A function              is defined as the maximum solution of 
the numerical search for 
 
                 
  
 
  
    
        
 
                     (3-19) 
Exemplary results for the determining expected value    are found in tables in appendix 
A. This says that when        events occur after a distance      , it is statistically prov-
                                                 
184
 The value (5 %, 1 %, 0.1 % etc.) that is taken needs further considerations but is just one variable in 
that theory.  
185
 Tabular values or approximations exist but aren’t necessary as the numerical search is easely per-
formed in any calculation tool like Excel™ or Matlab™ for example. 
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en with error probability    that the vehicle is worse in terms of safety compared to a 
performance level of    
     
  
.  
 
Figure 25 depicts this connection between error probability, number of counted events, 
and the distance factor. When for example two events occurred (        ), one can 
conclude that the vehicle is less safe than         if the distance tested is smaller than 
        times the reference on an error probability          . If         times 
the reference, the proof is given for an error probability           . It makes sense 
that the areas flipped around from Figure 24 to Figure 25 as for proving higher safety 
we need less distance when reducing the level of significance and for proving less safety 
the other way around. Notice that at least one accident needs to be counted before one 
can state that the system is worse than anything else. That is the reason why the plot in 
Figure 25 starts at    . Figure 24 can be converted into Figure 25 by shifting the 
values for one event and calculating        . 
Figure 25 Distance factor    as a function of the probability of error        and 
number of counted events   for the proof of being worse than        . 
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For better understanding of the difference between equations (2-3) and (3-18), Figure 26 
illustrates an example. For          and     , the resulting PDF and CDF plots 
are presented, the light-open bars for the proven being better    and the dark-closed 
bars for the proven being worse   . 
Consequently, there exists an interval of uncertainty in-between proving safety and 
proving less safety. Let’s assume that the performance level for the benchmark is 
          . So after a distance of        , one of the relevant events should happen 
in statistical average. Now we want to introduce the OuT after it was tested for distance 
                  (3-20) 
and        events occurred. The necessary distance factor    describes the ratio be-
tween the test distance and the benchmark. From equation (3-18), it is known that the 
performance level of the OuT       is equal or worse 
 
      
     
  
  (3-21) 
Combining both equation (3-20) and (3-21), the performance level of the OuT is 
 
      
          
  
  (3-22) 
Equation (3-22) tells us that the OuT is worse than 
  
  
 times the benchmark. On the 
other hand, it only says that the vehicle is better than 
 
      
          
  
  (3-23) 
Figure 26 PDF and CDF for an example of          and           
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With this test it cannot be proven that the OuT is less safe than 
  
  
 times the benchmark, 
and on the other hand it is only proven that the OuT is safer than a 
  
  
 times worse sys-
tem 
           
  
       
          
  
  (3-24) 
To illustrate how either the number of events or the testing distance needs to change to 
come to a statement, both Figure 24 and Figure 25 can be combined in Figure 27.  
 
For the proof of being safer, the “Approval-Trap” explains why for economic reasons 
we will stay ahead of introduction in the white area of Figure 27. The same will result 
for the proof of less safety assuming an       being comparable with today’s bench-
mark. If we can’t prove it is less safe than the benchmark: Why should this system not 
be introduced into traffic? If we just know that it is safer than a 
  
  
-times worse system: 
Why should we take the risk to introduce the system?  
These questions will only be answered when the different positions of the affected 
parties, as described in section 1.3 “Societal Risk Constellation”, are discussed. The 
party that is affected negatively would argue: “Safety has not been proven, thus do not 
expose us to that risk and prevent the introduction of the vehicle!” The party that profits 
Figure 27 Distance factor    
as a function of the probability of error   and number of 
counted events   for comparison of proving better or worse. 
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from the technology would argue: “No one has proven less safety, thus do not withhold 
us from the benefits and introduce the vehicle!” 
On the one hand, the user is the one that will profit in first place. Thus, the question is: 
Will users tolerate a technology that is not safety proven and use it as long as no one has 
proven less safety? On the other hand, the bystanders would be the first that are mostly 
negatively affected. Is there a way these bystanders, called society, could be convinced 
to accept the uncertainty of the not yet been given proof of safety? 
It has been shown that the proof of safety is economically not possible up to the point of 
mass introduction but the proof of less safety is also pending. Obviously, it is necessary 
to refine the requirement. The next section will elaborate on the idea to split and refine 
the requirements depending on the affected parties. 
3.4 Requirements Refinement 
Q 16 Which safety level do humans require before using automated vehicles? 
Q 17 Which safety level does society require to tolerate the use of automated vehicles? 
Two sources of requirements have been identified on the safety assessment of AD3+. 
On the one hand, the individual of society, as the disadvantaged person, could ask for 
the proof of higher safety compared to today’s vehicles. On the other hand, the users, as 
the beneficiaries of automated driving, could ask for the proof of less safety if someone 
wants to prohibit the introduction of automated driving. 
Unfortunately, none of both attempts, taking a statistical proof under consideration, will 
succeed. The economics constraints together with an assumed level of safety will avoid 
the verification of any of both requirements before the mass introduction.  
Consequently, when both requirements can’t be fulfilled, the requirements need to be 
refined to make them verifiable. Therefore, this chapter will propose the so-called “safe-
ty detector”, firstly for the users’ perspective and secondly for the society’s perspective. 
Be aware that neither this thesis nor respective research activities can define require-
ments which society and users would accept offhandedly
186
. Nevertheless, my under-
standing is to concretize, formalize, and propose refined requirements as this seems 
necessary for a successive constructive follow up discussion. 
                                                 
186
 A more detailed discussion on the subjective versus objective persception of risks can be found in 
Fritzsche, A. F.: Wie sicher leben wir? (1986). 
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3.4.1 Users’ “Safety Detector” 
Freewill is the gateway to discuss the users’ requirement on safety. Fritzsche187 discuss-
es the difference of acceptable and inacceptable individual fatality risks reported in 
literature, illustrated in Figure 28. Among other topics, Fritzsche highlights that those 
humans taking risks voluntarily may accept risk levels they would never accept for 
work or, in general, involuntarily. 
Users of automated vehicles can be seen as taking these risks resulting from usage on 
free will. Consequently, the requirement from users on the safety of automated vehicles 
depends on her or his individual weighting. The requirement on safety assessment from 
a user’s perspective is concluded to be the need for transparency that he or she is able to 
weight responsibly. Objective numbers are necessary for the user to come up with a 
subjective conclusion.  
 
Two exemplary objective numbers are stated: 
 The safety performance level estimation in best- and worst-case. This follows from 
equation (3-24). After testing the vehicle, the values for          are known and 
         is derived from given statistics, thus the best- and worst-case can be calcu-
lated 
                              (3-25) 
As already discussed, this number has an additional “degree of freedom”: the prob-
ability of error       .  
                                                 
187
 Steininger, U.; Wech, L.: Wie sicher ist sicher genug? (2013). Condensed information from Fritzsche, 
A. F.: Wie sicher leben wir? (1986).  
Figure 28 Properties affecting the acceptable individual fatality risk 
(translated) 
187 
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To avoid this number as a degree of freedom, another error probability can be used 
as the objective number itself (see next). 
 A less intuitive but also expressive number is the error probability estimation      
for the proof of being safer as a benchmark. This follows equation (2-3). After test-
ing the vehicle, the values for        are known and        is derived from given 
statistics and the distance driven expressed by the distance factor    
                         (3-26) 
Additionally, the error probability estimation      for the proof of being less safe 
as a reference can be given by adapting equation (3-18)  
                         (3-27) 
The only degree of freedom with equations (3-26) and (3-27) is the benchmark that 
is used for deriving       . Different benchmarks can be used as long as their risk 
can be expressed on the same scale as the OuT risk. Take for example the safety 
performance    using a motorbike. 
Obviously, by changing the requirements from proving safety to producing transparen-
cy, the users’ role in safety assessment of automated vehicles has changed. The users are 
not anymore treated as one homogeneous group, but rather as many individuals. Each of 
the individuals has to weight, based on objective information, whether it wants to use 
the automated vehicle or not. 
The stricter requirement on the safety assessment of automated vehicles sensibly results 
from the disadvantaged persons (the society) and will be explained in the next section. 
3.4.2 Society’s “Safety Detector” 
It is assumed that society will not be satisfied with transparency for the assessment 
process if the safety outcome of automated driving could lower safety. This is related to 
the benefit and drawback share for society. Road traffic participants are only hardly able 
to avoid automated vehicles in total. That is one of the big differences compared to the 
user of the vehicles. It is an involuntary change in their risk constellation. Thus, it seems 
necessary to prove that by the introduction of automated vehicles the safety outcome of 
road traffic for society or the individual of the society will not change or only change in 
an acceptable manner. Therefore, we will first lay out some theoretical thoughts on the 
safety detector for the society and secondly derive one exemplary detector. 
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Theoretical Thoughts 
Hauer states on the problem of road safety
188
: 
Thus, in the context of heavy-truck safety, the question does not seem to be whether 
some kind of truck is over-represented, nor whether the accident rate of one type is 
larger than that of another type. Any interest which we might have in characteristic 
accident rates will derive from questions such as: ‘what will be the change in the 
number and severity of accidents if the use of a certain kind or size of vehicle is al-
lowed?’ 
As explained in section 1.4.1, the social as well as the individual safety for society 
depend on the absolute number of injuries   . If it is not possible to prove safety using 
the safety performance   -dimension of the three-dimensional road safety problem (see 
again Figure 12), another dimension has to be addressed to come to a proof of safety for 
society. This could either be the exposure expressed by the distance driven   or the ratio 
of injuries per accident    .  
On the one hand, without reducing the velocity (kinetic energy) of the OuT in compari-
son to the benchmark use case, it seems impossible to reduce the injury per accident rate 
significantly. And even then the      can only reduce to 1, thus only offers a minimal 
improvement potential compared to the value derived for 2013 (         . If the 
velocity is reduced stronger, it would mostly change the use case and thus the reference. 
On the other hand, by limiting the distance         that is driven with the new technolo-
gy, thus limiting the exposure of the society, the risk for society can be controlled signif-
icantly. Generally spoken this follows the idea of the finding of Paracelsus
189
 in chemis-
try:  
Alle Dinge sind Gift, und nichts ist ohne Gift; allein die dosis machts, daß ein Ding 
kein Gift sei. 
Translated
190
: 
All things are poisonous and nothing is without poison; only the dose makes a thing 
not poisonous. 
The question to answer for road traffic safety is: What is the acceptable dose of AD3+ 
vehicles within today’s road traffic? If         is the distance driven of vehicles with 
lower levels of automation and         the distance of AD3+ vehicles in automated 
                                                 
188
 Hauer, E.: On exposure and accident rate (1995). 
189
 Paracelsus, T.: Septem Defensiones (1538), p. 73. 
190
 Ottoboni, M. A.: The dose makes the poison (1991). 
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mode, the question is expressed by the right size of the value for        . If assuming 
an unchanged injury per accident ratio 
            (3-28) 
 as well as an unchanged total number of distance driven by all vehicles together 
                               (3-29) 
the question on road traffic safety narrows down to the change in numbers of accidents 
due to        . The discussion is obvious for the Vision Zero example. If no accidents 
occur, the highest safety for society has been reached in road traffic. But if the number 
of accidents with fatalities or other severity classes isn’t zero, the question is what num-
ber expresses no or positive change in road safety for society. An obvious conclusion is 
that the lower the accident number with respect to severity is, the higher the safety for 
society
191
. When checking the time series of accident numbers for a traffic system with 
defined boundaries, you will not find monotonic figures. Accordingly, also higher num-
bers within a limited range are tolerated by society as long as a trend leads higher or 
equal safety. Some kind of noise that is influenced by surrounding factors and not only 
by the skills of the single driven vehicle changes the accident numbers. Consequently, 
higher accident numbers cannot directly be linked with less safe single vehicles. For this 
reason, the society’s safety detector has a detector limit. This detector limit represents 
the lowest change in numbers which can be interpreted as higher, lower, or no change in 
safety. 
Thus, society’s requirement is defined: “as long as safety has not been proven by the 
safety performance   , a proof has to be given that the expected accident numbers will 
stay below a tolerated limit for society’s safety”.  
One exemplary Detector 
A detector limit is deduced based on the example in Figure 29. Each year, a discrete 
number of events was recorded. Over the years, the number decreased following a 
certain monotonic trend. This trend is not given but can be fitted by, for example, a least 
square approximation of a suitable mathematical function like a linear function
192
     . 
                                                 
191
 For these conclusions and theory, the system boarders of evaluation do not change. Germany is an 
example where this has to be taken into account as accident numbers cover after the reunification also 
the numbers of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR/DDR). 
192
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Other ways of time-series analysis may be applied like discussed in Bergel-Hayat and 
Zukowska
193
. 
 
As a simplification, the fitting is done for this example by the (red/solid) line (see Fig-
ure 29). All points differ from the trend line. These deviations are still independent from 
the technology we want to introduce. This fact leads to the question: How does the next 
number of recorded events has to differ from the values in the past, fitted by the trend 
line, to be sure that it was affected negatively? 
To propose one answer, the standard deviation of these events compared to the trend 
line is derived 
 
   
 
  
              
    
    
. (3-30) 
In this equation,    is the number of years and    is the number of events recorded in 
year  .    is the first year of evaluation and      the last year. We now define that 
                           (3-31) 
is indistinguishable from the trend line for society.       
 
 
 expresses the indistin-
guishable limit of numbers of events for the safety detector. This change in numbers is 
  times smaller than the standard deviation and therefore disappears in the noise of 
numbers each year. There is actually no way to prove or detect that the trend is affected 
negatively as the number is too small and lies below the limit of detection. 
Other approaches exist to define these limits for example for clinical laboratory meas-
urements. The Clinical and Laboratory Standards Institute (CLSI) has published a 
                                                 
193
 Bergel-Hayat, R.; Zukowska, J.: Review of time-series analysis (2015), p. 651–654. 
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Figure 29: Number of events recorded for 23 years and fitted by a linear equation 
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guideline EP17
194
 where the Limit of Blank (LoB), Limit of Detection (LoD), and Limit 
of Quantitation (LoQ) is derived from the Normal distribution. Based on this, 
Armbruster and Pry specify
195a
: 
LoB is the highest apparent analyte concentration expected to be found when repli-
cates of a blank sample containing no analyte are tested. 
                               
LoD is the lowest analyte concentration likely to be reliably distinguished from the 
LoB and at which detection is feasible. LoD is determined by utilising both the meas-
ured LoB and test replicates of a sample known to contain a low concentration of 
analyte. 
                                             
LoQ is the lowest concentration at which the analyte can not only be reliably detect-
ed but at which some predefined goals for bias and imprecision are met. The LoQ 
may be equivalent to the LoD or it could be at a much higher concentration. 
The number of 1.645 corresponds to 95 % cumulative probability of the Normal distri-
bution
195b
. It should be highlighted that for     and     also a repetition rate is rec-
ommended
195b
: 
A recommended practical number of LoB and LoD samples to be used by a manufac-
turer to establish these parameters is 60, while a laboratory verifying a manufactur-
er’s LoD (and possibly the LoB) is 20. 
Accident numbers may change in future, probably due to the introduction and use of 
automated driving. Consequently, the standard deviation might also be derived as a time 
variant parameter. Nevertheless, the limit proposed above is seen as a simplified first 
version that is used in the following. 
Coming from two requirements that can economically not be met ahead of introduction, 
this section 3.4 derived two refined requirements. These proposed requirements reflect 
the different societal risk constellations of users and society. This analysis led to less 
ambitious requirements that still could reflect the safety needs of the different affected 
parties. The next section 3.5 will lay out a strategy that aims to fulfill both requirements 
derived above. The society’s requirement suggests to widen the scope of safety assess-
ment, extending the testing phase, and planning the introduction. That is because the 
society’s safety detector works on numbers for the next year of real-world application. 
Thus, the following strategy describes the test, introduction, and supervision of auto-
mated vehicles based on estimated uncertainties. 
                                                 
194
 Pierson-Perry, J. F. et al.: Detection capability for clinical laboratory measurement (2012). 
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3.5 Uncertainty-Based Usage Strategy 
Q 18  How can users’ and society’s safety requirements be fulfilled? 
The main goal of this concept is to describe a way how to introduce automated driving 
and fulfill the users’ and society’s safety requirements. 
On top of that it seems reasonable that during usage there will come the point in time at 
which a statistical proof of safety or less safety is achievable (    ). How should then be 
continued with the introduction of new vehicles, either human or automated driven? It 
should be noticed that the requirements derived above do not vanish when automated 
vehicles have been introduced. Consequently, as long as AD3+ are in usage, the re-
quirements should be fulfilled at least from today’s perspective. 
The three following sections propose an uncertainty-based usage strategy for three 
phases of the automated vehicle usage. The testing phase       , the introduction phase 
       , and the supervision phase        (see Figure 30). The timeline in Figure 30 
depicts different time spans    as well as certain points in time   that are important for 
the understanding of the following explanation. The timeline will thus be used for ex-
planation. 
Figure 30 Timeline with crucial points in time   and time spans    for the usage theory 
After this subsection, in 3.6 “Usage Strategy Examination” certain parameter variations 
of the usage strategy are examined for the Autobahn Pilot and its safety outcomes. 
3.5.1 Testing Phase 
For the classical safety lifecycle of the automobile described in the ISO 26262
196
, test-
ing is defined as the  
process of planning, preparing and executing or exercising a system or system com-
ponent to verify that it satisfies specified requirements, to detect errors, and to create 
confidence in the system behaviour. 
                                                                                                                                               
195
 Armbruster, D. A.; Pry, T.: LoB, LoD, LoQ (2008), p. a:49, b:50. 
196
 ISO: DIS 26262: Road vehicles - Functional safety (2008), p. 16 part I. 
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Testing is part of verification and validation, thus the overall system development. It 
ends with the release for production. However, from today’s perspective the start of 
production does not need to be the end of development. Examples from Tesla Motors 
Inc.
197
 and others exist that report the activation of software-based functions after the 
vehicle is already in use by the customer. Due to that reason, the testing phase is defined 
as the phase starting with the first testable item of the automated vehicle        and 
ending with the release for usage (RfU    ) instead of the release for production. 
How this could actually change the safety lifecycle in automotive industry will be dis-
cussed in chapter 5. To evaluate the testing phase at     , the concept needs input data. 
Concept input during testing phase: 
To apply the concept, three steps need to be carried out: 
1. Identification of safety benchmark:  
The safety benchmark        , describing the distance between two relevant events, 
needs to be defined. This benchmark is a vector of different severities. Exemplary sever-
ities that will also be used in the next sections are accidents with injuries and accidents 
with fatalities. Conceivable are also near misses, describing a proximity to a real acci-
dent. As described in section 1.4 by the accident triangle, different severities need to be 
studied to come to a statement on safety 
 
         
          
 
          
 . (3-32) 
The source for concrete values might be road traffic statistics as described for the Auto-
bahn Pilot in section 3.6 and in general in chapter 4. 
2. Collection of test distance: 
The object under test (OuT) needs to be tested
198
 in a representative way. Representa-
tively covers all behavior effecting elements in a scenario. The vehicle itself should 
have reached a version that is as close to the series product as possible. The test driver 
and other passengers should behave representatively. This means that the test driver 
should be able to supervise and overwrite the vehicle without being recognizable as a 
driver. Concepts like the “Wizard-of-Oz” vehicle199 or driving instructor vehicle prepa-
rations could be a way to reach this illusion for the surrounding. Besides the passengers 
and the vehicle itself, a scenario is affected by the surrounding of the vehicle due to its 
                                                 
197
 Tesla Motors Inc.: SOFTWARE RELEASE NOTES v7.1, p. 1. 
198
 Schoettle, B.; Sivak, M.: Real-World Crashes Involving Self-Driving Vehicles (2015), p. 18. 
199
 Mok, B. K.-J. et al.: Wizard of Oz Design (2015). 
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sensors and force exchange with the environment. Depending on the use case, the sur-
rounding needs to be met in a representative way by testing the vehicle. This can either 
be done by defined test cases where representativeness needs to be shown, or by real-
world driving. The representativeness of real-world driving can be derived from the use 
case itself and knowledge about the users’ behavior for this use case. The same distance 
driven can lead to different levels of representativeness, so that the right selection of the 
travelled routes and environmental conditions plays a key role for this theory. This will 
be addressed in chapter 4 in more detail. 
The amount of representative distance needs to be collected during the testing time span 
       and is called 
                      . (3-33) 
The function         ) leads the distance driven during the time span    for which the 
start         and       end time can be found in Figure 30 
                              . (3-34) 
More distance will be driven also after      in the following phases. One of the main 
questions today is: How many kilometers should be tested before introduction? On that 
topic exists literature, but that mainly predicts
200
 numbers roughly. 
Besides these predicted literature values, two other methods are derived theoretically in 
the following. One method is called the “prevention of less safety” and the other the 
“monetary balance”. How the different test distances affect the usage strategy will be 
evaluated in section 3.6. 
The “prevention of less safety” proposes to drive that many test kilometers that although 
one new event       would occur the proof of less safety compared to the benchmark 
would fail. This is formalized by demanding  
                         (3-35) 
and                    leads to the values in Table 6. These values are the same as 
listed in appendix A, Table 15, but shifted by one event. 
Table 6 Necessary distance as a factor of         that is necessary to prevent the proof of less 
safety by one more event counted            . 
Number of events       : 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Distance factor   : 0.051 0.355 0.818 1.37 1.97 2.61 
                                                 
200
 Becker, J.: Toward Fully Automated Driving (2014), p. 16. 
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Thus, one way to define the test distance before RfU could be  
                           .  (3-36) 
Table 6 lists further values for            . These values could be used in the case 
that one event was recorded before the distance factor in column one was reached. If 
this happened, the proof of less safety would have been given during testing. For a 
comparable good system, this would be unlikely as has been described above (falsifica-
tion). Consequently, for further calculations the value from the first column is assumed 
to apply. 
The second method, the “monetary balance”, proposes to formalize the benefits of using 
the technology and set this in ratio with the costs of testing and using the technology. 
The principle is motivated by the ALARP approach (as low as reasonable practical). A 
simple relation is proposed for that 
                                                           . (3-37) 
In this equation,                represents the driven distance after the RfU. The time 
span         begins at the release for usage      and covers the time until the  ’s evalua-
tion after the release for usage       . This distance is multiplied once by a benefit factor 
        and by a cost factor        . The value of driven distance during testing         
is added to the inequality and multiplied by a cost factor        . Equation (3-37) sum-
marizes the monetary benefits on the left of the inequality and the costs on the right. No 
matter when the test distance is driven, in average a certain distance        is necessary 
to reach the statistical proof of safety, thus 
                              . (3-38) 
Applying equation (3-38) to equation (3-37), we can derive another definition of the 
distance that should be driven during testing phase 
        
        
               
                       
                           
        
               
                       
                           
 . (3-39) 
Two cases need to be studied (equation (3-39)). As long as                 
         , it would be better to test more distance before introduction, thus increase 
       . In the other case                          , it would be better to stop 
testing and start the usage.  
From these three values (                       ), the benefits during usage 
(       ) as well as the costs during testing (       ) are independent from the safety 
performance of the OuT. The determining factor to calculate         is the number of 
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events that will occur. Assuming the performance vector of the OuT (     ) and com-
bining this with the weighting factors explained in section 1.4.1, the cost factor can be 
defined as 
                
 
        
       
 
        
. (3-40) 
Applying this to the lower case of equation (3-39), a relation defines for which worst-
case estimation the test during usage should be started 
 
       
 
             
       
 
             
                  (3-41) 
For further discussions, ahead of testing without knowledge about the      , a ratio 
between the safety performance level of different severities       is assumed 
       
             
             
. (3-42) 
Equations (3-41) and (3-42) result in an inequality that defines a lower boundary for the 
worst-case estimation of the safety performance of the OuT 
               
                
                      
. (3-43) 
As soon as it can be proven that the OuT’s performance is above that level, the “mone-
tary balance” approach suggests to give the RfU. The necessary distance for this proof 
can be calculated based on equation (3-23). The distance factor (based on          ) 
as the result of this calculation is given in Table 7 and has already been discussed in 
Figure 18.  
Table 7 Necessary distance as a factor of            that is necessary for monetary balance 
(based on          ). 
Number of events     : 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Distance factor       : 3 4.74 6.3 7.75 9.15 10.5 
Thus, another way to determine         is formalized by 
                
                
                      
.  (3-44) 
However, the table highlights that there is not just a single value that can be defined as 
the necessary distance. This distance depends on the safety performance of the OuT.  
Thus, a logical loop is defined: The necessary distance for identifying the safety per-
formance of the OuT depends on the safety performance of the OuT. This loop only 
exists when trying to estimate the necessary distance before introduction, not when 
applying the theory during real testing. This logical loop can be solved when asking for 
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the most probable case that is described by the expected number of events      
       
        
. Given this, together with equation (3-44), the column from Table 7 can be 
selected when  
                     .  (3-45) 
A possible way to determine the cost and benefit factors (                       ) as 
well as the right column of Table 7 is presented in the next section 3.6, when the usage 
strategy is parameterized. 
3. Record of events: 
Different events will occur during testing. These are separated into: 
a) Accidents due to automation control 
b) Accidents due to human control 
c) Near misses due to automation control 
d) Near misses due to human control 
e) Interventions due to danger 
f) Interventions due to instruction 
g) Others 
Events that are of relevance are accidents and near misses due to automation control and 
interventions due to danger as the test driver anticipates an arising accident. Thinking 
back to the Bernoulli experiment,        in general would be 
 
          
     
   
 (3-46) 
with       trials until the end of the testing phase     . Or similar to the test distance, the 
number of events within the testing distance is defined by 
These events sensitive to severity need to be counted 
 
 
        
         
 
         
 . (3-48) 
Interventions due to danger (case e) ) need to be post-processed, as the hypothetical 
severity is unknown. Without a corresponding severity, no benchmark for comparison 
with human driven vehicles would exist, and these numbers could only serve to com-
pare automated vehicles. Due to the reason that more events will be counted in the 
 
 
                              . (3-47) 
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following phases, a time step is introduced indicating testing       , so that the number 
of events can be assigned to testing by               . 
Fulfillment of users’ requirement evaluated during testing phase: 
Per definition, during testing phase, the test drivers take care of the automated vehicle’s 
safety. Nevertheless, based on the kilometers and events that are counted during testing, 
a prediction on the automated vehicle’s safety after RfU is necessary. The question that 
should be answered is whether the OuT fulfills users’ requirements during usage. As is 
described in section 3.4.1, two main approaches exist to transparently report the predict-
ed safety of automated vehicles for future users based on the testing results and thereby 
to fulfill the requirement. These approaches are briefly repeated to explain the strategy. 
 Calculate the best- and worst-case estimation 
To apply a best- and worst-case estimation, a concrete value for the level of significance 
       needs to be defined. Of importance is that this value is communicated and ex-
plained for interpretation. Applying equation (3-21) on                        , the 
best- and worst-case estimation of the OuT’s safety performance vector 
                        and                          can be calculated. Both have two 
components for the different severity levels. The      indicates that the estimation is 
calculated at      and uses the data collected before. To better understand the different 
time indices, please see Figure 30. 
 Calculate the proof’s uncertainty 
Following equations (3-26) and (3-27) the uncertainty vector for the proof of being 
better            and the uncertainty vector for the proof of being worst            is 
calculated using        . The smaller the proof-of-being-better uncertainty the better 
for introduction.  
Fulfillment of society’s requirement evaluated during testing phase: 
The test driver serves as the safety fallback solution and thereby fulfills the society’s 
safety requirements during the testing phase. The goal is to predict whether the OuT will 
also fulfill the safety requirement stated by society when the test driver is not present. 
Therefore, the society’s tolerated number of events                  needs to be derived. 
      represents the time span for which the numbers      are tolerated. The observation 
time for the explained society’s “Safety Detector” (see section 3.4.2) was one year, thus 
this time span is also used for deriving the tolerated numbers 
               .  (3-49) 
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This tolerated number        can be derived using different approaches. Three possible 
approaches that are objectively arguable are explained in the following. Others and 
more complex ones are possible. In principle, the approaches explained in the following 
base on the detector limit       and formalize additional possible events. 
 The Detector’s Limit: Understanding automated driving as a new mode of mobility, 
it is difficult to argue that events due to existing mobility concepts are “replaced”. 
Accordingly, it is consequent to require that existing safety in road traffic is not be-
ing influenced by the introduction of automated vehicles. The consequence would 
be to equate the tolerated number of events with the detector’s limit, derived for ex-
ample from equation (3-31) on a yearly base 
                   .  (3-50) 
 The Mobility Replacement: One could argue differently when understanding auto-
mated driving as a replacement for human driving. On top of the detector’s limit, 
the society could additionally allow the vehicle to “replace” the number of events 
               that arise if human driven vehicles would be used 
                                
               
                
          
                
          
   .  
(3-51) 
The “ ” symbol indicates201 the Hadamard- or Schur-product that is defined for 
two matrices of the same dimension as the element-wise multiplication. To calcu-
late the expected number of events that would result from conventional human driv-
ing (               , equation (2-2) is applied. Necessary for application is the av-
erage performance of human drivers         and the worst-case estimation of the 
safety performance of the OuT            to calculate the event ratio. The safety 
performance of the human as the benchmark has already been defined by equation 
(3-32).  
 The Special Needs Safety Account: The before explained approach predicts safety 
into future application. A more conservative approach would look back in time and 
ask for the experience on the safety impact. A concept would be to have a safety 
event account. The tolerated number of events depends on the sum of the detector 
limit and on this account             
                            .  (3-52) 
                                                 
201
 Voigt, C.; Adamy, J.: Formelsammlung der Matrizenrechnung (2012), p. 13. 
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The account numbers can be derived in different ways based on the information 
known at  . As at the point in time      there is no history of usage, the value for 
the account can be derived for the first time after the release for usage. 
                
         
       
            .  (3-53) 
Either the difference of the number of events an average human driver generates 
compared to the number of events counted during testing (          ) will be add-
ed to the detector’s limit (equation (3-53). Or like initiatives try to motivate, a more 
differentiated consideration of additional benefits might be tolerable. Considering 
the usage demand of mobility-limited people, a share of the distance (       could 
be seen as of higher benefit for these mobility-limited people. Consequently, a low-
er safety performance (         ) as the safety performance of the benchmark in-
creases the number of tolerated events. The resulting special needs event account 
replaces the event account in equation (3-52) by 
 
                      
 
            
 
            
       .  (3-54) 
These three approaches have a significant impact on the usage strategy because they 
limit the usage as is described in the following. Additionally, approaches two and three 
have a self-reinforcing character. They reward a potentially safe system and penalize a 
potentially worse system. 
The key question is: How to predict whether the consequences of deploying automated 
vehicles in means of event numbers will or will not exceed the tolerated numbers de-
rived above? A careful approach is to assume a worst-case safety performance and limit 
the number of allowed distance driven. A possible way would be to use the  
                        estimated above, but using        would neglect the interven-
tion by the limitation of distance. By limiting the distance, the consequences of a mis-
judgment are reduced. Type one and type two errors are caught by the introduction 
phase evaluation in every time step       . Because of that impact reduction, the worst-
case estimation is performed with less significance       . In general, the inequality 
(3-55) states an order between the probability of error, but as has been described
202
 the 
specific values are arbitrary 
                (3-55) 
                                                 
202
 Cowles, M.; Davis, C.: On the origins of the 5% level (1982), p. 1. 
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The worst-case estimation of the OuT’s performance vector                      thus 
follows equation (3-21) and this time applies       .  
Adapting equation (2-1), the requirement to not exceed the tolerated number of events 
can be formulated mathematically: 
                        (3-56) 
Find the expected value              that leads to more then        events with an error 
probability       . The expected value for tolerated events is found on each severity 
level by                                     . With the expected value of the Poisson-
distribution              and the worst-case safety performance 
                       , “tolerated” distances are calculated by 
                                                      (3-57) 
The minimum is chosen from the vector of allowed distances         , as only one 
limitation can be set. The allowed distances refer to a certain time window       that is 
defined by the analysis time span of the tolerated number of events. The shorter the 
chosen time window the lower the tolerated number of events will be. When observing 
a year        , the number of tolerated events is obviously higher compared to an 
observation of one day.  
To decouple the examination from this observed time window, an expected event rate 
can be derived. As long as this rate is constant over time it can be derived by the follow-
ing quotient 
 
            
            
  
  (3-58) 
Alternatively, the expected event rate could also be calculated by the derivative of the 
event rate as a function of time 
 
             
        
   
 
    
  (3-59) 
For reasons of simplicity, at a point in time yearly constant tolerated expected values 
       are assumed. Similar like before, the calculated expected event rate             can 
be used to restrict the usage of automated systems. This time the usage is limited by a 
defined maximum average yearly velocity the vehicles are allowed to drive in automat-
ed mode 
                                                   (3-60) 
From the vector of velocities      , the minimal number is chosen for limitation. 
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Caution: The defined velocity is the allowed average yearly velocity for all automated 
vehicles together. This upper limit of velocity follows the idea: the higher the velocity, 
the more Bernoulli experiments   are carried out during a certain time. Thus, by limit-
ing the velocity, the chance to encounter a relevant event within one trial stays the same, 
but the number of trials reduces and consequently the outcome of relevant events gets 
lower. How this velocity is influenced by different parameters like the test distance or 
the approach to derive the tolerated events is discussed in section 3.6 based on exam-
ples. 
Based on this theory, the automated vehicles will be introduced during the introduction 
phase, explained in the next subsection. 
3.5.2 Introduction Phase 
The introduction or deployment of AD3+ vehicles to real traffic without a human driver 
as a supervisor begins with     . At this point, the statistical proof of higher safety of 
the OuT is still pending. Nevertheless, the users’ and society’s requirements are ful-
filled. However, the fulfillment of the requirements could change as new test distance 
and events are collected by driving in real traffic. This new experience and knowledge is 
used to reduce uncertainty about the safety of automated vehicles. The introduction 
phase ends with the proof of more or less safety at     . The introduction phase is han-
dled as follows: 
Concept input during introduction phase: 
Not more than the allowed velocity derived with equation (3-60) should be driven with 
automated vehicles within the planned use case. This should be ensured either by the 
users or better by the automated driving function itself
203
. The allowed velocity can be 
shared between all vehicles that enable automated driving within the defined use case. 
Knowing the average velocity of the vehicles                , their velocity driven 
automated is limited by 
 
             
    
      
  (3-61) 
When the velocity of the individual vehicle is unknown, the velocity can be limited by 
the amount of active automated driving functions       that result either from the 
assumed average yearly velocity      
                                                 
203
 The jam assist of different OEMs today also is limited to highway scenarios. This should be adaptable 
also for the described use case. This limitation could be extended to a velocity limitation. 
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  (3-62) 
or from the maximum drivable velocity of the use case        by  
 
       
      
       
   (3-63) 
No matter which way the velocity is limited, as long as it is above zero the result of 
application will be more driven distance within the use case. New driven distance means 
new information for assessment. At any point in time                    after release 
of usage, the fulfillment of the requirements is evaluable. Assuming the knowledge 
about the driven velocity           , the additional distance should be recorded and can 
be seen as the test distance         . As this distance has been collected during real-
world usage, the representativeness is without question. Together with the test distance 
during testing phase, a total is defined by 
                                        
                           
      
    
  
(3-64) 
Due to new distance, additional relevant events will occur. The sum over time of the 
events follows equation (3-48) 
 
                 
         
 
         
 . (3-65) 
Together with the events during testing phase, a total of events is defined by 
                                          (3-66) 
For the introduction phase, all relevant events are connected with a severity level as no 
test driver exists to intervene before a near miss or accident
204
 event (see automated 
driving definition in section 1.1). 
Based on these new events and distance, the fulfillment of stated requirements needs to 
be checked: 
                                                 
204
 To the authors understanding the interaction concept between human and machine is still unknown for 
higher automated vehicles. Accordingly the chance exists that also during introduction phase the nor-
mal drivers might be able to overrule the automation. This should be kept in mind, when counting 
events. 
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Fulfillment of users’ requirement during introduction phase: 
The more distances driven, the better distinguishable two systems with different per-
formance values are. See the example in Figure 31 where system one is twice as good as 
system two          . System one gets distinguishable from system two the more 
kilometers       are driven. To calculate the values of the Poisson distributions in Figure 
31, the test kilometers have been increased from column one to three by the factors 
         . 
This example illustrates that updating the performance estimations 
                          and                           at        by the gained data 
will be necessary to keep the information up to date for users of automated vehicles. 
The same is true for the uncertainty evaluation              and             . 
Fulfillment of society’s requirement during introduction phase: 
The allowed velocity for automated vehicles                will change due to new 
information about the estimated safety of automated vehicles 
                          and a change in tolerance of events        due to automated 
driving. At certain points in time       , the allowed velocity can be updated by adapt-
ing the equations (3-56) to (3-60) to the new time span and point in time following 
Figure 30. 
Additionally, the risk which has been taken can be evaluated during introduction, ex-
pressed as an error probability by deploying the automated driving technology. This is 
similar to the uncertainty evaluation for the users’ perspective. Known is the worst-case 
 
Figure 31 Poisson distribution PDF and CDF comparison of two safety performance 
level for different test kilometer as evaluation basis and one severity  . 
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approximation of the OuT                           and the driven distance 
               as well as the tolerated number of events                   defined one 
point in time ahead of evaluation (    . Using these information first  
 
       
 
 
 
 
 
              
                            
              
                             
 
 
 
 
 (3-67) 
and secondly the probability that the counted number of events would have occurred is 
calculable by 
                                             (3-68) 
These values are sensitive to the level of severity, thus        is a vector and equation 
(3-68) has to be evaluated for each level of severity. 
3.5.3 Supervision Phase 
Above the requirement to generate objective information for users, the introduction 
phase has the potential to generate enough distance that is necessary for the final proof 
of safety. This was not achievable during testing phase (see section 2.4.2). The more 
distance is driven, the better the chance to distinguish a safe from an unsafe OuT. This is 
depicted for explanation in Figure 31. One theoretical exception exists for         
     . In real application, the chance for exactly               is very little and 
thus this is more a theoretical problem. Over time (       , the estimated performance 
                          will converge to the real performance      .  
At one point in time      (see Figure 30), the estimated performance will exceed the 
benchmark  
                                  (3-69) 
or in contrast it could also occur that the best-case estimation drops below the bench-
mark 
                                 (3-70) 
Equation (3-69) formalizes case 1: the proof of more safety and equation (3-70) formal-
izes case 2: the proof of less safety. It seems wise to keep in mind that one of these two 
cases can happen. Firstly, because it is unclear what happens if automated vehicles of 
different brands get directly comparable in means of safety? Would certain vehicles be 
withdrawn from traffic? Secondly, it is unclear what happens if the automated system is 
proven less safe? Would then all vehicles get banned from road traffic? Thirdly, it is 
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unclear what happens after safety has been proven? Would then the limitation of veloci-
ty be obsolete? 
The first question is out of our scope. The second and third question can be addressed 
by reviewing both, the users’ requirements and the society’s requirements. The results 
might be applied to the supervision phase (      ) after the proof of safety (      .  
Concept input during supervision phase: 
To argue about a safety evolution, further driven distances as well as resulting events 
need to be counted and reported. Obviously, after a safety proof, the question may arise 
why a further supervision is of relevance. However, it should be kept in mind that the 
safety proof was given on data of the past. A proof can only be given retrospective or 
based on the guarantee that the system under observation, meaning road traffic in this 
case, is not changing over time. I assume that no one can give this guarantee for open 
road traffic. Consequently, the proof of safety, although it is the best guess for the fu-
ture, is only valid for the past. As today’s traffic changes over time, the different capa-
bilities of human driver and automated driver will result in changing performance levels 
        and       over time
205
. Accordingly, the check for fulfillment of both re-
quirements should not end with      because the requirements will not vanish either. 
Thus, at several points in time        the data and information from         should be 
exermined. 
Fulfillment of users’ requirement during supervision phase: 
The users’ requirement asks at        for the update of the objective safety indicators 
being the performance estimations                           and 
                         . The same should be done for the uncertainty evaluation 
             and             . 
The equations to calculate these values remain the same. A time window         for 
evaluation has to be chosen carefully. During the first evaluation at     , the whole 
amount of distance and corresponding events must be used for evaluation. This point in 
time is the first time when enough information is accessible to conduct the proof of 
safety. This whole time span is described by               . All the information within 
this time span is necessary to reach the required level of significance. After      this 
might change. To keep the same significance, not all information before      is neces-
sary for evaluating safety. In other words: when using all information, also the “oldest”, 
                                                 
205
 Wachenfeld, W.; Winner, H.: Do Autonomous Vehicles Learn? (2016). 
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we do not evaluate the actual safety but implement some kind of filter that smoothes the 
safety information. 
Therefore, a sliding window with an adaptive width defined by its evaluation point in 
time        and its time span         is defined. Its characteristic is that based on the 
information within this time window the required error probability   would be reached. 
Using this time window, up to date information about the safety of existing vehicles 
applied to today’s road traffic is gathered. Important is that the distance traveled within 
this time window is representative. If this can’t be stated, neglecting old data is not 
reasonable. For this thesis, the studied OuT as well as the area of usage is assumed to be 
time-invariant. Consequently, a sliding window is not necessary. Nevertheless, for real-
world application this issue needs to be addressed. 
If the proof of safety (case 1) occurs, the user’s requirements are fulfilled given a pre-
defined uncertainty. Thus, there is no reason from users’ perspective to further limit the 
introduction of these vehicles. 
If the proof of less safety (case 2) occurs, the users’ requirements are still fulfilled as 
long as these results are transparently and instantaneously reported. To my understand-
ing, expressed by equation (1-1), it is not absolute to ask for higher safety. Obviously, 
this is discussable depending on the benefits besides safety and needs a strong debate by 
affected parties. At this point in time, this debate can be conducted as knowledge from 
real usage exists. From the users’ perspective, the proof of less safety doesn’t change 
his/her task to interpret the knowledge about safety for him- or herself.                                                         
Fulfillment of society’s requirement during supervision phase: 
The output of the society’s requirement is the allowed velocity for automated vehicles 
              . This velocity is affected differently depending on the case that occurs. 
Proof of higher safety - case 1: Should the allowed velocity be set unlimited and thereby 
should the usage of automated vehicles not be limited anymore after     ? On the one 
hand, arguments exist to not limit the usage: Safety has been proven thus it can be treat-
ed as regular vehicles today. Today’s distances traveled as the result of a velocity are not 
limited. Why should automated usage be limited? On the other hand, arguments exist to 
further limit the usage: When increasing the allowed velocity, the number of events 
could increase although the vehicles drive safer. This might happen especially when 
additional distance will be driven, due to the chance that vehicles drive without passen-
gers. This would be of interest if the numbers of vehicles are reduced and car and/or 
ride sharing concepts are implemented. To give access to existing users and enable the 
same amount of mobility, the vehicles need to be distributed without passengers. The 
number and speed of AD2- vehicles today is limited by driver licenses. AD3+, if not 
3 Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment 
102 
 
limited artificially for example by the allowed speed, would theoretically not be limited 
by anything than economic reasons. 
Proof of lower safety - case 2: Should the allowed velocity be set to zero and thereby 
should the usage of automated vehicles be prevented after     ? The answer depends on 
additional benefits that might outweigh the additional risks. Some kind of limited usage 
seems appropriate. The approaches explained to derive the allowed velocity already 
include a reaction on a bad best-case estimation. The usage strategies reduce the al-
lowed velocity and thereby limit the impact on safety for society.  
No matter which case occurs, this point in time      defined by the proof of lower or 
higher safety should be seen as the point in time when a profound decision can be made: 
What is the future of AD3+ mobility? A strict prohibition as well as a strict deregulation 
seems not appropriate from the safety point of view. It is more about the question on 
how to limit the risks for everybody. 
3.6 Usage Strategy Examination 
Q 19 How will the usage strategy affect the deployment of automated driving and how 
will different parameters influence the safety outcome? 
To answer Q 19, the usage strategy described above is now applied for a fictive Auto-
bahn-Pilot in Germany. The performed calculation steps described above are arranged 
for better understanding in a simplified flowchart, depicted in Figure 32. This flowchart 
separates the usage strategy evaluation (gray background) from the reality simulation 
(light background). The reality simulation needs to be performed, as no real AD3+ 
vehicle has yet been tested and used. 
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Figure 32 Simplified flowchart of usage strategy for automated systems 
 
To study the application of the strategy, simplifications for reality simulation are as-
sumed. One main simplification is that the surrounding world is not changing (time-
invariant), i.e.: 
 The    of the benchmark and the OuT do not change over time. 
 The costs of events do not change over time. 
 The usage demand and behavior do not change over time 
 The tolerance, general infrastructure, etc. do not change over time. 
Given these simplifications, the following subsections first identify and define the pa-
rameters that influence the strategy by explaining the flowchart. Second, assign exem-
plary values to the parameters. Third, define criteria for evaluation. Fourth, analyze the 
result of the simulation. Last, subsection 3.6.5 will conclude on the usage strategy ex-
amination. 
3.6.1 Usage Strategy Parameter Identification 
Today, concrete values are unknown for the application of the usage strategy. These 
values are: 
     – The usage demand formalized by four different average yearly velocities.  
       – The safety performance vector of the OuT that describes average distance 
in between two events of the same severity level. 
These parameters are defined as assumptions and serve as concept input in Figure 32. 
These assumptions are used to simulate the output of testing and real usage (light back-
ground). Obviously, these assumptions are not necessary if a real automated vehicle is 
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tested and introduced. The usage demand depends on the users that would request the 
vehicle. The safety performance vector is the safety characteristic of the automated 
vehicle itself. Thus, in section 3.6.2, values are assigned to these assumptions for study-
ing the theory’s outcome.  
As Figure 32 indicates, another input is needed for the application of the usage strategy 
(gray background). The so-called definitions have to be derived also in real-world ap-
plication of the theory: 
        – The probability of error that is used to derive the best- and worst-case es-
timations of the OuT for the proof of lower or higher safety. 
         – The total distance which the automated vehicles have been driven under 
testing conditions before the release for usage     . 
         – The safety performance vector is used as the benchmark for comparison. 
               – The probability of error, the tolerated number of events. Both are 
used to derive the allowed velocity. 
Thus, in section 3.6.2, these definitions are assigned values to simulate the usage strate-
gy. 
Given these assumptions and definitions as model input, the theory can be applied. 
Application means to execute different numerical calculations either for the usage strat-
egy evaluation (Figure 32 gray-background) or the reality simulation (Figure 32 light 
background). At a point in time  , the updated distance driven by automated vehicles, 
either during testing or usage, as well as the number of events is taken for evaluation. 
Based on the defined probability of error, the best- and worst-case performance vectors 
of the OuT are estimated. These estimations are compared with a defined performance 
benchmark vector to either stop the usage, go back to testing, or to limit the usage. The 
limitation is done by the defined error of probability and the tolerated number of events 
resulting in an allowed velocity. 
This allowed velocity is the output of the usage strategy evaluation and the input of the 
usage simulation. The simulated usage closes the evaluation loop by calculating a dis-
tance traveled during the time span    as well as the numbers of events that might have 
happened during this time span. The simulated usage limits the velocity either by the 
allowed velocity or the velocity demanded by newly registered vehicles.  
As Figure 32 indicates, the evaluation which is depicted as a loop is executed several 
times and its output (        influences its inputs (       and      ). Consequently, two 
simulation parameters need to be assigned: 
    – The length of the time span between two evaluations. 
      – The end of simulation for this usage strategy examination. 
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3.6.2 Usage Strategy Parameter Assignment 
To study the theory, values need to be assigned to the parameters identified above. 
Either specific values can be derived theoretically or, if this is not possible, the follow-
ing sections will study the sensitivity of the usage strategy outcome for different param-
eter combinations. 
Necessary Assumptions 
    – Several technologies exist that have found their way into every newly registered 
automobile. From Litman
206
 there exists a publication that tries to predict the autono-
mous vehicle implementation based on these technology experiences and on different 
other contributing factors. In general, all predictions of future take rates suffer high 
uncertainty. Especially for a new technology, if few comparable products exist. Howev-
er, there will still be some difference between the real introduction depending on the 
usage demand and the total introduction when every new vehicle is equipped with a 
technology (equipment ratio         .  
Accordingly to Sefati
207
, the ESC (electronic stability control) equipment ratio from 
1995 until 2015 is considered to get a simple predictor of the usage demand of automat-
ed driving functions. The ESC equipment ratio is chosen because it describes the ratio 
from 0 to 1 of newly registered vehicles in Germany, thus it stands for a successful 
introduction. Additionally, it is a safety relevant function that supports the driver. Alt-
hough the real equipment demand will differ from this approximation, it is seen as a 
first best guess. 
                                                 
206
 Litman, T.: Autonomous Vehicle Implementation Predictions (2014). 
207
 Sefati, M.: Benefit Analysis of Automated Safety Systems, Report Project Ko-KOMP (2013), p. 8–9. 
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Figure 33 depicts the equipment ratio for ESC where year 0 is the year of introduction 
1995. To derive a possible equipment ratio for automated driving, the ESC numbers are 
fitted by a cosine function up to year 20 
 
       
 
 
       
 
    
          
       
  . (3-71) 
The usage demand for automated driving is expressed by the average yearly velocity  . 
This average yearly velocity   is defined by 
 
  
  
 
 (3-72) 
where    is the annually driven distance and the number of hours of one year are  
        . This velocity should not be confused with the average velocity   that is 
defined by the distance driven   and the time it takes to drive this distance    
 
   
  
  
  (3-73) 
The usage ratio    is defined by the quotient of both velocities 
 
   
  
 
 
  
 
  (3-74) 
For one vehicle in today’s Autobahn traffic, the average yearly velocity is 
         
    
      
       
  
 
. (3-75) 
 
Figure 33 Automotive technology equipment rate for ESP and predicted for AD3+ 
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That is calculated based on the distance driven
208a
 by all vehicles (Kfz) on the Autobahn 
in Germany in 2013              
    , the number of registered vehicles that 
might access the Autobahn (passenger cars/Pkw:         , motorcycles/Krafträder: 
        , busses/Kraftomnibusse:          , trucks/Lkw:          articulated 
vehicles/Sattelzüge:          and others/übrige Kfz:         ) in Germany208b 2013 
              
  and the hours of one year              . Additionally, a factor 
      
    
     
      is necessary to correct the numbers of vehicles as also vehicles not 
registered in Germany lead to driven distances on German Autobahn. This factor is 
taken from a counting
209
 of foreign vehicles on German Autobahn in 2008. Thus, the 
usage demand in general is calculated by multiplying a number of vehicles with this 
average yearly velocity        . For all vehicles              
  that drove on 
German Autobahn in 2013, the usage demand is expressed by the velocity 
 
                             
  
  
 
  (3-76) 
The usage demand of newly registered vehicles is a function of time 
 
                                 
 
 
 (3-77) 
with the rate of newly registered vehicles being 
 
            
       
 
          (3-78) 
The number of newly registered vehicles (Kfz) in Germany 2013 multiplied with the 
correction factor is                
 . 
When assuming an equipment ratio being smaller than 1 described by equation (3-71), 
the usage demand follows to be 
                         
 
 
. (3-79) 
The rate of registered vehicles following an equipment ratio is defined as 
 
        
       
 
       (3-80) 
The usage demand increases from year to year and represents how many vehicles would 
be driven automated in real traffic if no limitations by a usage strategy are implemented. 
This is depicted in Figure 34. The life expectancy of vehicles is not modelled. Assuming 
the usage demand is not changing, there will be an upper limit given by        . 
                                                 
208
 BMVI et al.: Verkehr in Zahlen 2015/16 (2016), p. a:106, b:133. 
209
 Lensing, N.: BASt-Zählung Ausländischer Kraftfahrzeugverkehr 2008 (2010), p. 18. 
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Predicting the equipment ratio    for    years into the future suffers high uncertainty 
for different reasons. One is the comparison with a technical system of the past (e.g. 
ESC) that has different benefits and drawbacks. Others are the regulatory dependency or 
the self-reinforcing effect as the usage demand would be highly influenced by the safety 
impact. Additionally, financial and lifestyle factors in general affect the usage demand. 
Nevertheless, for the simulation the usage demand expressed by different velocities     
is necessary to analyze and compare the impact of different parameters. For the real-
world application of the theory,    should be measured or at least estimated continu-
ously to reduce these uncertainties. 
Besides the upper limit for a usage demand        , a lower limit can also be calculated. 
This lower limit can for example be motivated by the “Convention on the Rights of 
Persons with Disabilities” (CRPD) Article 4.1.g210: 
To undertake or promote research and development of, and to promote the availabil-
ity and use of new technologies, including information and communications technol-
ogies, mobility aids, devices and assistive technologies, suitable for persons with 
disabilities, giving priority to technologies at an affordable cost; 
The lower limit of demand would be for the benefit of people with mobility limitations 
due to disabilities. This lower limit may be calculated based on numbers from repre-
sentative surveys. In 2002, a seventh of the respondents of the German mobility study
211
 
                                                 
210
 UN: Protection and Promotion of the Rights and Dignity of Persons with Disabilities (2006), p. 9. 
211
 Follmer, R. et al.: Mobilität in Deutschland 2002 (2004), p. 141–144. The newer study from 2008 
doesn’t deliver the same information to calulate  . See Follmer, R. et al.: Mobilität in Deutschland 
2008 (2010), p. 85–86. 
Figure 34 Usage demand for the Autobahn pilot 
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suffered disabilities. Of these respondents, 2/3 answered that this would result in mobili-
ty limitations. This limitation for individual mobility resulted for them in only 10.3 km 
of self-driving whereas people without disabilities ended up driving 26.3 km a day. The 
average distance for all respondents is reported with 25.1 km. From these figures, a 
mobility demand considering a mobility limitation factor         is derived and is 
applied to the total number of newly registered vehicles 
                            (3-81) 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
           
    
       . (3-82) 
This number of    has to be used carefully, because it is a rough simplification of the 
actual challenge mobility limited people are confronted with. Automated driving might 
be one step to overcome their limitations, but other hindrances for mobility like difficult 
building access will still exist. In addition, the Autobahn-Pilot will not be the first use 
case for mobility limited people. 
      – The second assumption that needs to be assigned is the safety performance 
vector of the automated vehicle. As the missing information about the performance is 
the origin point for the whole thesis, different values are assumed. The relation between 
the safety performance values and the safety outcome of the strategy is studied. The 
range of performance level that is reasonable to be discussed may be derived from 
today’s performance level variation due to human vehicle control. Studies212 have been 
conducted that deliver a factor of approximately 6 between an experienced driver and a 
young (17 years old) inexperienced driver. Their performance is measured in accidents 
per year. The principle of the model that is built based on the results of the study is 
depicted in Figure 35. The median number of accidents of this studied sample is
212a
 
         for drivers with 6000-9999 annual mileage. The variation of the assumed 
performance factor       is defined by  
                   (3-83) 
                       (3-84) 
where              represents the upper end of human performance and     
                       One order of safety performance better and worse OuT are 
chosen as representatives to see how the strategy deals with significantly worse or better 
systems. 
                                                 
212
 Maycock, G.; Lockwood, C. R.: The accident liability of British car drivers (1993), p. a:235 Table 1. 
Caution: these are numbers for British drivers reported 1993. This is a first best attempt to use mean-
ingful ratios between median and extreme values. An update for this numbers should be done for con-
cept application. 
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This performance vector of the automated vehicle can be used in different ways to 
simulate the occurrence of an event. Either the Poisson process is simulated or a deter-
ministic simulation using the expected value is performed. To study the effect of the 
different assumptions and definitions, a deterministic process is used as this is what is 
most likely to happen in reality.  
Necessary Definitions 
        - The Autobahn Pilot for Germany is studied, thus today’s average values 
(2013)
214
 are taken as the benchmark 
 
        
 
 
 
 
 
    
     
    
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
     
  
         
   
   
 
 
 
         
    
           
  (3-85) 
with the number of accidents with injuries       and fatalities      . The higher the 
event’s severity, the higher the performance of today’s road traffic. For real application 
of the theory, additional severity level should be used. The lower the safety performance 
at another level of severity, the more probable is an indicator for safety. For understand-
ing the theory, it is not important how many different level of severity are discussed as 
long as two competing ones are handled. 
                                                 
213
 Maycock, G.; Lockwood, C. R.: The accident liability of British car drivers (1993), p. 240. 
214
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015), p. 6 & 23. 
Figure 35 The predicted effect of age and driving experience on accident liability.
213
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              - both error probabilities are difficult to derive theoretically. Obviously, 
type 1 and type 2 errors and the weighting of their outcome may lead to a decision for a 
specific level. The explanation for the error types is given in Table 8. Values for both 
error probability parameters need to be defined. From literature
215
 and especially com-
mon in medical tests
216
, these values are arbitrarily defined as 
            
(3-86) 
            
Table 8 Systematic of error types
217
 
 
Null hypothesis (H0) is 
Valid/True Invalid/False 
Judgment of Null Hypothesis 
(H0) 
Reject 
Type I error 
(False-Positive) 
Correct inference 
(True-Positive) 
Fail to 
reject 
Correct inference 
(True-Negative) 
Type II error 
(False-Negative) 
 
       - As has been described (see section 3.5), different methods exist to define these 
tolerated numbers. To see how these methods influence the usage strategy, the three 
approaches are studied as representatives for others. All three methods depend on the 
detectors’ limit      . As this detector limit is not necessarily derived as explained in 
section 3.4.2, its impact on the introduction will be studied as well. Therefore, besides 
the derived values that are calculated as the floored standard deviation (   ) to a 
fitted trend line at the yearly numbers from 1992-2014 for German Autobahn events
218
, 
also a floored tenth (      as well as the often required vision zero (        is 
examined: 
 
         
 
 
 
 
        
 
        
  
 
 
 
  (3-87) 
For the severity level of accidents with fatalities,                   results. 
                                                 
215
 Cowles, M.; Davis, C.: On the origins of the 5% level (1982), p. 553–557. 
216
 Altman, D. G. et al.: Statistics with confidence (2000 // 2011), p. 219. 
217
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Type_I_and_type_II_errors accessed 24.09.2016 
218
 Destatis: Verkehrsunfälle - Zeitreihen 2014 (2015), p. 23. 
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1. The Detector’s Limit – This approach gives a tolerated number for each severity level 
following equations (3-31) and (3-50). This approach is chosen as a representative 
approach because a fixed number is derived that is not adapted during the years. 
                  (3-88) 
2. The Mobility Replacement – This approach uses the hypothesis that the allowed 
velocity        calculated based on the detector limit will be driven by the automation. 
Thereby the automation replaces human driven distances, thus human driven events. 
This replacement strategy assumes that these replaced events would additionally be 
tolerable for the automation. Thus, the tolerated number of events results to be as de-
fined in equation (3-51) 
                                 
          
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
             
          
             
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(3-89) 
Assuming a tolerable replacement of events, the number of events increases depending 
on the ration of the safety performance values of the different level of severity. 
3. The Special Needs Safety Account – The additional tolerated events are depending on 
the detectors’ limit and the events of the past  
                                      .   
Equation (3-52) for       is concretized by the mobility limitation factor        that 
is used to define the demand for the test distance with special treatment      .  
The performance level tolerated for special needs is defined as the safety performance 
of an inexperienced young driver. A concrete value for that is defined by           
              with a factor of           derived from Figure 35.  
           
            
            
          
    
           
  
For every new evaluation (       , the safety account vector       is updated leading to 
a reinforced strategy. The better the vehicle compared to the inexperienced young driv-
er, the more events are tolerated. 
        – Another parameter influencing the usage strategy is the amount of testing dis-
tance, which will be run before the release for usage. As has already been cited, there 
                          
      
    
.  (3-90) 
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exists a rough prediction of Becker
219
 that the Autobahn Pilot will need up to        of 
testing using today’s approaches. Therefore, this would be defined as the upper limit.  
              
      . (3-91) 
However, besides taking this value from literature, two other approaches have been 
described. By assuming concrete values for each of the approach’s parameters, further 
test distances for examining the usage strategy are simulated. On the one hand, the 
“prevention of less safety” leads to test distances by applying the defined safety perfor-
mance benchmark                   
     to equation (3-36) (see page 89) 
                   
          . (3-92) 
On the other hand, the “monetary balance” approach can be evaluated when assigning 
values to        ,        ,          The weighting factors220 have been derived (sec-
tion 1.4.1) to              
    and               
   . The monetary benefit 
during usage               
 
  
 is approximated based on two reports. Dungs et 
al.
221
 identified the value of time to be    
 
 
  on average. Additionally, Follmer222 identi-
fied time and distance used for mobility demand. The study identified the time it took 
the questioned to travel one kilometer        
 
  
. The cost for test driving is approxi-
mated by              
 
  
. This approximation assumes costs for the vehicles and 
costs for the test drivers (see appendix B). Other costs as post-processing are neglected 
because of the assumption that these would be alike the costs for supervision during the 
introduction phase. As the severity safety performance factor, today’s values are used 
for the first best guess       
          
          
        . Thus, equation (3-44) is 
                
                
                      
. (3-93) 
The unknown distance factor for “monetary balance”        depends on the safety per-
formance of the object under test       (see Table 7) and is selected when relation 
                                                 
219
 Becker, J.: Toward Fully Automated Driving (2014), p. 16. Calculated assuming 50 km/h average 
velocity for Autobahn/Highway. 
220
 At this point mistake is made when excluding certain level of severity. Nevertheless for the sake of 
simplicity the theory stays with two level of severity for explanation. 
221
 Dungs et al.: The Value of Time (2016), p. 16. Further approaches for the USA and additional coun-
tries can be found in: Trottenberg, P.; Belenky, P.: Valuation of travel time in economic analysis 
(2011). 
222
 Follmer, R. et al.: Mobilität in Deutschland 2008 (2010), p. 21. 
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(3-45) on page 91 is fulfilled. As long as the OuT has not more than      events after 
testing the distance        , the OuT might be introduced into usage. 
Table 9 Check for fulfillment of inequality (3-45) for the worst studied OuT 
                                     
3 0                 0.0233 4.42 % 
Although the safety performance of the OuT is varying by a magnitude of two, the 
probability for more than 0 events using          stays below 5 % for all OuT. Table 9 
summarizes the calculation to check whether relation (3-45) is fulfilled. Consequently, 
the test distance 2.67        is added for all of the       assumptions. 
Overall, three different approximations of test distances have been put in concrete terms 
and will be used for the examination of the usage strategy 
                 
                  .  (3-94) 
Necessary Simulation parameter 
     - For the current discussions, it is of interest how automated driving vehicles will 
affect road traffic. Therefore, one could evaluate the mean length of an automobile’s 
safety life cycle. This is estimated in Germany 2013
223
 with 8.7 years and constantly 
lengthened over the last years. However, for the technology of automated driving it is of 
greater interest how a usage strategy would influence the market penetration and there-
by the whole traffic system. Therefore, the simulation will study the time span that other 
technologies needed to be fully deployed in the market 
                    (3-95) 
This value is taken from Figure 33 and represents the time that is necessary until the 
technology is fully deployed. 
   – Figure 32 shows that the usage strategy results influence the next usage step by a 
limitation of velocity. As long as no new event occurs, the            estimation im-
proves and the velocity consequently increases. Thus, the last evaluation step influences 
the next evaluation step. This can be described by an ordinary differential equation and 
an initial value, as long as the tolerated number of events does not change. Due to the 
introduction of different usage strategies (“Detectors Limit”, “Mobility Replacement” 
etc.), these tolerated numbers (        may change. Consequently, a numerical solution 
                                                 
223
 statista.de: Durchschnittliches Alter von Pkw in Deutschland 1960 bis 2016 (2016). 
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of the differential equations is necessary and the Euler method is applied
224
. Due to that 
reason, the outcome of the usage strategy is sensitive to   . The smaller the time step 
  , the more accurate the simulation, especially the self-reinforcing effects, are calculat-
ed. In appendix C it is shown that the maximum relative error of the cumulative dis-
tance traveled at the end of the simulation time               is smaller than     that 
might result in the worst-case scenario if         . The worst-case is designed by 
choosing the longest overall simulation time as well as the biggest gradient possible at 
this point in time. This worst-case might change when different usage strategies are 
defined. During real-world application of the theory, the value for    should be chosen 
much smaller than this value because the computation time is irrelevant. For simulation 
during this thesis,          is chosen to reduce computation time. 
3.6.3 Usage Strategy Simulation Evaluation Criteria 
The parameter space is reduced to a four dimensional space by the parameter assign-
ment above, see Figure 36. The assumption on the safety performance of the OuT is one 
parameter (      . The other three parameters define the usage strategy:         defines 
the test distance ahead of introduction. Hidden behind the parameter        is the method 
that derives the tolerated number M-     of events as well as the detector limit      . 
 
When each of the assigned values of the four parameters is combined fully factorial, 
            simulations result. To identify the effect of these parameters, the 
results of the usage simulation need to be comparable. Therefore, the results of the 
simulation over several time spans are condensed to numeric values for discussion. 
What criteria make the usage strategy evaluable given different assumptions         
and definitions (M-                   ? 
The usage strategy itself takes care that the requirements of users and the society are 
fulfilled. Consequently, as long as the observed world follows the prerequisites, the 
                                                 
224
 Dahmen, W.; Reusken, A.: Numerik für Ingenieure (2006), p. 386. 
Figure 36 Parameter space for parameter study 
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requirements cannot be taken as evaluation criteria. Given the reality simulation ex-
plained in Figure 32, the prerequisites are fulfilled by definition.
225
 
However, when having safety in focus, the results of different usage strategies are eval-
uated in comparison to different usage demands (    . To study how a change of pa-
rameter values (M-                  ) changes the usage strategy outcomes, a worse and 
better outcome is identified and formalized by numeric values. These numeric values 
are defined for two time spans. First the introduction phase         and second the su-
pervision phase       . 
Evaluation criteria for         
Firstly, to evaluate the strategy the usage time with high uncertainty is analyzed. This 
time begins with      and ends at     . Before     , the test drivers reduce the uncer-
tainty on safety. After     , enough data is available that reduces uncertainty about the 
safety performance of the OuT       in comparison to a benchmark. In between, the 
usage following the strategy is compared with different alternatives. To develop evalua-
tion criteria, three extreme cases with different OuT’s performance are discussed: 
 
 
 The OuT is as good as or better than the benchmark – A good usage strategy would 
hinder the usage of the OuT as little as possible compared to an unlimited registra-
tion of new vehicles.  
                                                 
225
 Attention: This changes when real vehicles that drive in reality are examined. 
Figure 37 Qualitative example to derive the evaluation criteria for the case of a better OuT 
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The first criterion is formalized by comparing the distance driven due to the usage 
demand of newly registered vehicles                  with the distance driven due to 
the strategy’s limitation               (see light gray area in Figure 37). 
The gray area (called RvD: newly Registered vs. Driven) is describable with two values. 
On the one hand, this area represents a loss in automated driving kilometers       that 
users suffer when the strategy limits the usage below the demanded values. 
On the other hand, it depends also on the performance of the OuT whether it is good to 
have the blue solid line closer to the upper or lower line in Figure 37. For that reason, 
the performance vector of the OuT       and the performance of the benchmark 
        are used for evaluation. These values and          are used to define an 
average delta in events as the evaluation criteria  
 
                           
 
 
 
 
 
  
          
  
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
        
  
         
 
 
 
 
  (3-97) 
The closer to zero           the lower is the hindrance due to the strategy. If the OuT 
is better than its benchmark, the safety change gets negative as the strategy prevents the 
technology to reduce the number of accidents (“lost safety”).  
Actually,           is a vector and consists of independent numbers. The different 
level of severity can be weighted (see section 1.4.1) to define one indicator value that 
expresses the average change in safety due to the usage strategy in a monetary way
226
 
                              (3-98) 
 
                         
       
 
  (3-99) 
To judge whether this is a high number or not, it is related to the accident costs generat-
ed by all registered vehicles during this time span         
                                                 
226
 Attention: As already discussed, the monetary assessment is simplified. Only costs due to accident 
events for two level of severity are under consideration. What misses are further level of severity as 
accidents without personal injury. Above that, also congestion, valuable lifetime etc. due to automated 
driving will change additional cost factors. 
     
   
                                                      
                     
 
      
         
 
(3-96) 
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  (3-100) 
The same approach is used for the formalization of sentence two.  
 The OuT is as good as an inexperienced young driver – A good usage strategy 
would hinder better users but satisfy individual mobility demands for people with 
mobility limitations. 
Equation (3-96) is adapted and now describes the distance that is missing to satisfy the 
demand of mobility limited groups (equation (3-101)).  
For explanation this is depicted as the black area (called LvD: mobility Limited vs. 
Driven) in Figure 38. 
 
To get an idea how much the usage strategy hinders AD3+ usage, this delta is related to 
the total demand of mobility limited people until the PoS. 
This value describes the theoretically available mobility, provided by automated driving 
in relation to the demanded of the mobility limited people. Whether these people use the 
automated driving vehicles or not is not discussed. This is left open for a political dis-
cussion whether a certain preferential treatment of limited people will be enforced. 
For the formalization of sentence three, the figure is adapted again. 
        
                                            
                
 
      
         
 (3-101) 
       
     
                
      
         
 (3-102) 
Figure 38 Qualitative example to derive the evaluation criteria for the case of a OuT being as 
good as a young inexperienced driver 
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 The OuT is worse than an inexperienced young driver – A good strategy would pro-
tect the society by hindering the mass usage compared to the unlimited introduc-
tion.  
Figure 39 illustrates: if the usage is unlimited (     , thus no strategy exists to limit 
the usage, the proof of less safety would have occurred earlier            . The area, 
respectively the traveled distance below the green (dash-dotted) line until        , is 
equal to the area below the blue (solid) line. This is due to the fact that the same number 
of kilometers          needs to be collected to come to the proof of safety no matter 
how fast it is collected. 
 
Consequently, the velocity of the unlimited introduction might be different compared to 
the one driven. If the unlimited introduction leads to higher velocities, the tolerated 
number of events by society needs to be higher as well. As this would contradict the 
requirement of the society, the ratio between the different limitations is derived as an-
other indicator. Thus, the third sentence is formalized by describing the ratio between 
the maximum velocities  
  
   
   
                
             
   
              
           
  (3-103) 
Be aware that the time span for the search of a maximum is different for denominator 
and numerator. The maximum of both time spans is chosen to evaluate the strategy 
because this ratio expresses how much the strategy hinders the usage and thereby pro-
tects the society. Thus: the bigger the    the better the usage strategy. 
These criteria described by equations (3-98) to (3-103) are theoretically derived and 
condense the information gained by the simulation. From my point of view, a weighting 
Figure 39 Qualitative example to derive the evaluation criteria for the case of a worse OuT 
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of these criteria to derive one single evaluation criteria value is not reasonable. The 
reason for that are the different units as well as the challenge to compare the monetary 
value of time and the monetary value of health. Additionally, further evaluation criteria 
should be considered depending on the point of view and the information about the real 
usage of the vehicles. 
Evaluation criteria for        
Secondly, the usage time after the proof of higher or lower safety is analyzed. What are 
the characteristics of a usage strategy that would motivate a further limitation of the 
usage? The criteria that formalize this motivation are still derived from the goal to 
improve road traffic safety. The following three criteria are identified: 
 The OuT is as good or better as the benchmark – The usage of automated vehicles 
doesn’t need to be hindered compared to the known usage demand from today’s 
registration numbers. 
To evaluate the criteria, an evaluation time span has to be defined. Therefore, the time is 
studied where a usual technology would need to be fully deployed to the whole existing 
market        . 
The first criterion is formalized by calculating the area marked light-gray in Figure 40 
 
                                                       
       
         
 (3-104) 
Figure 40 Area that expresses the first criteria for evaluation after PoS in the   -diagram 
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This delta in distance                results in a delta of events                 that 
occurs given the safety performance values for the benchmark and the OuT and apply-
ing equation (3-97). This delta in events is translated to accompanied costs by the 
known weighting factors 
                                                     (3-105) 
The more negative this delta, the more costs have not been omitted due to the hindrance 
of the strategy. 
 The OuT is as good as a young and inexperienced driver – The usage should be 
enabled for people suffering mobility limitations whereas more usage should be 
hindered. 
To formalize the second criterion, the gray area in Figure 41 is determined by 
This area, representing the delta in distance, is put into ratio with the dotted area repre-
senting the total demand of the mobility limited people. This ratio is defined by 
 
     
  
                
       
         
  (3-107) 
The closer this ratio is to zero, the less usage demand of the mobility limited people has 
been omitted by the strategy. 
     
                                            
                
        
         
. (3-106) 
 
Figure 41 Areas that express the second criteria for evaluation after PoS in the   -diagram 
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 The OuT is worse compared to a young and inexperienced driver – The usage 
should be hindered as much as possible. 
The last criterion represented by the light gray area in Figure 42 is formalized by  
This distance is translated in a delta of events 
 
      
 
       
 
 
     
 (3-109) 
and respectively to a difference in costs 
                             (3-110) 
The closer this value is to zero, the less additional costs have been introduced by letting 
a less safe vehicle drive in real traffic. 
3.6.4 Usage Strategy Simulation Result Analysis  
A stochastic process for the occurrence of accidents and vehicle safety performance has 
been defined. Based on this, the users’ as well as the society’s requirements have been 
discussed and a possible formalization has been given. To fulfill these requirements, 
different usage strategies have been proposed. To study these strategies, the necessary 
definitions and assumptions are concretized for the German Autobahn-Pilot of 2013. 
Based on these definitions and assumptions, the introduction is simulated 108-times, 
                    
       
         
  (3-108) 
 
Figure 42 Area that expresses the third criteria for evaluation after PoS in the  - -diagram 
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thus fully factorial. To explain the effect of the changed parameters on the simulation, 
first a selection of simulations is studied in detail and second the evaluation criteria are 
compared for all 108 simulations. 
Exemplary Explanation of Simulation Results 
An each-once combinatory is exemplarily studied. Three out of four parameters are kept 
constant and one is changed from simulation to simulation.            simula-
tions of the 108 simulations are therefore discussed in detail. Given the evaluation 
criteria defined above, the driven velocity (          227) and the safety performance 
estimation (             ) are the two main results from simulation. These two main 
results are now discussed for the 13 simulations in four sets. First,         is varied (3 
simulations – set 1), then M-     is varied (3 simulations – set 2), then       is varied (3 
simulations – set 3), and lastly       is varied (4 simulations – set 4). 
        is varied – the other parameters are kept constant: 
The first result, the velocity in every simulation step, is depicted in Figure 43. The 
double logarithmic scale is chosen because of the broad velocity range (y-scale) that 
covers 30 years and the importance of the first years (x-scale) for the usage strategy.  
                                                 
227
 Velocity   in this context is still the average yearly velocity (incl. standstill while parking or the time 
outside a use case). It must not be confused with the average velocity during usage   . For comparison, 
equation (3-75) calculated               
  
 
 for one vehicle in Germany 2013. Thus, the number 
of automated driving vehicles can be approximated by        . The whole vehicle fleet      
          drove                 
  
  
 
 (see equation (3-76) on page 106). 
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The usage demands                        are not sensitive to the parameter com-
binations that are simulated, thus these values are reference figures for all 13 simula-
tions. To recapitulate, the velocity            expresses the usage demand of newly 
registered vehicles. The velocities       result when assuming equipment ratios as 
explained in 3.6.2.       represents the usage demand when assuming a certain mobili-
ty limitation.  
       and         are the values that are sensitive to the parameter combinations. The 
allowed velocity        is defined by equation (3-60) and updated every evaluation. For 
the simulation, the driven velocity is defined as follows 
                                   (3-111) 
The three parameter combinations in Figure 43 differ in the test distance driven ahead of 
introduction        . Please have a closer look at         and       . At several points in 
Figure 43, the lines lie on top of each other. Due to the line style the lines are distin-
guishable. As an exemplary qualitative interpretation, the following conclusions can be 
drawn that are similar for the three parameter combinations: 
 Before year 9, the strategy would not hinder the introduction compared to the de-
ployment given an equipment ratio like assumed above. This conclusion is derived 
from Figure 43: the line (blue-diamond) for       is below the lines (green, red 
and orange-dashed) for        . 
Figure 43 Simulation result   over   for                    and M-     = “Detec-
tor’s Limit”,                 and                 
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 The driven velocities         approach similar values for all three parameter com-
binations.  
 The upper limitation of         reached approximately 1/10 of the total mobility 
demand of today registered vehicles. A maximum velocity is reached for which the 
tolerated event numbers will not be exceeded, given a certain worst-case estimation 
of the safety performance           . 
 Comparing the allowed velocity (        with the demanded velocity by newly 
registered vehicles (          ), the further introduction is hindered after one year, 
no matter which strategy is used.  
By changing the driven distance ahead of introduction (        , the following changes 
result and are derived from Figure 43: 
 The mobility demand of mobility limited people would be fulfilled during the 
whole examination time frame, except a little portion for the smallest testing dis-
tance. The line (turquoise-circle) for       is nearly always below the line for 
       . 
 The higher        , the higher          . Consequently, the longer the usage de-
mand of newly registered vehicles              can be fulfilled. 
 Parameter combination one with                   
     is limiting the usage 
from                   on (out of scope). The two lines (green-dashed) 
        and (green-dotted)        are below           .  
 The same happens later at            for parameter combination two with 
                  
    . For this combination the hindrance is smaller. 
Figure 44 presents the second result, being the safety performance values    over time. 
The depicted group of lines represents the evolution of the fatal accident level of severi-
ty. A similar group of lines exists for the discussion of accidents with injuries. Not sensi-
tive to any parameter combination is the defined benchmark         (black-solide). 
This is the reference for all simulations studied. 
In this set of simulations, also the assumed safety performance of the object under test is 
not changing      . The black-dashed line is the value to which the best- and worst-
case estimations converge to. 
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Conclusions that are the same for the three parameter combinations: 
 The light-green best-case estimation            converges from above against the 
assumed safety performance      . 
 The red worst-case estimation            converges from below against the as-
sumed safety performance      . 
 The best- and worst-case estimations are not steadily increasing or decreasing. As 
long as no further event occurred, the worst-case estimation of the    leads to 
higher safety performance values (e-function shape). Once a new event occurred, 
this estimation is corrected. The fact that events are discrete occurrences leads to 
the unsteady line for the SP estimations. The speed        calculation of equation 
(3-60) depends on the worst-case estimation, thus also the allowed speed is un-
steady (see Figure 43 above). 
 The more distance has been driven, the smaller the safety performance uncertainty. 
The factor 
          
       
 for accident with fatalities is approximately 0.0367 after test-
ing           
     (   ). Whereas when testing                
     the 
factor reduces to 0.00098. For comparison
228
, the ratio for accident with personal 
injury per distance (     when driving a car compared to driving a motorbike is 
                                                 
228
 Caution: Accidents with fatality per distance of motorbikes is not reported in standard statistics for 
comparison.  
Figure 44 Simulation result       over   for                    and M-     = “Detec-
tor’s Limit”,                 and                 
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          in Germany229 2013. When comparing fatalities per distance (    , a 
factor of             results229. 
 The worst-case estimations cross the benchmark line, thus a proof of higher safety 
is given indicated by upwards directing triangles. Depending on the test distance, 
the PoS is reached earlier or later in the fourth year of usage. 
 The more distance has been driven ahead of introduction, the earlier the proof of 
safety is given. But in this case the necessary distance for the proof of safety is or-
ders of magnitude higher than the testing distance. Consequently, the difference at 
the time of the proof is small. In these three simulations, the main distance for the 
proof is collected during usage. 
M-     is varied – the other parameters are kept constant: 
For the set of simulations studied now, the method how to derive the tolerated number 
of events is varied. The speed over time result is depicted in Figure 45. The usage de-
mand velocities haven’t changed and can be seen as the reference. What hasn’t changed 
either is the simulation that uses the “Detector’s Limit” approach (green-thinnest line). 
The comparison of this simulation to the other leads to: 
 All simulations start with similar allowed speeds       . This is reasonable as on 
the one hand the safety account realizes no delta in events, as no events have oc-
curred. On the other hand, the mobility replacement leads to little more tolerated 
events as the worst-case estimation is orders of magnitude lower than the reference 
at the beginning of simulation. 
 After approximately two months, the difference between the approaches gets visi-
ble in the logarithmic plot.  
 The approach following the “Special Needs Safety Account” (broadest-orange) 
follows the usage demand of mobility limited people as soon as the events due to 
this usage demand get significant in comparison to the event numbers of the detec-
tor limit      . The allowed speed has a positive offset to the usage demand of mo-
bility limited people due to the higher safety performance of the object under test 
compared to the inexperienced young driver. 
                                                 
229
 Kühn, M.: Motorradunfälle in Deutschland (2016), p. 10. 
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Especially during the first year of usage, the driven velocities are close together for all 
three simulations. This is reflected in the second result depicted in Figure 46. The safety 
performance worst-case estimation for the first year seems to be the same for all three 
simulations. The zoom on the right side of Figure 46 shows the worst-case safety per-
formance estimation for the “Special Needs Safety Account” during the proof of higher 
safety.  
 For these simulation parameters, the proof of safety is firstly reached by the “Mo-
bility replacement”, then by the others.  
 The zoom shows the unsteady line that result from the discrete events. 
 Due to this unsteady course, the proof of safety or less safety needs to be combined 
with a hysteresis or a smoothing filter to avoid alternating safety statements. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 45 Simulation result   over   for                    and M-     {“S.N. Safety 
Account”, “Mob. Repl.”, “Detector’s Limit”},                 and                
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      is varied – the other parameters are kept constant: 
A major parameter affecting the introduction is the number of events that are defined as 
the detector’s limit      . In subsection 3.4.2, the detector’s limit is derived for the 
society’s safety detector from the standard deviation of the trend of yearly counted 
accidents with fatalities on Autobahn. This limit as well as two alternatives were simu-
lated                 . For these combinations, the method to derive the tolerated 
numbers is the “Detector’s Limit”. The simulation outcome is illustrated in Figure 47. 
The three different simulations vary significantly:  
 If       is zero, the introduction and usage is hindered the most. Figure 47 does not 
even show the line for these values as it does not increase above the level of 1000 
km/h after 30 years. Therefore, less than 2000 vehicles are negligible within the 
fleet of over        vehicles in Germany after 30 years. 
 For         the usage demand assumed based on a regular equipment ratio could 
be satisfied for approximately half a year. Later in time, the limitation still increases 
but strongly hinders the usage. Overall, the line (red-medium) would converge to a 
value below the usage demand of mobility limited people. 
 The third line of          is known from the two simulation sets from above. 
With this number of tolerated events, the demand of mobility limited could be ful-
filled. However, the registration or activation of further demanded AD3+ vehicles 
would be hindered.  
Figure 46 Simulation result       over   for                    and M-     {“S.N. 
Safety Account”, “Mob. Repl.”, “Detector’s Limit”},                 and              
      . 
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The estimation of the worst-case safety performance only improves when additional 
information, thus additional distance and events are collected. Consequently, the safety 
performance estimation for the same object under test is sensitive to      : 
 If only minimal additional distance is driven, the estimation does not change. For 
          the line (red-thinnest) depicts that. All estimations start at the same 
level as the test distance ahead of introduction         is the same. 
 For three events, as the detector’s limit, the estimation improves (red-medium). The 
proof of safety is not reached during the 30 years of simulation. 
 The third line (red-broadest) is known from above. The proof of safety is reached 
during the fourth year of introduction. 
Figure 47 Simulation result   over   for                    and M-     = “Detec-
tor’s Limit”,                  and                
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      is varied – the other parameters are kept constant: 
Above, parameters were varied that actually can be directly manipulated during real 
application. The safety performance       can also be developed to a higher level, 
however it is unknown which level it has reached. Thus, the question studied now is 
how the usage strategy will change depending on the safety performance of the object 
under test. Figure 49 illustrates the effect on the allowed velocity: 
 The better the object under test, the higher the value of the allowed velocity at the 
end of simulation. 
 During the first month until         , the allowed velocity of all objects under 
tests beside the worst one are the same. This results from the fact that none of these 
vehicles had an accident with fatalities. 
 The longer the simulation takes, the broader the range of the different allowed ve-
locities gets. 
 
Figure 48 Simulation result       over   for                    and M-     = “Detector’s 
Limit”,                  and                
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The reason for these different allowed velocities gets understandable with Figure 50. 
Only the benchmark and the lines for                    are the same like in the 
figures above. All other lines have changed due to the simulation parameter. For this 
parameter combination also the proof of less safety is indicated by a downwards direct-
ing triangle (red). The following conclusions can be drawn from this figure: 
 For all simulation parameter combinations, the best- and worst-case estimations 
converge against the object under test safety performance. 
 The two less safe objects are found to be less safe at          and         . 
 The two safer objects are found to be safer at          and         . 
 Besides the worst systems, all worst-case estimations start at the same point. This 
again happens as there has not been an event for any of these systems during the 
testing phase. 
 For                   the best-case estimation is calculated the first time at 
        . Before, there is no best-case estimation because no accident with fatali-
ties happened. 
  
Figure 49 Simulation result   over   for                                 and 
M-     = “Detector’s Limit”,                 and                
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To further analyze the impact of the usage strategy parameters, the evaluation criteria 
are presented for all 108 simulations in appendix D and discussed in the following.  
Characteristic Value      
For the 108 defined parameter combinations, the time in years for which the proof of 
safety has been given is presented in Table 18 and Table 19 (see appendix D). The error 
probability and the safety performance benchmark for the proof are the same for all 
parameter combinations, as explained in section 3.6.2 “Usage Strategy Parameter 
Assignment” on page 105. As the PoS requires a severity sensitive examination, both 
proofs of safety are depicted, one for accidents with injuries the other for accidents with 
fatalities. The interpretation of this characteristic value leads to: 
 The first proof of less safety for accidents with fatalities is reached at           
for the worst OuT (       ), the usage strategy “Mobility Replacement”, the 
highest detector limit, and           
    . The first proof of higher safety is 
reached at          for the best OuT (       , the highest detector limit, and 
with the longest testing distance           
    . 
 During        , the PoS is reached earlier, the more extreme the ratio in safety per-
formance between OuT and benchmark (   ) is. 
 The more has been tested before RfU, the earlier the PoS is reached. 
Figure 50 Simulation result       over   for                                 and 
M-     = “Detector’s Limit”,                 and                
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 As long as no events are tolerated, the proof of higher or less safety cannot be 
reached. 
 The more events are tolerated, the faster the PoS or PolS is reached. 
 As the OuT and the benchmark for events with injuries are lower than that of events 
with fatalities, the proof of less safety is reached earlier. For the worse OuTs studied 
the PolS is given before the release for usage (RfU). Thus, the lower level of severi-
ty may serve as a good safety indicator. Caution: It might also happen as explained 
by Figure 11 (the severity sensitive pyramid), that at lower levels of severity safety 
can be proven although on higher level of severity it cannot. The other way around 
might reasonably also happen. 
Evaluation Criteria for the Time Span         
For the 108 defined parameter combinations, Table 20 lists      . This ratio compares 
the delta in costs with the total cost of traffic events until     . Either events are saved 
(positive values) or are created (negative values) by limiting the usage based on the 
usage strategy. For better OuT (      , this value should be close to zero, for worse 
OuT as big as possible. 
 The longer test distances have been driven, the more costs (saved and created) have 
been shifted to the testing phase. 
 As long as high numbers for the detector’s limit are tolerated the ratio is small, thus 
the limitation is little. 
 The further     is from 1, the more a usage strategy affects the usage and its out-
come. 
 The “Special Needs Safety Account” method to derive the tolerated number of 
events reduces the limitation for worse OuT (      . Because of that, the proof 
of safety is reached for all parameter combinations. Consequently, also additionally 
costs aren’t hindered for worse systems (         than the inexpirienced drivers. 
This result demands a method to derive tolerated events, that stronger punishes for 
worse safety performance compared to the young inexperienced driver (        .  
 
For the 108 defined parameter combinations,        in Table 21 illustrates how much of 
the mobility demand of mobility limited people is not satisfied due to the limitation of a 
usage strategy until a PoS can be given. 
 The main contribution to this criteria has the detector’s limit      . For zero and 
three events this strongly limits the usage, thus the usage demands of mobility lim-
ited people is not met. 
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 Especially for an OuT that is at least as good as the young inexperienced driver, the 
“Special Needs Safety Account” method enables a partial fulfillment of mobility 
limited people’s demand. 
For the 108 defined parameter combinations,    in Table 22 presents the ratio of two 
maximum velocities. The numerator is the velocity demanded from newly registered 
vehicles up to the point the PoS would have occurred when following this demand. The 
denominator is the velocity during usage strategy limitation until     .  
 The worse the OuT, the more the usage strategy “protects” the society by limiting 
the velocity. 
 If the safety performance level of the OuT is below a certain limit, the proof of 
safety is either found ahead of usage or during the first month. In this case, the hin-
drance of the limitation is little because only little additional distance is necessary 
to reach the proof of less safety. 
 For the OuTs that are better than the benchmark, also values smaller than 100 % 
occur. This happens when the vehicles are introduced first slowly and later abruptly. 
When the test distance was small and consequently the uncertainty big, additional 
distance driven leads to a fast improvement of the worst-case estimation and thus to 
an allowed velocity gradient that is bigger than the gradient of the usage demand of 
newly registered vehicles. 
Evaluation Criteria for the Time Span        
For the 108 defined parameter combinations,         in Table 23 presents the delta in 
costs that is either saved (positive values) or is created (negative value) by limiting the 
usage to values below the usage demand of newly registered vehicles. 
 As long as the OuT and benchmark have the same   , no delta exists. 
 As long as the OuT is worse than the benchmark, the usage strategy prevents events 
and safes costs. 
 Even for a 10-times better OuT more than 3 events as a detector limit or a new us-
age strategy are necessary to not miss any safety benefits of AD3+ when applying 
the usage strategies.  
 
For the 108 defined parameter combinations,      in Table 24 presents the hindrance of 
the usage demand of people with mobility limitation during the whole simulation 
       . 
 “Vision Zero” does never fulfill the demand – not even for mobility limited people.  
 All usage strategies hinder the OuT that is as good (or bad) as an inexperienced 
young driver when the detector limit is below 3, despite the “Special Needs Safety 
Account”. 
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 The “Special Needs Safety Account” also enables the usage of a 10 times worse 
system. This might be seen as a drawback of this method for defining the tolerated 
number of events. More complex methods can be defined that hinder worse systems 
stronger and still enable the fulfillment of the usage demand of mobility limited 
people. 
 To meet the usage demand of mobility limited people, even for a better system than 
the benchmark, either the “Special Needs Safety Account” method needs to be ap-
plied or a detector limit higher than the studied three events needs to be defined. 
For the 108 defined parameter combinations,          in Table 25 presents the delta in 
costs that is either saved (positive values) or is created (negative value) by driving with 
AD3+ when following the usage strategy. 
 If no events are tolerated, there is no effect on road traffic safety. 
 The “Special Needs Safety Account“ tolerates more costs, because it respects the 
special needs of mobility limited people. Its nearly independent from the detector’s 
limit         
 The safety effect of the different usage strategies varies significantly. In case of a 
better OuT than the benchmark (          the saved costs range from little test-
ing and little detector’s limit                 
  € to the opposite          
          . 
3.6.5 Conclusions on the Usage Strategy Examination 
Direct Conclusions 
The evaluation criteria indicate changing safety outcomes when varying the usage strat-
egy and its definitions. Conclusions on the qualitative and quantitative discussion are 
drawn: Firstly, for the time until PoS. Secondly, for the time after PoS. 
What conclusions can be derived until the PoS? 
 To come to a PoS in a reasonable time, more than 0 events have to be tolerated. A 
risk tolerance is required. 
 If the mobility demand of mobility limited people should be satisfied, more than 0 
events have to be tolerated. 
 The derived “Detector’s Limit” enables the fulfillment of mobility demands of mo-
bility limited people. The minimum number of events that describe the detector’s 
limit might be derived for real-world application by an optimization. 
 When assuming equipment ratios derived from other technologies that found their 
way into the automobile, the limitation by the usage strategy sometimes gets obso-
lete. The take rates are sometimes a stricter limitation as the usage strategy as long 
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as more than zero events are tolerated. Special care must be taken if take rates ex-
ceed known values. Due to the benefits that might come with AD3+, this must be 
kept in mind. 
 The impacts of different methods to define the tolerated event numbers (M-    ) 
differ up to      mainly by the value for the detector’s limit. The reason for that is 
the little number of events that could influence the “Safety Account” as well as the 
“Mobility Replacement” approach. 
 As can be seen, it takes some time until the PoS is reached. During this time there 
should be a further system development to avoid identified challenges for the OuT. 
Unfortunately, by changing the OuT the meaning of the collected test distances gets 
questionable. Consequently, there should be a way to conserve the knowledge 
gained during this distance that can be used for testing OuT updates ahead of RfU. 
 Challenging is that the proof of safety and less safety would be possible during less 
than one year. This would neglect special effects eventually only occurring during 
the winter months or vice versa the summer months. To take care of these effects, 
the supervision of the OuT seems reasonable, at least for one year suffering differ-
ent natural seasons. 
What conclusions can be derived for the usage during supervision? 
 A pure tolerated number of the same size as the studied values (“Detector’s Limit”) 
that does not adapt over time hinders the usage even if the OuT is 10 times better 
than the benchmark.  
 The approach to additionally tolerate the replaced number of events (“Mobility Re-
placement”) saturates at a certain level as well. Thereby, it would also hinder a bet-
ter OuT than the benchmark. 
 When, in addition, trying to fulfill special needs, these have to be formalized and 
implemented into the usage strategy. Thereby, the hindrance can be reduced for the-
se special needs. 
 The price the society would have to pay for accounting these special needs would be 
in this example approximately          €, when allowing an OuT    at the inex-
perienced young driver level. In general, the effect of defining different usage strat-
egies is addressing thousands of fatalities and billions of € especially when covering 
30 years. These hypothetical values neglect additional costs besides fatalities and 
light injuries and suffer the simplifications that the simulation and value determina-
tion is based on. 
A problem is formalized, a solution is proposed, its sensitivity to parameters has been 
studied, and its outcome for an exemplary case was simulated. This represents a meth-
odology for the challenge of a prospective assessment. Not necessarily the exemplary 
3 Theory: Stochastic Model for Safety Assessment 
138 
 
results of the methodology, but the methodology itself should be seen as the main con-
tribution of this thesis. 
Abstracted Methodic Conclusions 
At the beginning of this chapter, Q 12 asked: How to use stochastic to achieve a safe 
usage of automated driving? The chapter proposes a methodology for the prospective 
assessment. The methodology mainly consists of three steps: 
1. Formalization 
 Use the Poisson process as the first best guess for expressing the uncertainty on the 
occurrence of accidents with AD3+. 
 Use the safety performance    and distance traveled   as key values for evaluation. 
 Take care of different levels of severity. 
 Define criteria by analyzing the allowed velocity to compare the outcome of differ-
ent usage strategies. 
 Define a usage strategy by concretizing the method to calculate the tolerated num-
ber of events M-    ,       and        . 
2. Simulation 
 Study the defined criteria for a time span like        . 
 Execute a case study for different performance levels       and usage demands to 
evaluate how a usage strategy would fulfill the criteria. 
3. Consideration/Weighing up 
 Visualize the outcome by plotting the safety performance SP and the velocity  , 
etc.. 
 Compare the numbers of the criteria. 
 Criteria could be used for optimizing the usage strategy parameter. But as simplifi-
cations as well as non up to date data have been used in this thesis, this optimiza-
tion should be done when the simplifications are adapted as well as the data has up-
dated. 
 
To apply the proposed concept (the usage strategy) to real cases, real-world data have to 
be used and today’s safety lifecycle of the automobile has to be extended. Both topics 
are discussed in the following: First in chapter 4 the “Application: Data to Apply the 
Usage Strategy“ and second in chapter 5 the “Consequences: The Safety Lifecycle of 
AD3+“. 
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4 Application: Data to Apply the Usage 
Strategy 
Q 20 Do the data for all use cases exist, which is  
necessary for application of the usage strategy? 
A concept has been described about how to handle the safety performance    uncertain-
ty. The concept compares and estimates safety performances. Based on these estima-
tions, the concept defines a careful usage strategy that considers requirements of the 
user as well as the individual of the society.  
For the example of the Autobahn-Pilot use case the concept has been applied above. 
Might these specific results be used for the real introduction of an Autobahn-Pilot? In 
principle, yes. But the data used for application must be accepted for application by the 
different stakeholders. 
To study what is necessary for application, firstly the data demand is derived. Secondly, 
the availability of these data is discussed for the use cases derived in subsection 1.1. 
Thirdly, other existing use cases are studied to answer whether the data exists to apply 
the concept. For the third part, the focus is set on a selection of use cases where num-
bers are reported like the Google driverless project or the Autopilot™ from Tesla Mo-
tors Inc. This chapter ends with recommendations derived from the data demand. 
4.1 Challenge of the Qualitative and Quantitative 
Data Demand 
Q 21 What data are necessary and what requirements have to be fulfilled for concept 
application? 
Up to this point in thesis, it was assumed that the data for application exists. Before 
application, data should be examined for each use case. The usage strategy bases only 
on two kinds of data: 
 distances   and 
 events  . 
However, different distance data      ,    and event data       ,    are required. The 
requirements on that data result from their use. Their use is described in subsection 3.5 
and is examined to come to the following individual requirements: 
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4.1.1 Data for Object under Test Assessment 
      – based on the driven test distance, the safety performance best- and worst-case 
estimations for the object under test are performed, applying a statistical concept 
(                     ). The object under test is under observation, thus the recording 
of the driven distance is assumed to be guaranteed by analyzing vehicle data recorder. 
As the safety performance will be estimated for the corresponding use case,       should 
be a sample of the possible distance driven within this use case. How should this sample 
be chosen for testing? This question is a classical question of the right sampling method. 
In general, non-probability sampling and probability sampling are distinguished
230a
. To 
apply the statistical concept, a probabilistic sampling is necessary. The challenge of 
designing a probabilistic sampling is to know the probability of appearance
230b
 of cer-
tain properties in advance. Today, both the relevant properties as well as their probabil-
ity of appearance are unknown. As mentioned above, the goal of running projects is to 
identify these properties by the microscopic approach. Consequently, this information is 
necessary to come to representative distances for application of the developed concept. 
Let’s take a simple example for explanation: By comparing the maximum height of 
snow in Germany in 2012/2013 with 2013/2014 huge differences exist
231
. For Frankfurt 
am Main, as an example, in 2012/2013 it was 18 cm whereas in 2013/2014 no day with 
snow was reported. Thus, when testing in the winter 2013/2014 it would be likely to 
miss something in the Frankfurt area that might cause an event in the next years. The 
right selection of test distance is an essential pre-requisite to apply the derived concept. 
Unfortunately, the question on what the right selection might be is not answered within 
this thesis. This topic is noted for the thesis outlook. 
       – based on the counted events, the object under test was involved in, the safety 
performance best- and worst-case is estimated (                    ). Thus, all 
events must be recorded that are defined to be relevant in order to avoid overestimating 
the safety performance. Therefore, either the vehicle itself needs to be able to identify 
an event or the user must be obliged to report the events. To determine the severity of an 
accident (property damage, with injury or fatality) an examination of each case is neces-
sary. Depending on the severity levels, the examination might be more or less detailed. 
During the testing phase, as has been described, also a re-simulation and estimation of 
the severity is necessary.  
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4.1.2 Data for Benchmark Definition 
   – based on the yearly driven use case distance, the safety performance benchmark 
        is defined. Compared to the test distance, other requirements exist. By the use 
case description it must clearly be defined what distance corresponds to the yearly 
driven use case distance. Unfortunately, there is no direct report of driven distances 
today
232
. Thus, also the yearly driven distance for a use case needs to be estimated. In 
principle, several methods for direct measuring and estimation exist
233
: The most aggre-
gated numbers that are recorded during regular vehicle inspections are vehicle odometer 
readings. These numbers, depending on the sample of the vehicle, are recorded in Ger-
many every half a year
234
. Obviously, by this method distances traveled of vehicles 
registered in Germany are recorded, thus the domestic traffic (German: 
Inländerkonzept) is recorded. It is unknown where this distance was traveled exactly. 
Another method using fuel sales and estimated fuel consumption is not a direct record-
ing of distances but estimates the distance traveled by a model based approach
235
. The 
distances calculated based on the fuel sales are a mixture of inland vs. domestic traffic 
recording, whereas by the model based approach different effects like fuel prices and 
border crossing traffic are tried to be compensated to come to an inland traffic record-
ing
236
. Besides this aggregated numbers also more disaggregated distances are recorded. 
Therefore two, “in-situ” approaches can be distinguished237: Either intrusive (pneumatic 
road tubes, piezoelectric sensors, or magnetic loops) or non-intrusive approaches (man-
ual counts, passive and active infrared, passive magnetic, microwave radar, ultrasonic, 
and passive acoustic or video image detection). Based on the traffic counting, the vehi-
cle distance can be calculated as long as it is defined where the counted vehicles need to 
travel after being counted. This is simple on highways and needs less counting stations, 
whereas in urban areas it is more challenging to determine accurate numbers. Another 
approach to identify the use case distance traveled is survey data. In Germany, a mileage 
survey, household mobility survey as well as the German Mobility Panel is regularly 
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conducted to obtain mobility behavior of passenger cars as well as the Survey of Road 
Freight Transport to record data from tractive vehicles with at least 3.5 tonnes load 
capacity
238
. The survey approach might provide deep insight depending on the survey 
design, but is costly thus not all of these are updated yearly. The most detailed insight 
into distances traveled is given by floating car data (FCD)
239
. This data might be col-
lected via GPS and mobile phone combination over nearly the entire road network. FCD 
might enable an accurate determination of the yearly driven use case distance. Attention 
must be paid on privacy concerns. This is addressed via ISO 24100:2010 on “basic 
principles for personal data protection in probe vehicle information services”. Another 
solution for gaining this data is conducting naturalistic driving studies (NDS). The study 
of Blanco et al.
240
 used the SHRP 2 NDS Dataset
241
. Within this NDS, the distance 
(           ) together with additional information (time, place, driver, etc,) was 
recorded by the equipped vehicles in the USA. For determining the driven use case 
distance, not only different approaches exist but also differences within countries in 
Europe
242
 and worldwide (see for example the USA
243
) must be considered.  
   – based on the events counted yearly for the use case, the safety performance 
benchmark         is defined. The benchmark is calculated as the expected value of a 
distance between two events for the studied population of drivers. The described con-
cept assumes to know the explicit expected value and no distribution. In general
244
, the 
standard deviation of an estimated expected value depends on the sample size   by 
     as well as on the variance of the population. To fulfill the requirement of a known 
expected value, a survey is required that covers a large number of samples. The question 
on what is large cannot be defined without knowing the variance of the population. A 
generic requirement is defined: 
 
               (4-1) 
The standard deviation of the safety performance estimation    should be at least an 
order of magnitude smaller than the expected value. The value of 1/10 is defined ran-
domly to indicate a well estimated safety performance. Further research on respective 
numbers should concretize the requirement on the necessary sample size. Thus, for the 
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defined requirement the arithmetic mean is close to the expected value. Different as for 
the object under test, no full supervision of the population exists. Road events in Europe 
are collected
245a
 by the police and are reported to ministries and statistical services
246
. In 
Germany, this is regulated by the German law on statistics of road traffic accidents 
(Straßenverkehrsunfallstatistikgesetz-StVUnfStatG)
247
. Additional information on dam-
age only accidents is collected and reported by insurances
245b
. For the reported accidents 
information are available to classify an event as relevant for the use case or not 
(StVUnfStatG §2). If more in-depth information is necessary, special studies exist. 
However, these do not cover all accidents within the reported statistics
248
. Besides the 
information depth the underreporting
249
 especially for less severe, single vehicle and 
two wheeler accidents is a challenge for defining an objective benchmark. No study was 
found on the identification of unreported accidents for Germany, although in the 
ETSC
250
 report    underreporting of death in Germany is stated. Whereas in the 
IRTAD
251
 report    killed,     severly injured, and     slightly injured are men-
tioned to be unreported in Germany. Blanco et al.
252a
 summarize similar findings for the 
USA. Different estimates provide a wide range of different numbers about unreported 
crashes. National estimates
253
 vary for not reported injury crashes from 15.4 % up to 
39.7 % and property damage from 35.6 % to 59.7 %. Besides the national estimates, 
also estimates based on the SHRP 2 study are made. 84 % of the 279 identified crashes 
were unreported. Thus when using these numbers for the safety performance bench-
mark, the benchmark is overestimated as long as no correction is applied.  
4.1.3 Generic Data Requirements 
Blanco et al.
252b
 conclude on the comparison of crash data: 
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Thus, we have a situation in which we are attempting to analyze self-driving car da-
ta, which has a full record of all crashes, relative to the current vehicle fleet, which 
has an incomplete record of crashes. The comparison is, as the old saying goes, ap-
ples to oranges. 
Their study mainly concentrates on the accident numbers of the benchmark. It should be 
emphasized that all of the data, necessary as explained above, needs to be appropriate 
and fit to each other: distance as well as accidents. Whether the data is appropriate or 
not, strongly depends on the use case. Consequently, besides the requirements that result 
from the individual usage of the data, there exist also generic requirements the data 
needs to fulfill: 
 The data must be associated with a detailed use case documentation. 
 The data must be derived following a documented and reviewed method. 
 The data must be up-to-date. 
 The data must be accessible at least from RfU on, together with the documenta-
tions. 
 The data must be archived for the life time of the vehicles together with the docu-
mentations. 
4.2 Data to Examine the Use Cases 
Q 22 Is data available to apply the usage strategy on the described use cases? 
The application of the usage strategy for the different use cases strongly depends on the 
data that exists. In subsection 1.1, four different use cases are introduced. For each use 
case, the existence of data is checked and systematic challenges for application of the 
usage strategy resulting from the use case are discussed. The application of the usage 
strategy is examined for Germany, as for other countries differences in data acquisition 
exist.  
4.2.1 Autobahn Pilot Examination 
Data for Object under Test Assessment 
No data exist, because no such vehicle is in testing phase or to be precise no data are 
communicated about any vehicle being in the testing phase. That is the reason why the 
usage strategy examination explained above is based on theoretically derived values. 
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      – By the street type Autobahn in Germany it is fairly easy defined where (spatial-
ly) to collect the test distance. In 2013, the German Autobahn was
254
 approximately 
12,917 km long. Even if it would be necessary to drive each lane and approx. 3 lanes 
exist in average, this would add up to less than 80,000 km. But the question remains 
when and how often to drive these roads. There needs to be a test design that delivers a 
test routing that takes care to come to a probabilistic sampling. If due to weather condi-
tions discussed above, representativeness cannot be guaranteed, also a limitation of 
usage might be necessary (see the concept of the Seed Automation). The methodology 
to derive the necessary data needs to be defined, documented, as well as published and 
archived. Data needs to be collected, updated, and communicated with RfU. 
       – Since no distance has been driven, no events are reported. When starting test 
driving, a simulation environment should be in place. Re-simulation during the testing 
phase of test driver interventions needs a simulation environment, together with simula-
tion models. If accuracy of the simulation environment is uncertain, a worst-case simu-
lation should be executed. The methodology for re-simulation needs to be defined, 
documented, as well as published and archived. Data need to be collected, updated, and 
communicated with RfU. 
Data for Benchmark Definition 
   – The distance driven on Autobahn (inland) exists and is published. The documenta-
tion exists and is published as well. Although the data is updated regularly, the process 
might be improved in a similar manner as safety assessment data will be collected when 
AD3+ vehicles will be connected. Digital recording and direct reporting would help to 
achieve an up-to-date benchmark. The two alternatives of either floating car data or 
automated vehicle identification in combination with existing toll stations would make 
this possible
255
. Many new vehicles are already equipped with hardware to generate and 
send all necessary data. This should be used to improve reporting. 
   – Accident numbers are recorded and reported for the Autobahn. Unknown is the 
number of unreported accidents. Especially the underreport of accidents with minor 
severity are challenging the object under test. At an early stage of testing, these minor 
cases are the first indicators of potential higher or lower safety. Care must be taken that 
the missing knowledge on minor cases of the benchmark does not hinder the introduc-
tion of automated vehicles. A correction factor should be identified and used to define 
the benchmark. Additionally, the aggregation of events today needs several administra-
tive steps. The same as for the collection of distances should also apply for the number 
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of events. The police records should directly be digitalized and reported to the statistical 
office. 
Today’s constellation, however, leads to an overestimation of today’s traffic’s safety 
performance, thus the benchmark. This overestimation of the human and the underesti-
mation of AD3+ is the ratio which guarantees safety for the society and it should be 
taken care that it will not be the other way around. 
4.2.2 Automated Valet Parking Examination 
Data for Object under Test Assessment 
In general, the same situation exists for the use case of automated valet parking. This 
use case is still a vision of the future, thus no data for real object under test assessment 
exists. 
      – The definition of the use case as it is given in subsection 1.1.2 is too fuzzy to 
really identify the area where the use case should be tested. Today, at least in most of 
Europe, normal driving and the attempt to find a parking lot as well as to park merge 
into each other. When limiting the use case to multi-story car parks (German: Parkhaus), 
the challenge of defining relevant properties as well as their probability of appearance 
might be reduced. Within car parks, weather as well as lighting might be controlled. 
Thus, this use case is an example that would need a more detailed description before 
any test design might be given. 
       – When distance is driven, again, the counting and corresponding re-simulation 
can be performed. For the reason that parking use cases are performed at low speed, it is 
of interest if the chance of an accident with higher levels of severity might be negligible. 
Existing studies on car-pedestrian accidents
256
 as well as car-car accidents
257
 indicate a 
monotonic relationship between fatality risk and car impact speed converging to zero 
for lower speeds. Based on additional comprehensive studies for the object under test it 
might be arguable to neglect the chance of a fatality. This would ease the introduction of 
automated valet parking and be a motivation for this use case from this safety assess-
ment concept. 
Data for Benchmark Definition 
   – As today there is no corresponding use case of automated valet parking the dis-
tance driven by the benchmark within this use case is unknown. There is no direct indi-
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cator like a certain road network that clearly defines a distance driven to be the valet 
parking case. Thus, by the use case definition it needs to be defined which of the dis-
tance driven by the benchmark is seen as relevant for comparison. In difference to the 
Autobahn network, as this is a special type of road, there is no information on driven 
distances for special inner-city areas
258
. Thus, for defining the benchmark for a valet 
parking use case, data is lacking. 
   – When the use case is precisely defined the information on events within this use 
case exist due to police reports. However, today this information is not processed to a 
resolution that would be necessary for defining the benchmark. A direct digitalization of 
accidents and association with annotated road network data (OpenStreetMap for exam-
ple) would ease the whole stochastic process. 
Thus, from the use case described in this thesis, it is concluded that requirements result 
also for the use case description (or item definition) when the safety assessment concept 
should be applied. 
4.2.3 Emergency Automation Examination 
Data for Object Under Test Assessment 
      – The use case is described to be active for the whole road network covering all 
environment conditions. By trying to come to a probabilistic sample, the same challenge 
for routing exists as has been described for Autobahn only, but for this use case the 
potential road network is
259
 approximately 830,000 km in Germany.  
       – When routing has been defined, the events resulting from the driven distance 
are countable. The amount of events that have to be counted during the test and usage of 
the different use cases obviously depends on the safety performance of the object under 
test. However, when addressing all emergency situations by this use case, also areas 
with a high frequency of events as in urban scenarios or high severity of events as in 
rural road scenarios are covered. The concept explained above does not include the 
discussion whether safety performance estimation should also be sensitive to different 
areas of usage. Thinking about an object under test that only causes events close to 
playgrounds or schools and somewhere else never causes any event. Although the safety 
performance indicates no difference in safety as it calculates a weighted mean for all 
areas, the local safety perception could be different. An area selective safety perfor-
mance could help to define a more detailed assessment. 
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Data for Benchmark Definition 
   – For Germany, the domestic distance
260a
 (including German vehicles distance in 
foreign countries, excluding foreign vehicles distance in Germany) exists.       
       were driven in 2013. The inland distance is not reported but should be used for 
the calculation of the benchmark. For the area selective approach, a survey of area 
selective distance driven would be necessary. 
   – The numbers
260b
 for events in Germany 2013 are processed for accidents with 
property damage, with injuries, and with fatalities separated for inside and outside of 
town, for different street types (Autobahn, Bundesstraße, Landstraße, Kreisstraße, oth-
ers) and federal states. As the data exist also for a finer area separation the data should 
be processed again for the area selective approach if necessary. 
4.2.4 Seed Automation Examination 
The area selective approach directly leads the seed automation. The idea of the fourth 
use case is not to start with the whole road network but with a small section (spatial, 
temporal, weather, etc.) of real traffic and constantly evolving this section.  
Data for Object under Test Assessment 
      – The area where to drive is exactly defined for the use case example explained in 
subsection 1.1.4. As it is limited to less than 100 km around Gothenburg, the probabilis-
tic sample is simplified.  
       – The events that might occur during driving should be re-simulated and record-
ed. There seems to be no special challenge. 
Data for Benchmark Definition 
   – The distance driven within the narrow area can easily be derived by a sample 
counting or even by a direct measurement as exits and entrances to the closed loop are 
little. 
   – The challenge for defining a benchmark results from the small number of events 
within this narrow area. For the Gothenburg municipality (Swedish: varav Göteborgs 
kommun), a total of 5 accidents with fatalities and 70 with personal injuries were re-
ported
261
 2015. Although it is not reported in the published statistics, there is a good 
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chance that there was not even one accident with fatalities on the defined road section. 
Following the equation (1-11) for the safety performance, a theoretical infinite safety 
performance for accidents with fatalities would result. Trying to prove the higher or 
equal safety of AD3+ is impossible. The reason for that is the definition of the bench-
mark. For the number of events the requirement has been defined, that the sample size 
together with the underlying distribution fulfills equation (4-1). To increase the sample 
size, it is either necessary to increase the use case area or to increase the observation 
time. The challenge for the increase of observation time results from the time variant 
safety performance. The benchmark may also have changed due to improvements in 
vehicle technology or other factors (see Figure 20). Thus, the definition of a benchmark 
could be done by studying road types of the same kind and to assume similar safety 
performances. An alternative way would be to also study the distribution of safety per-
formance and therefore compare two safety performance distributions, the one of AD3+ 
and the one of the benchmark. This is noted for the outlook and is left open for further 
research. 
4.3 Data to Examine Existing Use Cases  
Q 23 Are data available to apply the usage strategy on existing use cases? 
Today AD2- exists
262
 and is sold for use in real traffic. AD3+ is not in the testing phase 
(TRL 7) yet. As far as communicated, vehicles are driven worldwide to test functional 
behavior and use these results for further development and improving, meaning further 
changing the AD3+ functions. A test driver is in place to intervene. Thus, from the thesis 
concept point of view today no data exists or is communicated for the safety assessment 
goal.  
Nevertheless, in the USA two prominent examples exist that argue about safety using an 
accident per distance ratio and looking for a benchmark in today’s road traffic statistics. 
4.3.1 Tesla Motors Inc. Model S Autopilot Tech Package 
In the user’s manual263 of the Tesla Model S (Software Version 7.1) the Autopilot Tech 
Package including Traffic-Aware Cruise Control, Autosteer, Auto Lane Change, 
Autopark, as well as Auto High Beam is part of the Driver Assistance Features. The 
manual informs that: 
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Warning: Traffic-Aware Cruise Control is designed for your driving comfort and 
convenience and is not a collision warning or avoidance system. It is your responsi-
bility to stay alert, drive safely, and be in control of the vehicle at all times. Never 
depend on Traffic-Aware Cruise Control to adequately slow down Model S. Always 
watch the road in front of you and be prepared to take corrective action at all times. 
Failure to do so can result in serious injury or death.  
Thus, despite the naming the vehicle should be used as an AD2- vehicle. Consequently, 
the necessity for application of the usage strategy is not given. Nevertheless, a statement 
of the Tesla Team
264
 to the preliminary fatal accident evaluation
265
 of the National 
Transportation Safety Board exists. In this statement, three values are given: 
This is the first known fatality in just over 130 million miles where Autopilot was ac-
tivated. Among all vehicles in the US, there is a fatality every 94 million miles. 
Worldwide, there is a fatality approximately every 60 million miles. 
Although, they do not argue on safety, why should these numbers be stated otherwise? 
As it has been derived above, if these numbers would be used for comparison of safety, 
the actual use case of Autopilot should be defined explicitly. Given this use case, it 
should be asked whether the distance driven by the object under test (Autopilot) is a 
good sample for this use case. Besides the object under test assessment, also the data to 
define the benchmark should be explicitly derived and explained. If this had been done, 
the numbers could be used to ask whether the OuT is safer or less safe as the benchmark 
by the approach explained in subsection 3.3. Figure 51 illustrates the result assuming 
that the data above fulfills these requirements and all relevant events got known: 
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The numbers do not serve to either prove or reject the safety hypothesis. This compari-
son is done for the severity of accidents with fatalities. It would be of interest how this 
hypothesis changes for other level of severity. Unfortunately, these numbers are not 
published. But again, this is an AD2- system. And it is improbable that the data used 
reflects the benchmark as well as the OuT. Events avoided due to human intervention 
are not reported. A conclusion from this numbers for an AD3+ usage must not be drawn. 
4.3.2 Google Self-Driving Car Project 
The departments of motor vehicles (DMV) in different states of the USA are working to 
adopt regulations governing both the testing and public use of autonomous vehicles
266
. 
In September 2016, the U.S. Department of Transportation has published a federal 
automated vehicles policy
267
 to further harmonize the activities in different states. How-
ever, the DMV of California has been the first that adopted their regulations on testing 
in September 2014. The regulation requires a report of accidents as well as a report of 
                                                 
266
 Blanco, M. et al.: Automated Vehicle Crash Rate Comparison Using Naturalistic Data (2016), p. 8. 
267
 U.S. DOT: Federal Automated Vehicles Policy (2016). 
Figure 51 Distance factor    
as a function of the probability of error   and number of counted 
events   for comparison of the Tesla numbers with two benchmarks. 
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disengagement in certain conditions:
268
 Accidents within 10 days (§ 227.44) and disen-
gagements of autonomous mode yearly (§ 227.46). Thereby, a first framework for gath-
ering the necessary data has been defined by the requirement of the DMV in California. 
Similar regulations exist for other states
269
. 
The results of these reports
270
 are that the Google’s Self-Driving Car Project encoun-
tered the most events, but has also driven the longest distance by factors. Can the vehi-
cles operated by Google be proven to be safer or less safe? Due to the fact that the use 
case is not described clearly for the Self-Driving Car Project and it is unclear (from 
reporting) where the vehicle operated during the mileage that was collected, it could just 
be compared against the average vehicle and usage. Due to the challenges on gathering 
the necessary benchmark data, as indicated above, a study
271
 has been driven from the 
Virginia Tech Transportation Institute (VTTI) to adjust or correct the data. This adjust-
ment was done by using naturalistic driving study data (SHRP2) to mainly correct for 
unreported events. As this NDS data deliberately oversampled younger and older driv-
ers, an age adjustment was performed. Also variations on speed zones, locality, and 
others are discussed in the study. The study concludes with the comparison of accident 
per distance values for three crash severity levels (see Table 10). 
Table 10 SHRP 2 and Self-Driving Car Calculated Crash Rates per Million Miles Driven271 
Crash Severity SHRP 2 Age-Adjusted Estimated 
Rate per Million Miles 
Self-Driving Car Estimated 
Rate per Million Miles 
Level 1 2.5 1.6 
Level 2 3.3 1.6 
Level 3 14.4 5.6 
 
The different severity levels are defined by Table 11. 
Table 11 SHRP 2 NDS Crash Severity Classifications272 
SHRP 2 
NDS Crash 
Severity 
Level 
SHRP 2 NDS Classifications 
Level l 
Crashes with airbag deployment, injury, rollover, a high   , or that 
require towing. Injury, if present, should be sufficient to require a 
doctor's visit, including those self-reported and those from apparent 
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video. A high    is defined as a change in speed of the subject vehicle 
in any direction during impact greater than 20 mph (excluding curb 
strikes) or acceleration on any axis greater than ±2 g (excluding curb 
strikes). 
Level 2 
Crashes that do not meet the requirements for a Level 1 crash. In-
cludes sufficient property damage that one would anticipate is report-
ed to authorities (minimum of $1,500 worth of damage, as estimated 
from video). Also includes crashes that reach an acceleration on any 
axis greater than ± 1.3 g (excluding curb strikes). Most large animal 
strikes and sign strikes are considered Level 2. 
Level 3 
Crashes involving physical conflict with another object (but with 
minimal damage) that do not meet the requirements for a Level 1 or 
Level 2 crash. Includes most road departures (unless criteria for a 
more severe crash are met), small animal strikes, all curb and tire 
strikes potentially in conflict with oncoming traffic, and other curb 
strikes with an increased risk element (e.g., would have resulted in a 
worse crash had the curb not been there, usually related to some kind 
of driver behavior or state, for example, hitting a guardrail at low 
speeds). 
From these numbers for the different severity levels, the attempt to prove higher or less 
safety can be made when knowing the safety performance benchmark from Table 10, 
the event numbers
273
 for the object under test (Level 1: 2 times, Level 2: 2 times and 
Level 3: 7 times) as well as the testing distance
273
 of 1,266,611 miles in automated 
mode. The result is depicted in Figure 52. 
For each level, one point is depicted. The meaning for proving higher safety or lower 
safety of the level one point, the most severe level, is nearly neutral. For level two, the 
statement on safety is still uncertain (error probability >10 %). This second point is 
above the point of level one because the benchmark for level two is less safe 
(                             ). The third point for level three is clearly within the 
upper green proven better (      area.  
Thus, the data correction of the VTTI report as well as the reported numbers of the 
Google Self-Driving Car Project can neither prove higher safety nor lower safety. How-
ever, a first indicator is given by the lowest severity level. On this level, the proof of 
higher safety has been given. This might be used for a careful prediction based on the 
argumentation of the accident triangle from Heinrich
274
 and Hydén
275
. But as indicated 
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by the distorted triangle in Figure 7 and Figure 11, this proof on lower levels must not 
be taken for the overall proof on safety only. 
 
The conclusion of both examples is: “I know that I know nothing”. To be accurate: to 
know nothing is wrong. For the idea of the introduction strategy one necessary pre-
requisite is given: Less safety has not been proven. The assessment leads to a value in 
the uncertain area for higher and thus more relevant levels of severity.  
The conclusion of this application chapter is that there is no system where the usage 
strategy needs to be applied today. Nevertheless, the use cases exist and are about to 
become reality. Thus, data is necessary that needs to be collected and processed. This as 
well as the future usage strategy application itself asks for a study of the safety lifecycle 
of an automated vehicle. 
Figure 52 Distance factor    
as a function of the probability of error   and number of counted 
events   for comparison of the VTTI numbers with three level of severity. 
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5 Consequences: The Safety Lifecycle of 
AD3+ 
Q 24 Does the usage strategy affect the safety lifecycle of AD3+? 
The challenge to introduce AD3+ has been explained. A concept to overcome this chal-
lenge has been derived. As the concept should be seen as an extension to the existing 
development process, but by no means as a replacement, today’s safety lifecycle is 
studied. The safety lifecycle is described
276
 by the meaning of its two words. The lifecy-
cle of an item is the entirely of phases from item definition to decommissioning (see 
Figure 53). The goal should be to reach the absence of unreasonable risks during all 
these phases. Is the approach described in the ISO 26262 able to cope with AD3+ and 
the macroscopic approach?  
 
 
Firstly, the challenges for the safety lifecycle resulting from the safety assessment de-
scribed in this thesis are highlighted. Secondly, a potential adaptation of the safety 
lifecycle to handle these challenges is proposed. The third subsection gives an outlook 
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on potential tools that might address unmentioned major challenges, the collection of 
data and the limitation of usage. 
5.1 Challenges for Applying Today’s Safety 
Lifecycle 
Q 25 Why is today’s safety lifecycle not sufficient for AD3+? 
Today, the comprehensive statistical macroscopic proof of safety is not given for the 
release for production because it is not necessary as explained in subsection 2.1. The 
main challenge for applying the existing ISO 26262 results from the following two 
objectives. The objective of the release for production
277a
 defines: 
The release for production confirms that the item complies with the requirements for 
functional safety at vehicle level. 
Whereas the objective of the hazard analysis and risk assessment
277b
 is: 
to identify and categorise the hazards of the item and formulate the safety goals re-
lated to the prevention or mitigation of these hazards, in order to avoid unreasonable 
risk. 
A safety goal shall be determined for each hazardous event evaluated in the hazard 
analysis. Safety goals are top-level safety requirements for the item. They lead to the 
functional safety requirements needed to avoid an unreasonable risk for each haz-
ard. 
Thus, the person signing the release for production confirms that the item complies with 
the requirements that should avoid an unreasonable risk. But what if these requirements 
are not sufficient? This question is addressed
278
 by the initiative addressing the safety of 
the intended functionality (SoTIF). But what if safety still remains uncertain due to 
economic reasons as long as the usage of the item is not controlled? 
Today’s lifecycle is not addressing this handling of uncertainty on the safety perfor-
mance that may exist for AD3+. Consequently, as a result of this thesis, a proactive 
handling of this uncertainty needs to be established. Due to the existing uncertainty, 
events may happen during usage. They might be caused by the item. This must be ad-
dressed proactively on management level. The one that signs the release for production 
must, even if a perfectly developed vehicle is brought to usage, discuss the acceptability 
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of accidents. There is no possibility to introduce automated driving without generating 
acceptability for accidents, as will be explained in the following: 
In appendix C, the analytical equation (C-7) describing the simplified usage strategy by 
the exponential function has been derived to be  
                         
      
       
         
The elements of the exponential function are the worst-case OuT estimation for the 
expected value   , the allowed expected value rate         
      
     
 as well as the length 
of observation        . The initialization distance is the test distance before release for 
usage                 . The question to be answered is whether and how the proof of 
safety of AD3+ is possible without acceptance of accidents of these AD3+ vehicles. For 
the proof in general, the next inequality needs to be fulfilled 
                           (5-1) 
Up to a certain time         enough distance      must be driven to prove safety. This 
must be a multiple of the benchmark. When demanding not more than one accident 
during the time of full deployment                  equation (5-1) can be rewritten as 
 
                    
 
    (5-2) 
For the best-case, thus the vehicle is safe and no accident will occur,      is neces-
sary (see Table 15 for    ) to proof safety. Consequently, if more than      
                has been tested, most likely less than one event will occur. The con-
clusion of this is that the careful introduction of a very good system may work without 
an accident, but caution: at least twice the safety performance distance needs to be 
tested and then only the distance              is allowed to be driven for usage during 
the time        . As it is economically not feasible to test more than to use a system, an 
acceptability of events needs to be derived and proposed during the concept phase of 
AD3+. 
Only little challenges from the derived concept result for the product development 
phase, as long as during concept phase the uncertainty has been addressed.  
Major challenges exist for the phase after the release for production. The derived con-
cept handles the uncertainty with an updated assessment and limitation of usage. Today, 
during the operation there are maintenance and service activities planned. Additionally a 
safety management after release for production
279
 is required: 
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The organization shall institute, execute and maintain a field monitoring process 
with respect to functional safety. 
The data is used for decisions and measures e.g. a recall concerning safety incidents. 
However, these measures as well as “proven in use arguments” foresee a reporting of 
events for another purpose then limiting the usage.  
The awareness for need
280
 of a more advanced field monitoring process exists. 
Schittenhelm
281
 proposed a continuous evaluation process of real-world effectiveness. 
The process is separated into predicting real-world efficiency during development as 
well as proving real-world efficiency during real-world usage based on take rates of 
spare parts, insurance claim data, and road accident statistics. But this will only be the 
first step to apply the usage strategy. 
Prerequisites for the usage strategy are the collection of testing distance, the reporting of 
corresponding events and a possibility to control usage. Consequently, the following 
subsection will state requirements that should be addressed by the management of the 
safety lifecycle for AD3+.  
5.2 Potential Adaptations of the Safety Lifecycle 
of AD3+ 
Q 26 How could the safety lifecycle be adapted for AD3+? 
The results of this thesis lead the necessity to adapt or most likely extend the safety 
lifecycle in principle when addressing AD3+. Therefore two components are added to 
the safety lifecycle for AD3+ as depicted in Figure 54. 
One is the macroscopic safety concept. The other is the safety concept application. 
The macroscopic safety concept requires a precisely defined use case of AD3+. Based 
on this use case definition, a concept needs to be defined and to be studied similar as 
has been explained within chapter 3. The concept must handle possible safety perfor-
mance uncertainties of the object under test. This macroscopic safety concept shall be 
defined during the concept phase. The work product of this step is a documentation of 
this concept. 
The safety concept application requires a precisely defined macroscopic safety concept 
from above. Additionally, it requires the data for application. Most likely it will be the 
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data discussed in chapter 4. The application must collect the data defined by the macro-
scopic safety concept. The application must put the decision on the handling of these 
uncertainties into practice, thus influence the possibility to activate AD3+. The results of 
the applied concept should also be considered for the release for production. Additional-
ly, the application must cover the whole phase of operation as long as it has not been 
decided to be terminated. As described above and indicated by the circle in Figure 54, it 
should be seen as experiential learning from operation to adapt the usage limitation. 
Work products should be a documented database on relevant data as well as a concrete 
influence on AD3+ usage.  
This thesis has proposed a basic macroscopic safety concept to instantiate the first 
component of Figure 54. The thesis leaves open how to instantiate the second compo-
nent of Figure 54: the collection of data as well as the control of the usage of AD3+. 
The next subsections lay out thoughts on how to address the collection as well as the 
control as a methodological outlook for future research. 
5.3 Collecting Data for Safety Assessment 
Q 27 How can the collection of data be designed more efficiently? 
 
Figure 54 Extended safety lifecycle for AD3+. 
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5.3.1 Test Translation Factor 
The explained concept of the uncertainty-based introduction strategy has the potential to 
significantly reduce the necessary testing distance ahead of the release for usage. The 
numbers for         discussed in subsection 3.6 may even be drivable in real traffic with 
test drivers. Important to mention, however, is the assumption that underlies the ex-
plained concept: The OuT, thus the AD3+ vehicle including hard- as well as software 
that effects safety, must not be changed during assessment. When a change on any of 
these elements occurred, the distance collected before is not relevant for safety assess-
ment anymore. 
Starting the safety assessment over again is especially costly when updates during usage 
and testing are necessary. As both seem unavoidable at least during the first versions of 
AD3+, collecting test data needs to be optimized. The approaches described in subsec-
tion 2.5 “Possible Approaches for Solving the Challenge of Testing” therefore need to 
be enabled to contribute to the collection of test data. The basic idea is to derive a trans-
lation factor for testing tools combined with test cases other than real-world driving. Is a 
driven kilometer, as a part of a certain test case on proving ground, as valuable or valid 
as a kilometer driven in real world, or even more meaningful? Can a variation of scenar-
ios in simulation be translated into testing distance for the macroscopic assessment 
approach? The same questions can be asked for the events that have been counted dur-
ing testing. Is it possible to derive event numbers from testing tools and test cases other 
than real-world driving? Can a safety benchmark be defined based on data from driving 
simulators or naturalistic driving studies? 
In general, a translation of results from tests other than real-world driving to the safety 
outcome of AD3+ real-world driving is to my knowledge unknown today. These ques-
tions are subject of today’s research. However, a test translation factor would be neces-
sary to include all results from the microscopic approach to the macroscopic safety 
assessment. 
As this translation factor is missing today, the goal of the tool described in the following 
is to stay as close to real driving as possible but enabling economical coverage of reality 
and reducing additional risks to zero. 
5.3.2 Virtual Assessment of Automation in Field Operation 
(VAAFO) 
The basic idea of the VAAFO concept
282
 is derived from the so-called Trojan Horse 
approach
283
. This Trojan Horse approach addressed the testing of emergency intervening 
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systems like emergency brake assist
284
 (EBA), which try to mitigate accidents. For this 
EBA, the results of assessment by means of false-positive and false-negative rates are 
clear. When assessing systems that control vehicle dynamics constantly (AD3+), this 
unambiguity is not granted anymore. For this reason, the Trojan Horse has to be devel-
oped further, resulting in the VAAFO concept. Similar but less concrete ideas are writ-
ten down in a patent from Hoye et al.
285
 and at a press interview from an employee at 
Robert Bosch GmbH
286
 as well as in the Autopilot Release Notes from Tesla Motors 
Inc.
287
. All of them mention ideas without giving further insight into their developments. 
From a functional point of view, automated driving can be decomposed into three major 
levels: The automated driving function senses, thinks and acts. All possible sources of 
risks in terms of safety can be assigned to one of these three levels similarly as present-
ed for the human driver in Graab et al.
288
. Level one (sense) describes causes that hap-
pen within the information perception phase. The absence of sensor information leads to 
an absence of data needed to be processed. For example, an object may be covered or 
contain undetectable characteristics. Level two (think) classifies all errors that lie within 
the information processing such as the application of nowadays algorithms. Level three 
(act) categorizes all causes of accidents that occur after the decision is made due to 
improper control of the vehicle movement.  
On the one hand, the VAAFO tool uses the real sensors (level one/sense) as well as the 
real processing hardware (level two/think) to stay as close to the real automated driving 
function as possible. On the other hand it uses the decomposition of the vehicle automa-
tion to prevent additional risk by simulating the desired action (level three/act) of the 
automation. 
The VAAFO tool requires the following hardware: 
 The basis is a series vehicles that is driven by a human (SAE level 0) or assisted by 
advanced driver assistance systems (SAE level 1) or partially automated (SAE level 
2). 
 This series vehicle is equipped with sensors suitable for higher automated driving 
(SAE level 3+, called AD3+). These sense the real environment. 
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 Additionally, the microprocessors and respective processing algorithms are in-
stalled. These algorithms process the data coming from real sensors similar like the 
ones later used for AD3+. 
On the resulting perceived environment representation, the VAAFO tool is applied as 
depicted in Figure 55. 
 
Figure 55 VAAFO concept architecture
289
 
Further detailed explanation on this concept can be found in Wachenfeld and Winner
289
 
or Junietz et al.
290
. Figure 55 illustrates that with this concept both data sources are 
accessible: human driving behavior at real usage in state of the art vehicles as well as 
AD3+ simulated behavior for this real usage. It is an advanced naturalistic driving study 
with both systems in place that should be compared. Of course, this approach is not free 
from the necessity of a translation factor, but it is as close to real driving as possible. 
When VAAFO is applied in a huge scale, all information about the distance driven as 
well as the events that occur during this driving is accessible. The equipment of vehicles 
with these functionalities may violate rights of data protection. To address the contradic-
tion of data protection and data need, the information in the data should proactively be 
anonymized. The principle
291
 of collecting safety relevant events by a centralized entity 
has already been implemented in different risky industrial sectors. The Aviation Safety 
Reporting System (ASRS)
292
 of the Federal Aviation Administration in the USA handles 
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reports on potentially dangerous scenarios confidentially and guarantees immunity for 
reporting persons when they report within ten days. Similar Critical-Incident-Reporting-
Systems (CIRS) exist in the medical area to improve patients’ safety in hospitals. Fol-
lowing these examples and their lessons learnt, a Road Safety Reporting System 
(RSRS) should be implemented to enable the collection of data and enable more effi-
cient tools for this data collection. 
5.4 Limitation of AD3+ Usage 
Q 28 How can the usage of AD3+ be limited? 
As chapter 3 explains, the introduction of AD3+ should be careful to consider the safety 
performance uncertainty. Depending on updated numbers, the usage should be limited 
by the defined allowed average velocity       . 
 
Figure 56 illustrates possible limitation scenarios. Due to changing numbers, it will be 
unlikely that the limitation           will not change during the evaluation time. If the 
safety performance estimation will lead to higher values and/or the tolerated number of 
events increases, the limitation may relax, thus rise. The limitation would be tightened, 
thus           would fall if the safety performance estimation indicates lower numbers 
and/or the tolerated numbers reduce. The limitation must also be able to hinder the total 
usage of AD3+ whenever the defined macroscopic theory leads to this result or a com-
petent authority requires this step. On the other hand, also the cancellation of any limita-
tion might result from the proof of safety. 
No matter how these different possible limitations might be implemented, several gener-
ic requirements must be taken into account: 
Figure 56 Possible limitation necessities 
5 Consequences: The Safety Lifecycle of AD3+ 
164 
 
 The limitation must be use-case-embracing. Due to the tolerated number of events 
that is derived for a use case not an explicit product, but all vehicles within a use 
case must be addressed by the limitation. 
 This use-case-embracing approach needs a neutral central control structure. Conse-
quently, it seems reasonable to implement a road safety control system (RSCS) as 
the counterpart to the road safety report system (RSRS). 
 The update of allowed average velocities would ideally happen in real-time. By 
implementing an update rate, it must be studied what additional risk might result 
from not real-time updating. 
 As the possibility exists that the permission for driving AD3+ is rejected, an availa-
bility concept for the vehicles including a regular licensed driver must be in place at 
least during the introduction of AD3+. 
 When rejecting the permission for AD3+, driving a safe handover must be guaran-
teed. 
The requirements focus on the general managing of the control. The technical imple-
mentation might be studied as well, but due to existing concepts of OEMs there should 
be no technical challenge for realizing this limitation. Partially automated functions are 
spatially
293
 or event-based
294
 restricted and in combination with existing communication 
infrastructure
295
 this limitation could also be made controllable from an external entity.
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6 Conclusion: Critical Concept Reflection 
Q 29 What are the conclusions of this thesis? 
This thesis opens a new perspective on the safety assessment of AD3+. The main results 
will be summarized in the following four subsections. First, the concept’s findings on 
the safety assessment are described. It is not a given thing to apply the developed con-
cept. Consequently, the existing main challenges for concept application are described 
in subsection 6.2. These challenges indicate that the concept needs to be further devel-
oped before it is applied to a real-world use case. The concept consists of a usage pre-
diction and an iterative introduction that, in principle, will improve the closer the real 
introduction gets. An outlook is given that describes the most important and promising 
next steps to improve the assessment from my point of view. The last subsection will 
close up the thesis. Given the knowledge gained by the taken stochastic perspective, the 
first question asked in this thesis is reflected: Q 1 Should automated driving be used on 
public streets? 
6.1 Findings of the Concept on Safety Assess-
ment of AD3+ 
Q 30 What does the described concept tell us about the safety assessment of AD3+? 
The findings are summarized chapter-wise in the following 5 subsections. 
6.1.1 Findings from the Introduction Chapter 
The SAE level of automation are a first step for defining the object under test, but a 
more detailed look on the real use cases is necessary to weight benefits and drawbacks. 
Benefits are versatile. Given different use cases, these can vary significantly. A good 
understanding of potential benefits and drawbacks is essential as other benefits besides 
safety are necessary to pave the way for the introduction. 
Benefits and drawbacks are shared unequally in society. Taking a closer look and study-
ing certain stakeholder groups affects and refines requirements. To come to a conclusion 
on the introduction, requirements on safety need to be concretized and formalized. 
Therefore, different quantities exist. From the society’s perspective, accidents occur that 
lead to injuries which generate unwanted costs. These values need to be related to an 
exposure to the object under test. By a theoretical argumentation the safety performance 
6 Conclusion: Critical Concept Reflection 
166 
 
is selected to compare AD3+’s safety impact. The safety performance expresses safety 
by the expected distance between two events of the same kind. This safety performance 
was defined as two dimensional, comparing accidents with fatalities as well as accidents 
with injuries. Additional levels could and should be discussed. 
Although safety requirements are formalized, a prospective assessment suffers uncer-
tainty due to assumptions and simplifications. That as the result of a lack of knowledge 
is an unchangeable fact. Nevertheless, as the first introduction is pending it may be 
influenced when addressing these uncertainties proactively to enable a win-win situation 
for all stakeholders. 
6.1.2 Findings from the State of the Art 
Current test concepts are not prepared for the assessment of AD3+. Today, the human 
driver’s controllability builds the backbone of the test concept. Comfort systems of SAE 
level 2 and less have been assessed and improve today’s road traffic system. 
The general requirements for test concept haven’t changed. Test concepts must be valid, 
variable, observable, economical, reproducible, in good time, and safe. 
However, the object under test has changed. It is unknown how the human’s abilities to 
drive in everyday traffic can be assessed when a machine executes the driving task. As 
today’s test concepts have not been enabled for assessing AD3+, one could attempt to 
prove safety by just driving enough test distance. The necessary test distance, however, 
leads to the “Approval-Trap”: The statistical proof of safety assuming the Poisson dis-
tribution for accident events is economically not feasible ahead of introduction due to 
the high safety standard of today’s road traffic and economical boundary conditions. 
Different approaches exist to address this “Approval-Trap”. These approaches are sepa-
rated mainly into the microscopic approach and the macroscopic approach. The micro-
scopic approach is part of today’s research within the automotive industry and not dis-
cussed further. The macroscopic approach is the one that is described in this thesis. 
6.1.3 Findings from the Concept Derivation 
The macroscopic approach assumes that accidents underlie a stochastic process. Why 
the occurrence of accidents follows a Poisson process can be motivated by three ways. 
Firstly, it is a discrete process with low probability for an event so that it can be argued 
to follow from the Bernoulli experiment. Secondly, it has been used in the past and by 
different authors in research for similar studies. Thirdly, no data exists to falsify or 
confirm this assumption. Additionally, I assume that if enough data would exist to con-
firm and use another probability distribution function, the introduction challenge would 
have been solved. 
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The next scientific question, as long as a proof of safety based on the assumption of 
Poisson cannot be given, should be whether the proof of less safety is possible or not. 
When assuming an object under test approximately as good as the benchmark, this 
falsification of safety would again not be able ahead of introduction. 
What to do next? 
Refined requirements are proposed by splitting up the requirements for the user and the 
individual of society. The user must be enabled to come to an individual decision 
whether to use AD3+ or not. Therefore, it is proposed to estimate the best- and worst-
case safety performance based on existing testing distance and occurred events. This 
should be compared with today’s benchmarks of similar use cases or other means of 
transportation. The user can decide for himself weather to take the risk or not. 
On the other hand, the individual of the society cannot choose whether to be exposed to 
AD3+ or not. As a part of society, the individual is just exposed because he/she partici-
pates in road traffic. But as long as the object under test is introduced only little, the 
safety impact for the individual of society is small. It is assumed that it is also negligible 
or tolerable, when the impact on safety disappears in existing noise of the society’s 
safety detector. 
Using these two refined requirements, an uncertainty-based usage strategy is defined 
that guarantees to a certain error probability that both requirements will be fulfilled. The 
specialty about the introduction theory is that it carefully and iteratively introduces and 
analyses safety. 
How this will work, depends on several parameters of the usage strategy. These need to 
be defined explicitly. To understand their influence on the safety outcome, different 
parameter combinations (108) are studied. The main finding is that there might be an 
optimum for how much should be tested, how many events need to be tolerated, and 
how many vehicles enabling AD3+ can then be introduced. Different evaluation criteria 
that might be used for the real-world use case specific optimization have been identi-
fied. 
This is what this thesis can offer: proposing a formalization, a prediction, and criteria 
for decision. To provide road traffic benefits, the concept must be applied to real use 
cases and must contribute to the safety lifecycle of AD3+. 
6.1.4 Findings from the Discussion of Application 
As the concept has been formalized, it requires data to be applied, data to define a 
benchmark, and data to assess the object under test. Which data should be taken for 
benchmark definition and object under test assessment can only be defined when a 
precise use case description exists. In general, it is 4 values that change over time that 
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need to be collected: The distance of the benchmark driven in the use case, the number 
of events that occur during this driving, the test distance driven of the object under test 
driven in the use case, as well as the number of events that occur during test driving. 
This sounds simple but the devil is in the detail. Additionally, generic data requirements 
to apply the strategy have been defined: Data must be associated with a detailed use 
case documentation, derived by a reviewed derivation, be up-to-date, publicly accessi-
ble, and archived. 
From the four studied use cases, only the Autobahn Pilot is defined sufficiently to be 
assessed by this theory. For special cases, benchmarks do not exist. The right over- and 
under-estimation to solve this missing benchmark is necessary. 
To start with a seed automation at a high safety area is not a good choice from the safety 
assessment point of view, as the benchmark reaches high level of safety. This might 
change when it is possible to neglect certain level of severity for assessment. If it is 
possible to convince that it is not possible to be killed by the object under test, the cor-
responding assessment on accident with fatality level could be obsolete. 
The overall safety assessment could be a merging of area selective safety performance 
assessments depending on the acceptance of splitting up the usage area. The known 
installation of reduced speed areas like in the surrounding of schools and kindergartens 
is a motivator, whereas the German constitution
296
 as a demotivating factor tells: 
The dignity of man is inviolable. To respect and protect it shall be the duty of all 
public authority. 
Existing use cases that reported numbers for the distance driven and events that oc-
curred (Tesla’s Autopilot/Google Self-Driving) thus have no precise use case description 
and consequently an assessment cannot be done. The existing numbers that are used for 
argumentation just indicate that the “Approval-Trap” exists. 
6.1.5 Findings for the Safety Lifecycle 
Today’s safety lifecycle that addresses all phases from item definition up to decommis-
sioning constructs the necessary safety for AD2- vehicles. The concept described in ISO 
26262 relies on the human driver’s controllability. The uncertainty whether the new 
technology will improve safety is “hidden” behind the individual human abilities. 
For AD3+ vehicle development, this uncertainty must be addressed proactively. There-
fore, two safety lifecycle extensions are proposed: 
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One is the macroscopic safety concept definition during concept phase. It is shown that 
the concept is necessary because more than zero events must be tolerated to start the 
introduction. Although no event will occur at the end, it is necessary to argue introduc-
ing. The findings from the concept theory above could build the basis for this macro-
scopic safety concept.  
The second extension would be the application of the defined concept. This means the 
collection of data and control of AD3+ activation. This application of the concept must 
cover the development phase, as it influences the release for production. Additionally, it 
must cover the phase after release for production as it actively influences the operation 
of AD3+ vehicles.  
Although the developed concept refines requirements and thereby reduces the amount 
of necessary testing distance ahead of introduction, the collection of data still is the 
challenge for usage. Real test driving will be the basis for data collection but should not 
be the only test tool. Especially for the testing of potential changes in software, a test 
translation factor is motivated. How can software-in-the-loop testing or test track testing 
be translated to the macroscopic safety assessment? To stay as close as possible to real-
world test driving but still improve efficiency and safety, the Virtual Assessment of 
Automation in Field Operation (VAAFO) is proposed. It can be seen as an advanced 
naturalistic driving study that generates data for defining the benchmark as well as 
assessing the object under test. 
When the concept has been defined, it has been accepted, the data has been collected, 
and the vehicles are in place, one thing is missing. A controlled release for usage has to 
be given. The technology for this centralized control already exists or is in development. 
But the management and how the control of AD3+ activation is realized are up for 
research. 
6.2 Challenges for Concept Application 
Q 31 What might hinder the introduction of AD3+, despite the refined requirements? 
6.2.1 Identification of Challenges for Concept Application 
Three possible future scenarios wait for the concept application. Firstly, the concept or 
an offspring is accepted and AD3+ vehicles are introduced. Secondly, the concept or an 
offspring is accepted and AD3+ is not introduced. Thirdly, the concept and an offspring 
are not accepted. 
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The concept must be distinguished from the statistical proof of higher or less safety. The 
statistical proof is a part of stochastic and as an area of mathematics it is out of question. 
What could be challenged, however, are the numbers the concept takes to compare 
safety as well as to develop the introduction strategy. To study challenges beforehand 
that could lead the futures two and three, these challenges are identified. Let’s start with 
the second possible future and ask: What may lead to the avoidance of introduction 
although the concept is applied? 
 Although the introduction strategy was applied, the necessary testing distance is too 
large to come to an economically meaningful introduction. “Too large” has two rea-
sons. It results from a combination of the benchmark which is too safe and the eco-
nomic appropriateness that is missing.  
 The safety performance level of the OuT is just not high enough. Either it is proven 
ahead of release for usage that the OuT is less safe compared to the defined bench-
mark, or the resulting allowed velocity is too small. The allowed velocity could be 
negligible that no significant outweighing benefits result. 
 Due to an unlucky incident, an accumulation of events leads the proof of less safety 
although the OuT is safer. The probability of error will never be zero, thus it might 
happen. 
 The users are not willing to accept the reached worst-case safety performance esti-
mation. Thus, the usage demand is too little. 
 The society does not tolerate any personal damage caused by an automated unsu-
pervised system. The society or its representatives thereby would proactively de-
cide against the introduction of the technology and require the proof of safety ahead 
of introduction. Thereby, society would take the risk to avoid the introduction at all. 
This would be a massive step and must clearly be communicated. However, exam-
ples for bans exist like the nuclear phase-out or the prohibition of fracking.  
 
All of these reasons are reasonable and it is out of scope of this thesis to judge on that. 
This is different when thinking about reasons why the concept idea is not accepted to be 
applied. Because it should be taken care that the safety requirements identified ahead or 
further refined ones are met. It must not necessarily be the described concept, but there 
must be any concept in place to address the requirements. What may lead to the missing 
acceptance for application of the concept? 
 Someone is just confident that the OuT is safe enough and takes the risks to intro-
duce it. This might be possible as long as the introduction is not avoided by any 
type of type approval or if self-certification is sufficient without any further tests. It 
is questionable if this is compatible with the government’s task to protect its socie-
ty. This approach might end with AD3+ driving and improving safety but might al-
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so end the other way around. Liability might be necessary in last instance to coun-
terbalance unreasonable risks for affected stakeholders. 
 Someone just invests the money to drive enough test distance to prove safety, alt-
hough from today’s point of view this seems uneconomical. Then the concept does 
not need to be applied as uncertainty on the safety performance has already been 
reduced sufficiently. 
 Society just might accept low safety performance levels due to outstanding other 
benefits. Questionable will be if this acceptance is without opposition. 
 No one can be found that finally defines the necessary definitions. The final numer-
ical definition of tolerated fatalities for example will be one of these decision 
points. 
 The theoretical concept is just not accepted from any of the stakeholder and another 
concept that for example solely bases on an established microscopic approach is 
applied.  
 Or the reason for leaking acceptance is just a deep disagreement between the objec-
tively derived method, discussing safety and the subjective perception of this safety. 
Thus, it might be that a subjective safety might only be a social construct rather 
than a real absence of unreasonable risks. Haverkamp and Arnold
297
 explain this 
simplified with the safety quadrate in Table 12. 
Table 12 The safety quadrat
297
 
objective 
safe unsafe 
safe 
supposed 
safe 
safe 
subjective 
supposed 
unsafe 
unsafe unsafe 
 
The subjective perception of risks has not been in focus of this thesis but should not 
be forgotten when discussing the uncertainty risk based introduction of automated 
vehicles. The technical approach on risk analysis is not the only perspective that 
can be taken when thinking of public acceptance and acceptability. As Pavone et 
al.
298
 discuss, also other approaches exist that tackle risk analysis and its acceptabil-
ity. For example can causes for technology acceptability from the psychological ap-
proach be distinguished as shown in Table 13. 
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Table 13 Psychological aspects attenuating or amplifying risk perception
299
 
Attenuate risk perception  Amplify risk perception 
Familiarity ↔ Exoticism 
Individual control ↔ Control by others 
Natural ↔ Man‐made 
Statistical ↔ Catastrophic 
Clear benefit ↔ Little or no benefit 
Fair distribution ↔ Unfair distribution 
Voluntary ↔ Imposed 
Information from trusted 
sources 
↔ Information from noncredible sources 
In the media ↔ Not in the media 
To address the challenges explained above and thereby to avoid a missing acceptability, 
the following outlook summarizes the necessary next steps. 
6.2.2 Addressing the Challenges for Concept Application 
Again, the three future scenarios from above are discussed step by step to give an out-
look on how the identified challenges for concept application might be addressed:  
Firstly, if the concept or an offspring is accepted and AD3+ vehicles are introduced 
nothing needs to be done. However, given the simplifications and outdated data this 
seems unlikely and it is not advised. 
Secondly, if the concept or an offspring is accepted and AD3+ is not introduced it is not 
the concept that needs to be changed. On the contrary, it might be the purpose of the 
concept in this case to avoid the introduction and usage of AD3+ for the studied use 
case. However, this leads to another conclusion: The macroscopic safety concept may 
be used to find the right use case for AD3+ introduction. All the reasons that have been 
given are use case, user, and society sensitive. If the benchmark for a use case is too 
good, another use case should be chosen. If the proof of less safety has been given, it 
has been given for a certain use case. If the usage demand is too little due to the low 
safety performance estimation, other users might be addressed. If the society does not 
tolerate events, the exposed society should be chosen differently. Consequently, further 
work should not only improve the concept but also look for the right use case to apply 
the concept. The user as well as the society must be the ones that benefits most, because 
they also bear the risks. 
Thirdly, if the concept and an offspring are not accepted the concept should be im-
proved. The basic of the concept is explained in this thesis, thus it is a starting point for 
others to further improve the concept. As long as the required numbers exist, everybody 
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can simulate their special use case. From my point of view, the main activities to im-
prove the concept ahead of introduction should be: 
 Transparently discuss the tolerated number of events     . Additional methods to 
derive this value must be defined, prepared by science journalism, and actively 
communicated. Especially important is to identify and communicate who the re-
sponsible entity will be that defines the final value. These might be elected repre-
sentatives or each individual. 
 Law research should drive a case study: What would happen if a tolerated number 
was defined, somebody signed the fulfillment of AD3+ and different numbers of fa-
tal events happened in reality? This would clarify the personal responsibility before 
these cases happen in reality. Needs for adaptation can be identified and improve 
the introduction. 
 The right selection of test distance is an essential prerequisite to apply the derived 
concept. A more advanced calculation of an economic balance can be performed by 
companies having a more detailed insight, but also by the government. The eco-
nomic balance is relative and depends on the benefits and costs that are defined as 
relevant. 
 The simulation should be improved by introducing time variant values and improv-
ing assumptions: the safety performance benchmark         improves during sev-
eral years of simulation, the same counts for the tolerated number of events as well 
as for the usage demand in general and the usage demand of mobility limited peo-
ple as well as the equipment ration. 
When information on real testing of AD3+ gets accessible and the introduction comes 
closer, the following activities are necessary: 
 The motivated Road Safety Reporting System (RSRS) as well as the Road Safety 
Control System (RSCS) must be developed and established in good time. The 
RSRS should be in place as soon as the first test of AD3+ begins, but latest with the 
release for usage. The RSCS system must be in place with the release for usage as 
the communication of the release should be given by this system.  
The recorded information by the RSRS could be used to: 
 adapt the concept to the question: Who to blame for an accident? This ratio between 
being a victim or the responsible should be used do adapt the safety performance 
estimation.  
 The same counts for the injury per accident rate    . If this number is known, it 
should be added to the concept. 
 Once the time has come and the accident process underlying probability distribu-
tion gets checkable, this should be done. Especially when a super vision is planned, 
the new information must improve the safety assessment as well as prediction of its 
impact in the future. 
6 Conclusion: Critical Concept Reflection 
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Besides these concrete next steps, also general ideas to improve the acceptance from the 
psychological point of view should be studied. As a first proposal that directly follows 
from Table 13: 
 When the usage strategy is applied, the users as well as the society should be made 
familiar with the concept. The promotion process should start today and report safe-
ty performance values instead of fatalities each year, or similar statistics. 
 Users but also the individual should get a chance to contribute to key elements on 
the decision about usage. 
 Catastrophic risks must be avoided. Actively developed security must hinder a sys-
temic risk. 
 The users but also the society must benefit and this should actively be influenced. 
 The benefits must be distributed as the risks are. There should not be the one that is 
only exposed without the chance to benefit. 
 AD3+ vehicles design should be in a way that the usage is voluntary. The exposure 
of the individual of society will not be voluntary but should follow the defined con-
cept. 
 An independent entity should inform about the concept. 
 The information should proactively be communicated.  
6.3 How Stochastic can Help to Introduce Auto-
mated Driving 
Q 32 Should automated driving be used on public streets? 
This question cannot be answered using the change in safety of road traffic as the only 
argument, because the result of the safety assessment will most likely remain uncertain 
ahead of introduction. Consequently, other benefits must enable a decision to take a 
well-defined risk and introduce AD3+. If this prerequisite is given, the remaining uncer-
tainty should proactively be addressed. Stochastic will help to handle this uncertainty on 
safety. This thesis, as one possible approach, could be used to introduce automated 
driving. I am not aware of other approaches addressing the safety performance uncer-
tainty proactively. 
To close up the dissertation, I want to come back to the first sentence on page 1. I as-
sume that the first automobile has been introduced without the thoughts of this thesis. 
The main reason might be: 1. The mass market for automobiles did not exist, 2. The 
safety standards were lower, thus acceptance of events higher. Even if everybody want-
ed to drive an automobile in 1886, they could not. In 1903, 11235 automobiles were 
6.3 How Stochastic can Help to Introduce Automated Driving 
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sold
300
 in the US. In 1923, it were
300
 more than         . Figure 57 illustrates301 the 
introduction of the automobile to the world since 1900. 
 
Today, more than        vehicles are produced yearly. That is a huge difference com-
pared to the introduction of the automobile that began around 1900. Thus, the usage 
strategy required for AD3+ was inevitably applied in 1886 for the first automobile. 
During these times there was no other choice to introduce the technology than do it 
slowly. 
Today, we can shape road traffic and the use of technology. The informed individual 
should decide for himself whether to use AD3+ or not. Important is a risk management 
that controls how much it is used on public roads. Whether this management will then 
hinder the introduction or not depends on two things: The safer the AD3+ will be, the 
faster it will become a mass product for everyone. But more important is, the more the 
society tolerates that a human-built machine may also hurt a human, the faster this 
technology will be available. 
I see this last point as the core question that must be answered or a methodology must 
be found to answer this question to reach the next step on the way to automated driving: 
Q 33 How much harm, caused by a human-built machine (AD3+), is acceptable for 
the exposed humans? 
 
                                                 
300
 Volti, R.: Cars and culture: The life story of a technology (2006), p. 23. 
301
 Wikipedia.de: Wirtschaftszahlen zum Automobil. Cf. Ward's Automotive Group: Ward's world motor 
vehicle data (2007). And OICA: Automobile production statistics.  
Figure 57 Yearly produced automobiles world wide (1900-2014) 
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A. Tables with Values of the Poisson Distri-
bution 
Table 14 Expected values   for fulfilling equations (2-3) and (3-18) for a probability of error of 
      . 
                  
0 0.000 4.605   25 14.85 39.31 
1 0.010 6.638   26 15.62 40.53 
2 0.149 8.406   27 16.40 41.76 
3 0.436 10.05   28 17.17 42.98 
4 0.823 11.60   29 17.96 44.19 
5 1.279 13.11   30 18.74 45.40 
6 1.785 14.57   31 19.53 46.61 
7 2.330 16.00   32 20.32 47.81 
8 2.906 17.40   33 21.12 49.01 
9 3.507 18.78   34 21.92 50.21 
10 4.130 20.14   35 22.72 51.41 
11 4.771 21.49   36 23.53 52.60 
12 5.428 22.82   37 24.33 53.79 
13 6.099 24.14   38 25.14 54.98 
14 6.782 25.45   39 25.96 56.16 
15 7.477 26.74   40 26.77 57.35 
16 8.181 28.03   41 27.59 58.53 
17 8.895 29.31   42 28.41 59.71 
18 9.616 30.58   43 29.23 60.88 
19 10.35 31.85   44 30.05 62.06 
20 11.08 33.10   45 30.88 63.23 
21 11.83 34.35   46 31.70 64.40 
22 12.57 35.60   47 32.53 65.57 
23 13.33 36.84   48 33.36 66.74 
24 14.09 38.08   49 34.20 67.90 
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Table 15 Expected values   for fulfilling equations (2-3) and (3-18) for a probability of error of 
      . 
                  
0 0.000 2.996   25 17.38 34.92 
1 0.051 4.744   26 18.22 36.08 
2 0.355 6.296   27 19.06 37.23 
3 0.818 7.754   28 19.90 38.39 
4 1.366 9.154   29 20.75 39.54 
5 1.970 10.51   30 21.59 40.69 
6 2.613 11.84   31 22.44 41.84 
7 3.285 13.15   32 23.30 42.98 
8 3.981 14.43   33 24.15 44.13 
9 4.695 15.71   34 25.01 45.27 
10 5.425 16.96   35 25.87 46.40 
11 6.169 18.21   36 26.73 47.54 
12 6.924 19.44   37 27.59 48.68 
13 7.690 20.67   38 28.46 49.81 
14 8.464 21.89   39 29.33 50.94 
15 9.246 23.10   40 30.20 52.07 
16 10.04 24.30   41 31.07 53.20 
17 10.83 25.50   42 31.94 54.32 
18 11.63 26.69   43 32.81 55.45 
19 12.44 27.88   44 33.69 56.57 
20 13.25 29.06   45 34.56 57.69 
21 14.07 30.24   46 35.44 58.82 
22 14.89 31.41   47 36.32 59.94 
23 15.72 32.59   48 37.20 61.05 
24 16.55 33.75   49 38.08 62.17 
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B. Cost Calculation for Real-World Testing 
Stated values for the costs for real-world testing have not been found. This, however, is 
necessary to define         for subsection 3.6.2. A value of                   has 
been estimated given the following numbers. The vehicle costs including operation have 
been defined based on numbers calculated from the German automobile association
302
 
and are listed for three examples in Table 16.  
Table 16 Average vehicle costs for a user of a vehicle
302
. 
 
Total cost 
(15000 km/month) 
Brand and model: 
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Audi A8 3.0 TDI quattro tiptronic 193 81000 199 83 107 1288 1677 1.342 
BMW 730d Steptronic 195 82600 200 59 89 1140 1488 1.19 
Mercedes S 350 d 9G-Tronic 190 82222 211 112 99 1185 1607 1.286 
The costs per kilometer are weighted by the profit margin of the companies from 2012 
(Mercedes Benz Cars: 7.1 %, BMW: 10.8 %, Audi: 11 %)
303
 resulting in an average cost 
of 1.15 €/km. Besides the vehicle costs, also the costs for the test driver are necessary. 
These are estimated and derived based on the assumptions in Table 17. 
Table 17 Assumptions to derive the average costs per kilometer of a test driver. 
Average speed in km/h 50 
Driving time per day in h 6 
Distance per day in km 300 
Working days per year 222 
Distance per year in km 66600 
Costs per year in € 100000 
Average cost in €/km 1.50 
 Based on these assumptions, the average cost for test driving sums up to         
         . 
                                                 
302
 ADAC: ADAC Autokosten 2016. 
303
 statista.de: Daimler AG - Statista-Dossier, p. 19. statista.de: BMW Group - Statista-Dossier, p. 19. 
statista.de: Audi AG - Statista-Dossier, p. 19. 
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C. Usage Strategy    Sensitivity 
In section 3.6.2, a    value is assigned. This value results from the following system 
analysis based on the functional diagram depicted in Figure 58. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To study the sensitivity of the usage simulation outcome, the algebraic equation to 
calculate      for the end of simulation         is derived. As can be seen, it depends 
on the size of the time steps    
 
   
       
 
  (C-1) 
and leads   simulation loops. For the first simulation loop, the equation can be written 
as 
                                    (C-2) 
with the driven velocity being  
 
              
      
       
        (C-3) 
together results 
                    
      
       
     . (C-4) 
When calculating the     step thus until the end of simulation         the cumulative 
distance gets 
Figure 58 Functional diagram of the basic usage strategy simulation 
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. (C-5) 
Applying equation (C-1) to (C-5), the sensitivity of the outcome (represented by the 
overall distance) is described by 
 
                          
      
       
       
 
 
 
 (C-6) 
In this case, the behavior of the equation is studied under the limit of   to infinity. 
Formulary tells
304
 that for     the limit is    
 
 
 
 
   . Applying this to equation 
(C-6) results in the limit 
 
                 
   
          
      
       
       
 
 
 
  
          
      
       
       
. 
(C-7) 
Thus, when minimizing    the outcome convergs to one value. To choose    for simula-
tion a worst-case estimation is executed. The relative error due to      can be calcu-
lated using equations (C-6) and (C-7) 
 
              
   
      
       
       
  
 
 
      
       
       
  (C-8) 
It is assumed that if                , the error is small enough to be neglected. Thus 
for the worst-case estimation, the factor   
      
       
 as well as the time         is con-
cretized with reasonable values and the corresponding   is found numerically. The 
conclusion is, the larger   and         the more simulation steps are needed and the 
smaller    gets (see Figure 59). The minimum value          is found for        
  ,     ,               and                       resulting in       
  
simulation steps. This will be during the start of usage (     .    will always increase 
whereas        might increase or decrease depending on the usage strategy. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
304
 Merziger, G. et al.: Formeln+ Hilfen zur Höheren Mathematik. (2007), p. F3. 
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D. Tables to Examine the Usage Strategy 
Parameter Combinations 
Characteristic Value –      
Table 18 lists the point in time      (in years) when the PoS for higher (dark) or lower (light) 
safety on events with fatalities is given depending on the assumption about the    as well as the 
defined usage strategy. (nPoS/nPolS means no proof of safety or less safety during         ) 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 1.912E+01 2.485E+01 nPoS 2.538E+01 
29.6 1.031E+01 1.604E+01 nPoS 1.657E+01 
100 3.013E+00 1.045E+01 nPoS 1.211E+01 
39 
2.67 5.342E-01 6.942E-01 3.579E+00 7.732E-01 
29.6 2.937E-01 4.574E-01 3.345E+00 6.206E-01 
100 1.001E-01 3.137E-01 3.296E+00 5.901E-01 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
ep
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 1.912E+01 2.485E+01 nPoS 2.238E+01 
29.6 1.031E+01 1.604E+01 nPoS 1.357E+01 
100 3.013E+00 1.045E+01 nPoS 9.105E+00 
39 
2.67 5.307E-01 6.762E-01 2.530E+00 7.481E-01 
29.6 2.900E-01 4.398E-01 2.484E+00 6.137E-01 
100 9.811E-02 2.989E-01 2.477E+00 5.901E-01 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 2.797E+00 3.011E+00 5.445E+00 2.995E+00 
29.6 2.361E+00 2.708E+00 5.409E+00 2.663E+00 
100 1.724E+00 2.402E+00 5.392E+00 2.447E+00 
3 
2.67 2.554E+00 2.785E+00 5.339E+00 2.764E+00 
29.6 2.069E+00 2.463E+00 5.304E+00 2.402E+00 
100 1.306E+00 2.121E+00 5.289E+00 2.163E+00 
39 
2.67 5.456E-01 7.090E-01 3.936E+00 7.712E-01 
29.6 2.972E-01 4.786E-01 3.909E+00 6.206E-01 
100 1.001E-01 3.226E-01 3.902E+00 5.901E-01 
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Table 19 lists the point in time      (in years) when the PoS for higher (dark) or lower (light) 
safety on events with injuries is given depending on the assumption about the    as well as the 
defined usage strategy. (nPoS/nPolS means no proof of safety or less safety during         ) 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 before RfU before RfU nPoS nPoS 
100 before RfU before RfU nPoS 2.852E-04 
121 
2.67 5.487E-01 4.321E+00 2.352E+01 1.122E+01 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 1.471E+01 2.412E+00 
100 before RfU before RfU 1.025E+01 2.852E-04 
1216 
2.67 1.626E-02 1.215E-01 6.599E-01 3.143E-01 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 4.207E-01 7.757E-02 
100 before RfU before RfU 3.496E-01 2.852E-04 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 before RfU before RfU nPoS nPoS 
100 before RfU before RfU nPoS 2.852E-04 
121 
2.67 5.487E-01 4.321E+00 2.343E+01 1.122E+01 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 1.462E+01 2.412E+00 
100 before RfU before RfU 1.016E+01 2.852E-04 
1216 
2.67 1.626E-02 1.215E-01 6.126E-01 3.134E-01 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 3.890E-01 7.672E-02 
100 before RfU before RfU 3.434E-01 2.852E-04 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 1.196E+00 1.880E+00 2.939E+00 2.398E+00 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 2.592E+00 1.637E+00 
100 before RfU before RfU 2.365E+00 2.852E-04 
121 
2.67 5.339E-01 1.502E+00 2.704E+00 2.108E+00 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 2.326E+00 1.192E+00 
100 before RfU before RfU 2.074E+00 2.852E-04 
1216 
2.67 1.626E-02 1.215E-01 6.574E-01 3.143E-01 
29.6 before RfU before RfU 4.275E-01 7.757E-02 
100 before RfU before RfU 3.496E-01 2.852E-04 
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Evaluation Criteria for the Time Span         
Table 20 lists       depending on the assumption about the    as well as the defined usage 
strategy. (nPoS means NN as no Proof of Safety during         ) 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 549.82% 280.23% nPoS -63.58% 
29.6 311.73% 214.43% nPoS -49.54% 
100 91.09% 140.47% nPoS -36.54% 
39 
2.67 15.07% 8.28% -1.59% -0.93% 
29.6 7.28% 4.65% -1.29% -0.13% 
100 1.11% 2.43% -1.22% 0.00% 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 549.82% 280.23% nPoS -60.04% 
29.6 311.73% 214.43% nPoS -40.96% 
100 91.09% 140.47% nPoS -27.43% 
39 
2.67 14.96% 8.01% -0.08% -0.80% 
29.6 7.14% 4.35% -0.01% -0.09% 
100 1.02% 2.15% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 84.42% 40.24% -3.68% -8.69% 
29.6 71.24% 36.16% -3.64% -7.65% 
100 52.04% 32.06% -3.63% -6.97% 
3 
2.67 77.02% 37.18% -3.57% -7.97% 
29.6 62.37% 32.84% -3.54% -6.82% 
100 39.35% 28.25% -3.52% -6.06% 
39 
2.67 15.44% 8.50% -2.02% -0.92% 
29.6 7.40% 5.00% -1.99% -0.13% 
100 1.11% 2.60% -1.99% 0.00% 
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Table 21 lists        depending on the assumption about the    as well as the defined 
usage strategy. (nPoS means NN as no Proof of Safety during         ) 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 -99.91% -99.82% nPoS -98.87% 
29.6 -99.75% -99.67% nPoS -97.81% 
100 -98.84% -99.36% nPoS -96.04% 
39 
2.67 -3.42% -1.18% -0.04% -0.95% 
29.6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
100 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 -99.91% -99.82% nPoS -98.65% 
29.6 -99.75% -99.67% nPoS -96.76% 
100 -98.84% -99.36% nPoS -93.00% 
39 
2.67 -3.46% -1.25% -0.09% -1.02% 
29.6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
100 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 -95.89% -89.96% -22.65% -73.79% 
29.6 -95.30% -88.40% -16.19% -63.10% 
100 -96.43% -87.95% -12.74% -54.27% 
3 
2.67 -95.07% -88.27% -18.92% -69.35% 
29.6 -93.89% -85.98% -12.20% -54.93% 
100 -93.80% -84.56% -8.65% -41.91% 
39 
2.67 -3.82% -1.13% -0.04% -0.96% 
29.6 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
100 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table 22 lists    depending on the assumption about the    as well as the defined usage 
strategy. (nPoS means NN as no Proof of Safety during         ) 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 10898% 8061% nPoS 1218% 
29.6 9824% 7795% nPoS 1212% 
100 6266% 7047% nPoS 1196% 
39 
2.67 304.19% 224.96% 200.06% 77.76% 
29.6 274.70% 217.51% 200.00% 96.37% 
100 174.82% 196.50% 199.85% 100.00% 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
29.6 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
100 nPolS nPolS nPoS nPoS 
3 
2.67 10898% 8061% nPoS 303.18% 
29.6 9824% 7795% nPoS 301.72% 
100 6266% 7047% nPoS 297.69% 
39 
2.67 295.18% 206.77% 98.03% 80.37% 
29.6 266.79% 199.83% 99.80% 97.49% 
100 169.87% 180.53% 100.00% 100.00% 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 467.82% 294.09% 134.15% 39.91% 
29.6 607.41% 366.89% 139.85% 52.07% 
100 830.56% 434.81% 139.75% 65.74% 
3 
2.67 512.71% 317.94% 139.89% 42.81% 
29.6 690.58% 405.60% 142.88% 57.08% 
100 1091% 495.40% 145.95% 73.86% 
39 
2.67 313.18% 239.20% 194.33% 77.96% 
29.6 282.96% 238.47% 200.17% 96.37% 
100 174.82% 208.93% 201.22% 100.00% 
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Evaluation Criteria for the Time Span        
Table 23 lists        (in €) depending on the assumption about the SP as well as the 
defined usage strategy. 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 2.18E+11 9.69E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
29.6 2.18E+11 9.69E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
100 2.18E+11 9.69E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
3 
2.67 2.18E+11 9.68E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
29.6 2.18E+11 9.68E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.17E+10 
100 2.18E+11 9.68E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.17E+10 
39 
2.67 2.16E+11 9.53E+10 -5.48E+09 -6.34E+09 
29.6 2.16E+11 9.53E+10 -5.47E+09 -6.33E+09 
100 2.16E+11 9.53E+10 -5.47E+09 -6.33E+09 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 2.18E+11 9.69E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
29.6 2.18E+11 9.69E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
100 2.18E+11 9.69E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.18E+10 
3 
2.67 2.18E+11 9.68E+10 -6.14E+09 -2.02E+10 
29.6 2.18E+11 9.68E+10 -6.13E+09 -1.63E+10 
100 2.18E+11 9.68E+10 -6.13E+09 -1.41E+10 
39 
2.67 2.16E+11 9.50E+10 -4.58E+09 -6.08E+06 
29.6 2.16E+11 9.49E+10 -4.58E+09 -3.29E+05 
100 2.16E+11 9.49E+10 -4.58E+09 - 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 2.12E+11 9.14E+10 -3.81E+09 -2.97E+08 
29.6 2.12E+11 9.14E+10 -3.81E+09 -2.44E+08 
100 2.12E+11 9.14E+10 -3.81E+09 -2.15E+08 
3 
2.67 2.12E+11 9.13E+10 -3.80E+09 -2.52E+08 
29.6 2.12E+11 9.14E+10 -3.80E+09 -2.01E+08 
100 2.12E+11 9.13E+10 -3.80E+09 -1.73E+08 
39 
2.67 2.12E+11 9.13E+10 -3.77E+09 -8.00E+06 
29.6 2.12E+11 9.13E+10 -3.77E+09 -4.94E+05 
100 2.12E+11 9.13E+10 -3.77E+09 - 
  
Appendix 
188 
 
Table 24 lists      depending on the assumption about the SP as well as the defined 
usage strategy. 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
29.6 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
100 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
3 
2.67 99.88% 99.79% 99.25% 97.95% 
29.6 99.81% 99.65% 98.41% 93.45% 
100 99.76% 99.57% 97.92% 90.34% 
39 
2.67 86.42% 73.44% - - 
29.6 86.40% 73.43% - - 
100 86.39% 73.43% - - 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
29.6 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
100 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
3 
2.67 99.88% 99.79% 98.86% 70.05% 
29.6 99.81% 99.65% 96.53% 31.00% 
100 99.76% 99.57% 95.04% 13.80% 
39 
2.67 85.09% 68.38% - - 
29.6 85.06% 68.37% - - 
100 85.05% 68.37% - - 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 52.67% 5.45% 1.00% 0.99% 
29.6 52.66% 5.46% 0.71% 0.67% 
100 52.66% 5.45% 0.55% 0.48% 
3 
2.67 52.61% 5.34% 0.80% 0.79% 
29.6 52.60% 5.35% 0.51% 0.47% 
100 52.60% 5.33% 0.36% 0.29% 
39 
2.67 51.92% 4.21% - - 
29.6 51.96% 4.29% - - 
100 52.00% 4.32% - - 
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Table 25 lists         (in €) depending on the assumption about the SP as well as the 
defined usage strategy. 
Usage Strategy 
     
       
 
M-                     in    km 0.1 0.2 1.34 10 
D
e
te
ct
o
r'
s 
Li
m
it
 
0 
2.67 - - - - 
29.6 - - - - 
100 - - - - 
3 
2.67 -1.66E+07 -1.18E+07 2.81E+06 2.62E+07 
29.6 -2.54E+07 -2.02E+07 5.78E+06 8.53E+07 
100 -3.15E+07 -2.53E+07 8.03E+06 1.27E+08 
39 
2.67 -1.78E+09 -1.58E+09 6.66E+08 1.55E+10 
29.6 -1.79E+09 -1.59E+09 6.71E+08 1.55E+10 
100 -1.80E+09 -1.60E+09 6.72E+08 1.55E+10 
M
o
b
ili
ty
 R
e
p
la
ce
m
e
n
t 0 
2.67 - - - - 
29.6 - - - - 
100 - - - - 
3 
2.67 -1.66E+07 -1.18E+07 3.60E+06 1.62E+09 
29.6 -2.54E+07 -2.02E+07 1.34E+07 5.54E+09 
100 -3.15E+07 -2.53E+07 1.77E+07 7.72E+09 
39 
2.67 -1.96E+09 -1.89E+09 1.56E+09 2.18E+10 
29.6 -1.97E+09 -1.91E+09 1.56E+09 2.18E+10 
100 -1.98E+09 -1.92E+09 1.56E+09 2.18E+10 
Sp
ec
ia
l N
ee
d
s 
Sa
fe
ty
 A
cc
o
u
n
t 
0 
2.67 -6.19E+09 -5.50E+09 2.34E+09 2.15E+10 
29.6 -6.19E+09 -5.50E+09 2.34E+09 2.15E+10 
100 -6.19E+09 -5.50E+09 2.34E+09 2.16E+10 
3 
2.67 -6.20E+09 -5.51E+09 2.34E+09 2.15E+10 
29.6 -6.20E+09 -5.51E+09 2.34E+09 2.16E+10 
100 -6.20E+09 -5.51E+09 2.34E+09 2.16E+10 
39 
2.67 -6.29E+09 -5.59E+09 2.38E+09 2.18E+10 
29.6 -6.29E+09 -5.59E+09 2.38E+09 2.18E+10 
100 -6.29E+09 -5.59E+09 2.38E+09 2.18E+10 
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